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BRITAIN IN ARMS



BRITAIN IN ARMS
(L'EFFORT BRITANNIQUE)
BY JULES DESTRÉE
WITH A PREFACE BY ❧ ❧
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TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
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PREFACE

THIS is not a war for the possession of a town, a province, or a colony ; we are battling for freedom, for the existence of our race. There is now but one great issue at stake, and that is to decide which of the two hostile groups shall survive and carry on its history through the ages. It is a terrible struggle for life or death, and to it each nation is bringing its last ounce of treasure, its last drop of blood.

Millions upon millions are being swallowed up and lost. When the final signature comes to be written at the foot of the treaty of peace, what will be left of Europe as once we knew it ? Think of the immeasurable devastation ! Of the countless graves ! What reck our soldiers ? The war has claimed our children ; let it take our children's children. We will grudge them not. We will give, and give freely, of our possessions, of our flesh and blood. All the riches of our soil, all the resources of our resolution, we will fling into the crucible. Our minds are made up : we will not die. In our complete self-surrender, the surrender of all that one is

and of all that one has, one is inevitably guilty now and then of that almost criminal disability to recognise any but one's own resolution to conquer and prone to forget the ardour of one's allies.

We ourselves are rising to the supreme height of sacrifice. Is it possible, we ask, that over there, away beyond sea and mountain, our comrades in the struggle are fighting with an effort, a spirit of determination, commensurate with our own ?

Terrible is the moment when a man asks himself questions such as these. When the oarsman begins to dread that his companion is like to fail, he is near to feeling that the full burden of the task is weighing on him alone.

It is well, therefore, that someone should be heard from time to time telling us the part wrought by each in the fulfilment of the common duty.

Monsieur Destrée, in the following pages, speaks to us of England, of the effort she is making on sea and land, and of the resolution by which she is inspired ; and the things he tells us are most splendid and reassuring.

England did not want war. It must be said once more to her credit, and, alas ! to her confusion, that she had not prepared for it. Had not Belgian neutrality been violated, who could say when she would have drawn the sword ?

But now, behold her in the midst of the conflict. Slowly, but with a stubborn determination that nothing avails to diminish or to daunt, she has transformed herself into a military power.

She has accumulated vast numbers of guns, shells, and men. She has fenced herself about with four million bayonets. Wheresoever throughout all the length and breadth of the earth the noisome German weed had taken root, the British Tommy has turned up his sleeves and set about clearing the ground.

People render thanks to the British Fleet because, without stirring from its stations and without firing a shot, it has destroyed the German menace, blockaded the enemy's ports, and ensured the provisioning of our armies. It is true ! The silence of the long vigil it has kept detracts nothing from its grandeur. But England's miracle lies not there. It is not on the sea that England's miracle has been wrought. Dreadnoughts, cruisers, torpedo flotillas—these, after all, belonged to the England of tradition. The reason why the ancient Northern Island has grown in the esteem and admiration of men is that, for the first time in her immemorial history, she has ceased to be an island, ceased to desire to be but an island.

She has made herself one with the continent of Europe by giving those splendid tall sons of hers

who are fighting heroically in the Flanders trenches, by her guns, her convoys, and, above all, by the lofty serenity with which she has accepted (on our historic soil) the destiny of suffering and passionate strife.

And the splendour of the deed resides in this—that it is not the work of an hour, but the inevitable culmination of a history of ten centuries.

Other nations there are that have shed more freely of their life blood on the storied battlefields of Europe. Others have withstood the shock of mightier assaults, and been called upon to oppose with grimmer heroism the onrush of the barbarous foe. No other nation has resolved with such method and inflexibility to see through to the bitter end the task to which it has set its hand. No other nation has been conscious of such a complete metamorphosis in its customs, in the exercise of its rights and its claims to individual freedom.

Monsieur Destrée, who is, as they used to say of Gambetta, one of the most ardent “commercial travellers” in Latin culture and the Latin entente, and who only ceases to explain Italy to the French in order to speak of England to the Italians, has said all this and much besides, in a manner that cannot be surpassed.

No one was better qualified than he to speak of

the great racial hatred which this ghastly war has at length brought into being from the ashes of long-standing illusions.

“No longer,” he recently declared, “can I call any German friend or brother. I cannot take them by the hand, for their hands are too deeply dyed with the blood of my real friends and brothers, with the blood of those toilers of our industrial districts who reposed all too generous a trust in the influence and sincerity of social democracy. With them I will make no treaty, for they have declared that treaties are but scraps of paper to be disowned whenever their interests so direct.

“To this I will never assent, now or hereafter. But to-day, so long as the toilers of Belgium are compelled by a Reign of Terror unparalleled in human experience to bow to the will of their German conquerors, and so long as our land remains under the heel of the foe, it seems to me—and will not cease so to seem—singularly impossible to parley with the invader, even though the mask he wears be the mask of Socialism. And what, forsooth, is the subject on which we are invited to parley? Upon what questions are we to seek for an agreement? Did we, before the war, ask favours of Germany, and have we, since the war began, demanded anything save our independence, our liberty, and reparation for the ills that have been wrought us? What

imaginable compromise could there be on matters such as these ?

“ Even if the questions at issue were of wider import, if it were hoped to make use of Belgium as a cunning means of subjecting us to the Pax Germanica, we could but reply to the emissaries of Germany as we made answer to her soldiers : ‘ No thoroughfare.’ ”

Brave words these, and well suited to the burning will to conquer that animates England and Russia, Italy and France, alike.

This book will strengthen the confidence of our brave soldiers and of those who, though not themselves in the firing line, support them with their labours. It will also serve to bring home to those neutral countries who still need convincing, that the Entente Powers must and will be victorious, and chiefly so because they have right on their side, and not only right but might as well.

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU

INTRODUCTORY NOTES

I WENT recently to spend a few months in Italy, where I wished to make known Belgium's real position in the European War ; and, while there, I took part in the movement which led Italy to participate in the great conflict. It was during my stay that I came to the conclusion that the stupendous character of England's effort was not sufficiently realised by our Italian friends ; and I was thus led to lay the facts before them, desirous of affording them fresh grounds for confidence and hope.

I have been asked to write a French version of " Cio che hanno fatto gli Inglesi," and I readily comply with the request, for in France, no less than in Italy, the part played by England has not invariably met with the appreciation it deserves.

But, in performing my task, I must crave the reader's indulgence for bringing before him a work of very modest pretensions, a work which, after all, is merely a *résumé* of facts within the reach of anyone who reads the newspapers carefully, a work in which I have preferred to quote authorita-

tive opinions rather than indulge in any reflections of my own, a work conscientiously but hastily put together and exhibiting all the shortcomings inseparable from a topical production. I am undertaking the task because it seems to me that in a protracted conflict such as the present, confidence is just as necessary to the civil population as are munitions to the soldiers in the field. Day after day we are called upon to be on our guard against over-anxiety, weariness of spirit and discouragement, and I know of nothing better calculated to stiffen our resolution than an investigation of the achievements standing to the credit of the English people.

That so formidable an undertaking as theirs has been unmarked by failures and miscalculations it would be foolish to deny. But it would be infinitely more foolish to confine our attention solely to the failures and miscalculations and to take no account of the solid grounds which justify our confidence of victory, and so important are those grounds and so decisive that they leave in our minds no room for misgiving.

England, no less than France, has confronted the crisis with an energy so virile as profoundly to surprise those who thought that exhaustion had come upon her and that she was unworthy of wielding the sceptre that had formerly been hers. Her Navy is

still the finest in the world, she is still ruler of the waves ; her wealth is inexhaustible, and she has placed it unstintingly at the disposal of the common cause ; her Army, which scarcely existed at the outbreak of war, is slowly and surely assuming the proportions of the armies of the Continent.

The moment we bethink ourselves of these fundamental truths, the moment we devote ourselves to a detailed examination of this inflexible determination to win, the forebodings of dark days disappear and the certainty of triumph takes their place.

All propaganda work, however modest its scope, which increases international confidence, is a preparation for the better days to come, and every one of us should consider it his duty to undertake it. For a Belgian like myself, it is doubly a duty, it is an attempt to discharge a debt of gratitude due to England and to France.

J. D.

I take this opportunity of gratefully recording the obligation I am under to my friend, Monsieur Richard Dupiereux, for the generous assistance he has rendered me.

ROME,

End of February, 1916.




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BRITAIN IN ARMS



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CHAPTER I

HOW ENGLAND, THOUGH ANXIOUS FOR PEACE
FOUND HERSELF INVOLVED IN THE WAR

"LA PERFIDE ALBION"

NO stock saying has been more vigorously exploited by the agents of Germany than that which speaks of England's perfidy. The countless variations that have been composed on this theme, accepted without thought or enquiry by the superficial, have helped to create a body of opinion unfavourable to England. There are people who deem her capable only of following a policy of selfishness and of being quite ready, if her interests required it, to achieve her aim by means of a more or less questionable character, limiting herself to staking her money on a good sporting chance, and so arranging matters as to leave the real sacrifice to others.

Now that I am about to endeavour to enlighten

the public regarding the importance of England's share in the present war, I must beg the reader to divest himself of this prejudice, and to look at the matter in the light of the real facts of the case. If it is desired to estimate England's performance in its true proportions, it is essential not to allow our vision to be obscured by ready-made ideas and by preconceptions arising from ignorance and misapprehension of the true English character.

The English have their faults, no doubt, but perfidy is not one of them. The Englishman—and a few months in England will suffice to prove it—is not given to double-dealing. It was not on him that the gift of speech was bestowed in order that he might conceal his thoughts. He speaks out sincerely, artlessly almost, what is in his mind—no more and no less. Sophistry and subtlety do not belong to him. The Southern races, who are quick to understand, who seize an idea before it is completely expressed, who are prompt to divine innuendoes and mental reservations, are completely at fault when they credit the English with that intellectual finesse familiar to themselves. The Englishman is slow of comprehension, and he does not mean more than his words convey. Anything of an underhand nature displeases him and puts him out. Sincerity, real or assumed, disarms him, because it never enters his head to suspect the existence of

trickery and subterfuge. "Honesty is the best policy." Plain, straightforward measures alone can hope to find favour with the English people.

This intellectual slowness may be a drawback, a defect ; in some circumstances it is almost exasperating. The English only realise a danger when they are directly threatened by it, when the peril is before them palpable, imminent, and undeniable. But from other points of view this trait of the English character is a fine quality, for it implies good faith and is calculated to inspire confidence. When at length he grasps the situation an Englishman knows how to act, and to act with stubbornness and tenacity. He makes no empty promises.

The opening of Negotiations

For anyone who has succeeded in recognising these fundamental characteristics of English psychology, the German tale about the war being due to the machinations of England and pursued by her for her own ends, is absurd on the face of it. One must be possessed of a really Teutonic obtuseness to absorb it.

The English diplomatic correspondence has been made public. Nothing could be clearer or more convincing than the evidence these documents afford. They show conclusively that during the latter days of July, 1914, those at the head of affairs

in England—and particularly Sir Edward Grey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs—had but one thought and one desire, and that was to ensure the peace of Europe. Not only did they endeavour to localise the scourge, but they apparently never realised that they themselves might be drawn into the fray.

On the 23rd July Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British Ambassador at Vienna as follows :

Foreign Office,
23rd July, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British
Ambassador at Vienna*

It had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say, Austria, France, Russia and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit

and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

On the 24th July he telegraphs :

Foreign Office,

24th July, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British
Ambassador at Vienna*

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

The same day he replied to Serbia's appeal somewhat curtly as follows :

No. 12

Foreign Office,

24th July, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British
Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade*

Serbia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Serbian officials, however subordinate they may be,

were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Serbian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Serbian interests.

Next day, we find the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir G. Buchanan, urgently representing to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia should not precipitate war by mobilising before England had had an opportunity of taking steps to preserve peace.

Saint Petersburg,

25th July, 1914.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey (received
25th July)*

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions.

To this Sir Edward Grey replied :

Foreign Office,

25th July, 1914.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Serbian

quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

On the 27th July he wrote to Sir E. Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, to inform him of the result of an interview he had had with the German Ambassador in London :

Foreign Office,

27th July, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British
Ambassador in Berlin*

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so

other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known ; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch.

As far on then as the 27th July Sir Edward Grey had seen in these events nothing more than a quarrel between Austria and Serbia. This in itself had no interest for him, and he only occupied himself with the matter because of the consequences that might ensue therefrom—consequences which he hoped, with Germany's aid, to avoid by mediation.

To understand the strange illusions that England was labouring under in regard to Germany, it behoves us to bear in mind the influence which was wielded by Germany's agents in England. Mr. Wickham Steed, Foreign Editor of *The Times*, one of the most deeply versed in international politics of all European journalists, explained it in a lecture he delivered in Paris :

Towards the end of May, 1911, the Emperor William had met with a cordial reception in London—as grandson of Queen Victoria—when he came over to be present at the unveiling of the statue erected to her memory. Did the Emperor mistake the nature of the welcome that was then accorded to him? Possibly he did. At all events he thought he could throw down the gauntlet to France some

months later without stirring up England. When Mr. Lloyd George's speech put him right on this point he altered his tactics. He set about ingratiating himself with England by slow and subtle means. The celebrated Ambassador, Marshal von Bieberstein, whose appointment to London had awakened the suspicions of the English, had died before he had had an opportunity of undertaking the work he had set himself to perform. The Emperor William appointed in his stead a diplomat of Polish origin, Prince Lichnowsky, who possessed all the necessary qualifications for disarming prejudice. Calm, courteous, and a very great aristocrat, he was a man whose good faith and goodwill were beyond all question. He was most ably seconded by his wife, a very distinguished Bavarian woman, with a somewhat French cast of mind. Prince Lichnowsky, then, quickly succeeded in making himself a considerable influence in London Society. Side by side with him, but out of sight, worked Herr von Kuhlmann, the skilful wire-puller, who, after organising the landing of the Emperor William at Tangier in 1905, had succeeded in gaining for himself the Imperial favour. Herr von Kuhlmann displayed the most multifarious activity. He got into touch with every journalist, great or small, whom he thought capable of advancing his ends. He skilfully beguiled the publicists, and having crowned them with chaplets, caused them to be invited to his Ambassador's board; where they found themselves side by side with the aristocracy of their country. By his genial *bonhomie* he

managed to enlist many sympathies and even to convince the politicians and the staff of the Foreign Office of his excellent intentions. He multiplied the bonds of union between the Embassy and the cosmopolitan c  teries of *la haute finance* and deftly availed himself of the influence of the German Steamship Companies.

Thoroughly to appreciate how ably he went to work, it must be remarked that German diplomacy had been clever enough to select the one means of conciliating English sympathies. Nothing exerts such a hold on the English character as sincerity. Cleverness makes little impression upon it. Brilliance may arouse admiration, but it also arouses mistrust. Straightforwardness, on the other hand, real or apparent, always finds the way to an Englishman's heart—a singular but undeniable characteristic of a nation that has borne for centuries a reputation for hypocrisy and double-dealing. The Balkan crisis then came to the assistance of German policy. At the commencement of the war between the Balkan allies and Turkey, the diplomats and Generals at Berlin and Vienna expected to see Bulgaria held in check by the main body of the Turkish forces, while other Turkish armies were disposing of Greece and Serbia. They calculated that after the defeat of Serbia, Austria would have held out a "protecting" hand to the latter and would have concluded an understanding with the Young Turks whereby she would have had free access to Salonica. It is important to note this miscalculation because at the bottom of it lies one of the chief causes of the present war. The Serbian

victory at Kumanovo in November, 1912, was a bitter disappointment for Austria. At Vienna, where I was residing at the time, there was a sort of melancholy presentiment of a destiny that was moving towards its fulfilment, to a death-bed scene as it were. A few days after the battle of Kumanovo, a friend of General Konrad von Hotzendorf's, Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, came to explain to me the ideas of the latter, and asked me if I did not approve of them. "The Chief of the Staff," said this friend of his, "is convinced that the only way to save Austria would be to deliver an immediate and heavy blow at Serbia and Russia. We could topple them over," he added, "before they had time to say 'knife,' and the monarchy would be set firmly on its legs again for another fifty years at least."

Germany also counted on the very real need which English politicians had for peace at this period. The Irish question, the great strike, the suffragette movement, the administration of the Old Age Pension Fund all called for the constant attention of parliamentarians. The idea of having to take part in a European conflict brought about by the Balkan question was highly distasteful to British statesmen and almost incomprehensible to the great mass of the people, who had foolishly been left in ignorance of foreign politics. German diplomacy employed every means in its power to foster this reluctance, to add to the popular ignorance and to embitter the domestic feuds. The British Government never suspected this underhand work, nor did it realise any the more that the

eagerness for peace manifested by Germany at the conference of Ambassadors was chiefly a ruse to gain time for the reconstruction of her Army. In England people felt grateful to Germany for her pacific policy, and of this gratitude Germany made skilful use, taking the opportunity of proposing agreements with regard to the Bagdad railway and other questions still more dangerous. England suffered herself to fall into those traps and did not discover the true state of affairs until after the present war had begun.

The efforts at mediation receive a check

Sir Edward Grey, then, had relied on the support of Germany for the success of his attempt at mediation. He received from Sir M. de Bunsen, the British Ambassador at Vienna, a dispatch (No. 32), stating that the German Ambassador approved the high-handed attitude of Austria, and had declared to him that, so far as Germany was concerned, she thoroughly understood what she was doing in lending her support to Austria. Next day, Sir M. de Bunsen added the following :

No. 41

Vienna,

27th July, 1914.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna,
to Sir Edward Grey (received 27th July)*

The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-

Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable ; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia ; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake ; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

About the same time (27th July) France was signifying her acceptance (No. 42) and Germany her refusal (No. 43) of the English proposals. As the German refusal was veiled beneath objections with regard to form and procedure, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to his country's Ambassador at Berlin to fall in with any method of procedure Germany might propose, and the following day, the 29th July (No. 77), he instructed him to inform the Chancellor as follows :

No. 77

Foreign Office,

29th July, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British
Ambassador at Berlin*

His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all

fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

On the 29th July three important telegrams passed between London and Berlin.

The first was Sir Edward Grey's supreme effort to secure a peaceful solution of the difficulty.

No. 84

Foreign Office,

29th July, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British
Ambassador at Berlin*

I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

To this Germany does not so much as reply. She had determined on war, and now threw aside the mask. She asked Great Britain the conditions of her neutrality.

No. 85

Berlin,

29th July, 1914.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin,
to Sir Edward Grey (received 29th July)*

He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since

he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Then it was that Sir Edward Grey's eyes were opened to the danger. And now see with what admirable and scrupulous loyalty he feels himself constrained to define his attitude towards both Germany and France.

No. 89

Foreign Office,

29th July, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British
Ambassador at Berlin*

I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I

should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

And he immediately sends the following dignified reply to Germany's questions regarding neutrality :

No. 101

Foreign Office,

30th July, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British
Ambassador at Berlin*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace

for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

What more could be done ?

What, I ask any conscientious reader, could have been done in the interests of peace that England failed to do ?

She did not know then that Austria's attack on Serbia had been decided on long before. Monsieur Giolitti has since disclosed to us, in a speech delivered before the Italian Chamber, that it was, in fact, projected as far back as the year 1913. England believed in Germany's pacific declarations, and never suspected her of double-dealing. It was precisely because she herself was innocent of any perfidious designs that she failed to understand immediately the monstrous scheme to which the Central Empires were committed, and by which they aimed at securing for themselves the hegemony of the world. Innocent of such ambitions herself, England did not believe they were really harboured by others.

The diplomatic influence which she wielded as a great Power she employed wholly and unservedly on the side of peace.

The agents of Germany have taxed England with having attempted to bring pressure to bear on Berlin, and with endeavouring to compass her humiliation. How mischievous is this argument! Did not England exert similar pressure at Belgrade without any undue consideration for Serbian susceptibilities? Did she not make a like attempt at Vienna with every regard for form and ceremony?

But the pro-German pamphleteers have revived the same argument again, alleging that France and Russia had been secretly egged on by England. So far as France is concerned the lecture of Mr. Wickham Steed, which we have already quoted, contains a frank avowal that the hesitating attitude of the British Government in July, 1914, gave rise to a distinctly unfavourable impression in France. That sufficiently disposes of the German allegations.

In three diplomatic documents Sir Edward Grey, with a view to obviating all misunderstanding, had explicitly stated that he did not intend to commit himself:

Enclosure 1 in No. 105

Foreign Office,

22nd November, 1912.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French

Ambassador in London

My dear Ambassador,

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have con-

sulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common.

No. 116

Foreign Office,

31st July, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British
Ambassador at Paris*

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to inter-

vene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

No. 119

Foreign Office,

31st July, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British
Ambassador at Paris*

Sir,

M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same

thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not make any engagement.

With Russia the position was identical. Russia had agreed to submit the point at issue to the Hague Tribunal. England seconded this desirable attitude. It would be impossible to adduce not only any instance of incitement to war on her part, but even any promise of moral support. In the absence of documentary evidence, the Germans have made the most of a letter intercepted by them, in which an attaché of the Belgian Embassy, Monsieur de l'Escaille, writing on the 30th July, 1914, expressed himself as follows: "The assurance that England will come to the aid of France is of decisive importance, and has brought about the triumph of the war party." The documents we have just quoted (Nos. 116 and 119) show how gravely Monsieur de l'Escaille—always supposing that he wrote what is ascribed to him—was misinformed. England had not promised aid to France. The only statement made by England to Russia regarding the possibilities of intervention was dated 27th July (No. 47), and it lays down emphatically that they (the Russians) must not rely on anything beyond diplomatic action.

Thus, when it is judged in the light of the official documents, Monsieur de l'Escaille's assertion loses all significance.

The support given to France

The promise of support to France was only given on the 2nd of August, and is therefore subsequent to Germany's declaration of war on Russia. It was conditional and limited. It merely foreshadowed a naval protection of the French coasts in case they were threatened by Germany.

Mr. Ellis Barker has given an excellent account of the reasons for this :

Was England justified in giving to France this conditional and limited promise? Englishmen believe that she was—and that for the following reasons.

In the first place, Germany has been occupied during the twentieth century in building a large and menacing fleet. To meet that menace England has of late years concentrated her fleet more and more in the North Sea. On the other hand, France has concentrated her fleet more and more in the Mediterranean. This concentration has been possible on both sides, because of the confidence and friendship which existed between England and France. But this concentration has entailed duties on both sides. If a sudden emergency arose in the Mediterranean, which required prompt and vigorous action, France would naturally undertake as her duty the task of meeting that emergency. If a sudden emergency arose in the North Sea, which required such action, England would equally undertake as

her duty the task of meeting the emergency. By August 2 the emergency had arisen, and the duty of England was plain. And if it is urged that the plan of concentration in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean ought not to have been followed, the answer is also plain. That plan was forced on the two countries by the rapid growth of the German fleet, for which neither England nor France, but Germany alone, was responsible.

But, in the second place, England had another, and a larger and deeper, duty to France. France, like England, is a democracy. France is one of the greatest democracies of the world. She is one of the great treasure-houses of European civilisation ; she is one of the great seed-beds of liberal thought and ideas. Would England have been right to watch, unconcerned and without one proffer of any sort of aid, the crushing by military force of that democracy ; the rifling of that treasure-house, the trampling down of that seed-bed ? It is impossible to answer " Yes." There are duties which one nation owes to another in the name and the cause of the common civilisation which unites all great and free nations. There has been no finer prophet of those duties than the great Italian, Mazzini. Mazzini taught that it was the sacred duty of every nation to use every atom of its influence for great European causes. Nation, he taught, is mission. " A nation," as one of his interpreters has written, " is guilty of the great refusal if it do not stand forward and take its place, to the limits of its power, in international politics." England dared not be guilty of the great refusal.

On thus reading over once more these extracts from the British Blue Book, Sir Edward Grey comes before us as an honest, straightforward, and truthful man, slow to attribute evil intentions to others, and fostering to the very last his pacifist illusions. He is the type and symbol of the people of whose destinies he had charge.

But in the case of a country like England it is of essential importance to note this, namely, that Sir Edward Grey is not the Minister of an absolute monarch, but of a free people very tenacious of its liberties. In England, a Minister for Foreign Affairs does not decide on war, however eminently necessary that war may be to the safety of the country. The nation must first understand the necessity for it. The private and personal consent, so to speak, of each and every citizen is particularly indispensable in a self-governing democracy where military service rests on a voluntary basis.

Of all the countries now engaged in war it took England longest to understand the nature of the present conflict. At least a year of fighting was necessary to bring home to the English people that it was their future and their very existence as an Empire that were at stake. But in July of 1914, few, indeed, were possessed of this insight. The party in power professed a pacifism that came near to naïveté; the Socialist groups were all

more or less imbued with pro-German sympathies. Finally, domestic politics absorbed the whole of public attention. Let me, once again, quote Mr. Wickham Steed.

Why did the British Government continue to hesitate? At present after nine months of war it is easy to criticise and blame its indecision. But if you would be just you must examine more closely the circumstances in which it was placed in July. The Liberal Party, which was in power, desired peace, was bent on peace. It had embarked upon a policy of domestic reform which had aroused a deal of enthusiasm and a deal of opposition. The Home Rule Question, Social Reform, the Welsh Disestablishment Bill, and other less important questions were keeping the public mind in a state of acute tension that was still further increased by the Suffragette outrages. The future will perhaps reveal the share, doubtless considerable, played by German agents and German gold in these disturbances. Be that as it may it is certain that the effect of these domestic quarrels had been to distract the attention of the public from foreign politics and to concentrate it on the activities of Parliament and the Cabinet. Parliament had long since ceased to take any interest in great international questions. The members of the two principal political parties spoke, voted and acted according to the orders of the chiefs of their electoral "machinery." The principal departments of State had become so many little autocracies, each acting for itself. The Govern-

ment was quite out of touch with the country save on domestic questions. The July crisis found it bewildered and without any landmark to guide it in any definite foreign policy. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was afraid that he would incur the opposition of the Radicals who formed the bulk of the ministerial forces, if his policy were to show signs of outstripping the feelings of his party. Nor could he rely on the immediate support of the Unionist Party, although its leaders held broader and healthier views on the subject of international politics. The whole aim of the Conservative Party had for a long time been to secure the overthrow of the Government and to prevent its Irish policy from culminating in Civil War. The Conservatives, moreover, were afraid of being accused of warlike designs and of appearing to deserve the reproach of being the "War Party." It was not until the 31st July that a young Conservative member, alarmed at the signs of ministerial weakness, went to seek the leaders of his Party in the country and brought them back to London. Having returned to Town they held a meeting and decided on sending the historic letter in which Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law promised the Government their full support if they resolved to carry out a policy of loyalty towards France and Russia.

The Violation of Belgian Neutrality

I think I have demonstrated that the statesmen who were directing the policy of Great Britain were,

like the people they represented, desirous of maintaining peace, and that the possibility of war breaking out between England and Germany had been admitted and prepared for by nobody.

What, then, was the event that finally precipitated the crisis? Concerning this, one, and in spite of German allegations to the contrary, only one answer is possible. It was the violation of Belgian neutrality. That question was wholly free from complications. Belgian neutrality was guaranteed by England, not by a secret agreement whose terms might have been more or less debatable, but by virtue of a solemn treaty, whose provisions were known to the world, and which had been uniformly respected throughout a whole century. No hesitation was possible regarding the attitude it was England's duty to take up, and England showed none.

On looking back over events after this distance of time, it strikes one as singular that the Germans did not realise this at the outset. Setting at nought their own solemn undertaking, they thought that the English would do likewise and content themselves with a mere formal protest. Therein they totally misconceived the temper of the English people. However much at variance they might show themselves on questions exclusively national, the English were united in deeming

that the honour of their country required them to protect the integrity of Belgium.

No sooner did the danger take definite shape than Sir Edward Grey curtly asked for information as to the position taken up by France and Germany regarding Belgian neutrality. France gave a satisfactory answer ; Germany prevaricated.

No. 122
Berlin,

31st July, 1914.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin,
to Sir Edward Grey (received 1st August)*

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer.

No. 123
Foreign Office,
1st August, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British
Ambassador at Berlin*

Sir,

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium

affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.

On the 4th August the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier. King Albert appealed to the guarantee of England, and the latter took immediate action.

No. 153

Foreign Office,

4th August, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British
Ambassador at Berlin*

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms :

“ Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.”

His Majesty’s Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the

Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

No. 155

Foreign Office,

4th August, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British
Minister at Brussels*

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France,

if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

And the same day England makes up her mind.

No. 159

Foreign Office,

4th August, 1914.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British
Ambassador at Berlin*

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by twelve o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance

of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

To complete this part of the narrative we must read the dramatic account of the final interviews held by the British Ambassador at Berlin with Herr von Jagow and the Imperial Chancellor. At this fateful moment the political psychologies of the two nations are brought into striking contrast, and the comparison is wholly to the honour of England.

No. 160

London,

8th August, 1914.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin,
to Sir Edward Grey*

Sir,

In accordance with instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to

get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by twelve o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a

treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned twelve o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about seven o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He

begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree ; just for a word—" neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of " life and death " for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future ? The Chancellor said, " But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that ? " I hinted to his Excellency

as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the Embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never dispatched.

A communication sent by Monsieur le Comte de Lalaing, the Belgian Minister in London, to his

Government at home gives a vivid account of the enthusiasm with which Sir Edward Grey's policy was endorsed by Parliament and People.

London,

7th August, 1914.

*The King of the Belgians' Minister in London to
Monsieur Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

Monsieur le Ministre,

I beg to confirm the information that Parliament has voted a hundred million pounds for the war and a force of five hundred thousand men.

The French and Russian Ambassadors have been to present their congratulations to the King's Minister on the heroic conduct of the Belgian Army, which, by hindering the advance of the Germans, compelled the latter to alter their original plans and gave the adversaries of Germany time to concentrate their forces for the general defence.

The dispatch of the Expeditionary Force is being hurried on with all speed. The first transports containing victuals and war material will leave for France on Sunday, the 9th instant. The troops will then be embarked, and one may take it that at the end of next week—that is to say, about the 15th instant—the 100,000 men comprising the Expeditionary Force will be gathered together on the French coast. The disembarkation is to take place at four different points, and the separate sections will then unite, so at least I am informed by the French Ambassador.

Yesterday in the House of Commons the Prime Minister went into an analysis of the Blue Book which I sent you on the 6th August. He referred scornfully to the insidious proposals made by Germany with a view to securing Great Britain's neutrality.

"It amounted," said Mr. Asquith, "to this, that, leaving France and Holland out of the question, we were to strike a bargain with the German Imperial Government regardless of our obligations to Belgium and without her knowledge. If we had accepted these infamous proposals what reply should we have given when she addressed to us her moving appeal to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality. I do not envy the man who can read the moving address of the King of the Belgians to his people without emotion. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. We are going to fight in the first place to fulfil our international obligations, and, secondly, to defend the smaller nations. The country will recognise that our cause is just, and

I ask the House to vote a Credit of £100,000,000 and to bring the strength of the Army up to 500,000 men."

The House voted the money and the men then and there.

Public opinion is at length aroused, and the revulsion is overwhelming. It is perceived in Europe that a little nation was setting an example of honour and probity without regard to the consequences. The "peace at any price" party were impressed. Then it became known that the enemy had crossed the frontier, that they were giving battle, and that the Belgians had offered resistance to the German Colossus. People read our King's speech, everyone recognised the gravity of the situation, and even the most pacifically minded Englishman began to probe his conscience. "Can we," he said to himself, "can we leave in the lurch a nation that sets us so high an example of loyalty?" Then came the stories of the German atrocities and the heroic defence of Liège. These clinched matters. England to a man called for war and was not content with the naval support which was what the Cabinet at first favoured. People demanded the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force. The Government was expecting this mandate from the people, and obeyed it. Two Ministers who held a contrary opinion gave in their resignations, which were immediately accepted. Lord Kitchener was appointed to the War Office, and the order was given for mobilisation.

To-day the admiration of this country for Belgium knows no limits. In the military clubs toasts

are drunk to the brave Belgians. Newspapers of all shades acclaim our country. Congratulatory letters and telegrams arrive in shoals. If the King were to come here he would be borne in triumph through the streets of London.

I have opened a subscription for the families of Belgian soldiers, and for the sick and wounded of our army, under the patronage of H.R.H. the Duchesse de Vendôme, and I will hold the proceeds at your disposal.

The British Interests

The Germans impudently deny what we have just said. "It is," they say, in a pamphlet which they have published in Italian, "absolutely incorrect that the violation of Belgian neutrality made England fall into line with the enemies of Germany." And the Imperial Chancellor, in a speech delivered in August, 1915, displayed no more respect for the truth than this anonymous pamphleteer.

Be it remarked, however, that "honour" as a motive is quite beyond the comprehension of the Teutonic mind. "Make war for a point of honour?" You would never get a German to understand that. Their first surprise was to find Belgium rejecting Germany's friendship and offers of monetary compensation, and preferring to keep her word. Next, they were amazed when England plunged into a war which she did not want in order

to honour her signature to a treaty. Thirdly, they were completely nonplussed by the intervention of Italy, who preferred war to a servile neutrality. Nevertheless these successive lessons failed to enlighten her. Devoid of any notion of honour, and setting no value on anything but self-interest and force, the Germans are incapable of imagining that individuals and nations aspire above all to remain worthy of their traditions and to preserve their self-respect.

Nevertheless it cannot be gainsaid that, after a year of war, the aspect of things has undergone some modification, and that the Germans may now claim with a certain show of justification that the English are no longer fighting for Belgium alone, but for England into the bargain. The reason is that the British have begun to recognise what they failed to perceive in July, 1914. It is now borne in upon them that the aims and ambitions of the German Imperialists were a direct menace to themselves. They had, not without some presumption, underestimated the latter's resources, and looked upon their ambitions as so much empty braggadocio. It is, however, certain that Germany was more powerful than England supposed, and the difficulties we have had to surmount bear witness to the fact that the effort of all the nations of Europe is not too much to ensure

victory. It therefore most certainly follows that if Germany had been able to attack them in detail she would have crushed them one after another. Her naval effort was a direct thrust at England, whose power she would have annihilated as soon as she had crushed France. What England is fighting for now is her maritime supremacy and her political and economic independence ; these are vital to her. This being the case, the neutrality of Belgium takes a subsidiary place, and the Germans may dispute—not without a show of truth—the part now played by it in Britain's warlike activities. The phrase in which, as long ago as 1870, Lord Granville, in the House of Lords, summed up the policy of Great Britain, still holds good : “ We take our stand on the demands of honour and the interests of the country.” There is here nothing to detract from the greatness of England's attitude. It was motives of honour that made her cast the die ; it was not until afterwards that these motives were discovered to coincide with the interests of the country.

And this, perhaps, will be one of the most unlooked-for aspects of the service which, without either knowing or intending it, Belgium will prove to have rendered to England. She will be found to have been the means of uniting the national conscience at an hour when England was at the

crisis of her fate, and when English public opinion was not sufficiently aroused to perceive, then and there, the magnitude of the issue at stake. Had it not been for Belgium and her misfortunes, England, without any unanimous appreciation of what was going on around her, would without doubt have let slip the moment when her only safety lay in action.

The Declarations of Sir Edward Grey

Lecturing on the 22nd March, 1915, at the Bechstein Hall, London, Sir Edward Grey gave a most accurate and lucid *résumé* of the negotiations. He reminded his hearers how he had intervened in the interests of peace when the affairs of the Balkans were under discussion at the Conference of London. Only his modesty prevented him from adding that the German Chancellor himself said, "Europe will feel grateful to the British Minister for Foreign Affairs for the extraordinary skill and the spirit of conciliation with which he directed the discussion of the Ambassadors in London, and thanks to which he constantly succeeded in smoothing away the difficulties that arose."

"Hundreds of millions of money have been spent, hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost, and millions have been maimed and wounded in Europe during the last few months. And all this might have been avoided by the simple method of a con-

ference or a joint discussion between the Powers concerned, which might have been held in London, at The Hague, or wherever and in whatever form Germany would have consented to have it. (Hear, hear.) It would have been far easier to have settled by conference the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which Germany made the occasion for this war, than it was to get successfully through the Balkan crisis of two years ago. Germany knew from her experience of the conference in London which settled the Balkan crisis that she could count upon our good will for peace in any conference of the Powers. We had sought no diplomatic triumph in the Balkan Conference; we did not give ourselves to any intrigue; we pursued, impartially and honourably, the end of peace, and we were ready last July to do the same again.

“ In recent years we have given Germany every assurance that no aggression upon her would receive any support from us. We withheld from her one thing—we would not give an unconditional promise to stand aside, however aggressive Germany herself might be to her neighbours. (Cheers.) Last July, before the outbreak of war, France was ready to accept a conference; Italy was ready to accept a conference; Russia was ready to accept a conference; and we know now that after the British proposal for a conference was made, the Emperor of Russia himself proposed to the German Emperor that the dispute should be referred to The Hague. Germany refused every suggestion made to her for settling the dispute in this way. On her rests now, and must rest for all time, the

appalling responsibility for having plunged Europe into this war, and for having involved herself and the greater part of the Continent in the consequences of it.

“We now know that the German Government had prepared for war as only people who plan can prepare. This is the fourth time within living memory that Prussia had made war in Europe.”

The Alleged Anglo-Belgian Agreements

The Germans have attempted to turn to their own advantage the sympathy universally expressed for the misfortunes of Belgium by endeavouring to fix the responsibility for them on England. This calumny was impudently hawked abroad by all the hirelings in the pay of Germany, and the Imperial Chancellor himself has had the effrontery to work it for all it was worth. We must therefore pause a little at this point. In this matter Belgian interests and British interests merge into one another, and both countries agree in affirming the *bona fides* of their position and in protesting with energy against these Teutonic accusations. In order not to prolong my statement unduly I must refer the reader to Monsieur Waxweiler's excellent and cogent work entitled, *La Belgique neutre et loyale*, and to an essay, *Les Conventions Anglo-Belges*, from the pen of Monsieur Brunet, a member of the Chamber of Deputies and formerly *Bâtonnier*

of Brussels. There he will find a detailed analysis of the documents on which this strange charge reposes.

Be it noted first of all that these accusations are subsequent to the declaration of war. Neither the German Press nor the German diplomats made mention of them in the charges they levelled against us. Both alike invariably admitted that Belgium had scrupulously observed her obligations to all.

On the 3rd August, 1914, we find Herr von Jagow again declaring to our Minister at Berlin, the Baron Beyens, that Germany had no fault to find with Belgium; Belgium's attitude had always been irreproachable.

How, indeed, could he have said otherwise? Had we not had frequent and cordial intercourse with Germany? Was not our Queen a Bavarian Princess? Did not German operatic singers visit us every year in order to give us a German interpretation of the works of Richard Wagner? Were not the German working classes the friendly rivals of our own? Many and many a German came to earn his bread in Belgium, and found there the heartiest—and, as we now see—all too unsuspecting of welcomes. Our bank clerks, what were they? Germans! Our domestics? Germans! Our commercial travellers? Germans! Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Schule, Deutsche Bierbrauerei! And the

humorous side of it was that they were all spies. They were paving the way for invasion, and only waiting for the psychological moment to give effect to their preparations.

After accusing Belgium of playing into the hands of France—an accusation so manifestly baseless that it was forthwith abandoned—the Germans endeavoured to show that an agreement existed with England, basing their charges on documents discovered by them at the Belgian Foreign Office after the occupation of Brussels.

The diplomatic papers had been removed by the Belgian authorities, but a copy of them had been sent up to the third floor of the building for binding purposes. The Germans thought they had made a great discovery when they laid hands on these papers. They published everything which they thought would tend to injure Belgium in the eyes of the Allies or embroil the latter one with another.

Touching our neutrality, they were only able to discover, in this complete record of our foreign relations, two documents of no importance, and these they were obliged to falsify in order to support their line of argument.

The first is a summary of a conversation which took place in 1906 between Colonel Bernardiston, the British Military Attaché at Brussels, and General Ducarne, our Chief of Staff. This conversation

had reference to the steps to be taken in common, in case of an attack by Germany. It contained this all-important sentence: "The British would not enter Belgium until after the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany."

This sentence, which, of itself, is enough to set the document in its true light and shows the whole conversation to have been perfectly in order, was omitted in the translation given by the *Deutsche Allgemeine-Zeitung* of the 12th October, 1914. Furthermore the paper in question translates "conversation" by *abkommen*, which signifies "agreement."

The vociferous indignation expressed by the Germans in the face of documents such as this is obviously but another phase of the comedy. King Albert, in an interview granted to a member of the editorial staff of the *New York World* in February, 1915, had, in fact, revealed that, owing to his desire to maintain the most scrupulous neutrality, he was anxious that the German Ambassador should be kept informed of the tenour of the Anglo-Belgian conversations.

Another document that has been put forward in evidence is a report of Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin in 1911. It related to a plan of defence of a portion of the Belgian territory. This plan was drawn up by a Belgian officer, in strict

accordance with his right and duty, and dealt with the measures to be taken in case our neutrality was violated by Germany. It was communicated to our Minister at Berlin, who replied that the plan dealt with a hypothetical situation, and that as such it merited consideration.

Finally, a great stir was made about a further conversation that took place in 1912 between the British Military Attaché, Lieut.-Colonel Bridges, and General Jungbluth, our Chief of Staff. It was of still slighter significance than the conversation of 1906, and, like it, postulated an antecedent violation by Germany of Belgian territory. This time also, in order to invest it with importance, German newspapers were obliged, in defiance of the truth, to represent the British Military Attaché as a "plenipotentiary" (*Bevollmächtigte*).

A letter from Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian Government, dated the 7th April, 1913, and not published by Sir Edward until the 7th December, 1914, expressly said, "Until Belgian neutrality is violated by another Power we shall certainly send no troops to Belgium."

Must we, finally, recall that, as stated in Sir Edward Grey's dispatch of the 30th July, 1914 (No. 105), conversations between Military Attachés are not agreements between Governments. That is mere ordinary common sense. Moreover, Sir

Edward Grey declared in August, 1915, that there existed neither at the Foreign Office nor at the War Office any trace of such documents? No straightforward man who had studied the papers in question could come to the conclusion that Germany deduced from them; no one could fail to recognise that the loyalty of England as well as the loyalty of Belgium was beyond reproach.

Anglo-German Relations before the War
(1898-1914)

The pacific influence of British diplomacy, its firm resolve to maintain the peace of Europe and of the world, the straightforward means employed by it to attain this end, would be brought out into still greater prominence if we could examine the tendency of international politics during recent years. But this would carry us far afield. We are obliged to limit our survey to the period immediately prior to the European War. We must therefore refer any reader who is desirous of enlightenment on this point to a pamphlet by Sir Edward Cook, entitled, *How Britain strove for Peace: Anglo-German Negotiations, 1898-1914*.

CHAPTER II

GERMAN GRIEVANCES AGAINST ENGLAND

GERMAN newspapers are full of diatribes against England, and the Chancellor made his detestation of England the *leitmotiv* of the speech which he delivered on the 19th August, 1915, before the Reichstag. It is a good symptom, for it shows us that the English Blockade is having an ever-increasing effect on Germany, and that Kitchener's Armies are somewhat marring the fond dream of Imperialist triumphs.

But Germany's resentment does not date merely from to-day. The theme has been set forth and developed in German books and periodicals for fifteen years or more. It is a resentment inspired by events that are already ancient history, though they only date back to half a century ago. It would not be amiss to glance at them again, the better to understand the present situation. There are two books from which we may derive assistance; the one is entitled, *The Anglo-German Problem*, and is by Mr. Charles Saroléa, a Professor at the University of Edinburgh and Belgian Consul

in that city. The other is a collection of lectures by the late Mr. T. A. Cramb, Professor of History at Queen's College, London. Other works might of course, be read with profit, but these are interesting on two counts : first, because they were written before the war and are consequently free from the acrimony and bias inherent in the polemical writings of to-day ; secondly, because their authorship is a guarantee of good faith and impartiality. Monsieur Saroléa is a Belgian. His view of the conflict is therefore that of an onlooker, and he is neither judge nor party in the case. Mr. Cramb is a scholar pure and simple, a well-known pacifist and a most sincere admirer of Germany. He is thus placed far above the rough and tumble of the fray. Let us then, give another glance at this piece of ancient history in the light of the information contained in these two books.

Statement of German Grievances

The German grievances are summed up in a simile which frequently recurs in the works of von Bernhardi. "They have deprived us," he says, "of our place in the sun" ; by which is meant that Great Britain stands in the way of Germany's lawful desire for commercial and industrial expansion ; that she is opposed to Germany's colonial development ; and that she has deliberately aimed at foster-

ing an atmosphere of suspicion against Germany which has at length isolated her from the other European nations, and compromised her position in the West. These are allegations which it behoves us to examine in detail.

Has Great Britain thwarted Germany's Economic Expansion ?

When war broke out in August, 1914, the British Government arranged for an Exhibition to be held in London of articles of German manufacture. The object was to encourage British firms to fill the place of German imports by home products. The Exhibition was an extensive one and bore witness to the number and variety of the goods consumed in England and manufactured on the Continent or in the British Isles by German firms. There exists no better evidence than this fact, of the market which Germany has found for her goods beyond the seas.

Again, while Belgium and France were able without excessive difficulty to expel or intern the German subjects within their borders, such a step was impracticable in England. I expressed my astonishment thereat to an official personage. "There were too many of them," he replied. Does not that admission show more convincingly than any statistics the welcome that had been extended to German industry in England ?

Nor was the hospitality offered to German commercial enterprise any less warm in the colonies than in the Mother Country : witness Mr. Poultney Bigelow's emphatic statement in a letter published in the *New York Times* of the 8th June, 1915.

" Nowhere in the British Colonial world," he writes, " have I ever beheld the smallest trace of commercial monopoly, and certainly no trace of any special favour being granted to Englishmen to the detriment of Germans."

Even in India, and under the very nose of the Calcutta Council, the German bagman has driven the Englishman out of the market.

Moreover, the trading and manufacturing classes in the British Isles bear united testimony to the tenacity, endurance, enthusiasm, and adaptability of the Germans, even though they have had frequently to complain of their propensity for peaceful penetration and of the espionage carried on by them beneath a mask of goodwill and *bonhomie*.

That Germans have found a better market for their goods in England than elsewhere is due to the fact that, whereas other countries adopted protective tariffs of varying degrees of severity, England has always adhered to the old *laissez-faire* policy.

" Imagine England a sudden convert to the doctrines urged some time ago by Messrs. Chamberlain and Balfour ; suppose her throwing over Free

Trade, and you have to admit, as a corollary, that a formidable reduction would ensue in the volume of German trade and industry." It was no Englishman who advanced this hypothesis and deduced the results ; it was a worthy German economist—Professor Schulze Gaevernitz.

It is not the fact, therefore, that England has stood in the way of the peaceful development of German industry and trade. True, the British Government has at various times drawn the attention of British manufacturers to the progress of their German rivals. But this merely had the effect of stimulating their efforts, and such admonitions implied no enmity towards Germany.

Has Great Britain hindered Germany's Colonial Development ?

At the present day every country possesses a Colonial Empire which, in many cases, bears no relation to its actual position in the world. Germany's colonies are tracts of land, precarious in tenure and often unproductive. It is England again that has been her stumbling-block in this direction.

Such is the gist of what one reads in the publications of the German Colonial League and in the books, articles, and pamphlets of every German political publicist.

For England to have incurred the guilt of the crime thus laid at her door—the crime, that is, of having ousted Germany from her place in the extra European sun—it would have at least been necessary that when she was settling down in the coveted territories Germany should have disputed her right to do so. A tradesman cannot be called guilty of unfair rivalry towards another tradesman who has not yet opened shop. Such, however, is Germany's line of argument. At the time when the great English navigators, such as Drake and Raleigh, were conquering a vast empire for their Queen, at the cost of immense toil and hardship, Germany was not even in being. She cannot therefore accuse England of having deprived her of a right which she did not exist to claim.

Doubtless when the great apportionment of colonial territory which marked the last quarter of the nineteenth century was taking place, Germany was a living political entity. Victorious over Denmark, Austria, and France, we see her dictating her will in the treaties drawn up in the Council of Nations, and frequently those treaties were concerned with colonial questions. She had then both the power and the right to claim her share in the continents which were then being so freely apportioned. But she did not. She even encouraged other nations in a colonial policy with which she herself

showed no concern. She left Indo-China and Madagascar to France. She smiled approval on the birth of the Congo Free State.

What was the reason of this apathy in colonial matters? Monsieur Saroléa furnishes us with several, all equally cogent.

Bismarck did not possess the coloniser's imagination. His was a genius whose ambit was restricted to Europe. His dreams were confined to those lands which might be trampled on without crossing the seas. It is true, indeed, that the German Colonial Empire was largely acquired while the Iron Chancellor was at the head of affairs. Nevertheless during the whole of this period there never was any genuine manifestation of the colonising spirit in Germany. It was not until later on that the Empire asserted its claims to territory outside the Continent of Europe which should correspond to the importance of its own position within it.

Bismarck told himself that the unification of the Empire and the assuring of its supremacy in Europe were work enough for one mind without the troublesome addition of remote and doubtful undertakings. This attitude the Germans of to-day look upon as a fault. Was it so in fact? Was it not rather imposed of necessity on the aged Chancellor by the internal difficulties with which he was confronted in his bitter struggle with the Ultramontanists on

the one side and the Socialists on the other? Be that as it may, Bismarck, despite the colonial acquisitions which accrued during his *régime*, dissociated Germany from a colonial policy in the strict sense of the term. That is the great point to bear in mind.

In adopting this attitude, moreover, Bismarck did but give effect to the sentiments and tendencies of his people. The German has sometimes been represented as a good coloniser. That is only half true. When he betakes himself to lands where the spade work has been done for him, he proves himself an admirable coloniser; but he is not adapted to the high emprise of discovery, or to the dangers and difficulties of pioneering in virgin soil. The Germans did well in Brazil, but ill in Africa; and in the explorers' roll of honour there figure plenty of English and French names, but very few German.

Mr. Poultney Bigelow, whom I have already had occasion to quote, makes a similar statement.

Prussian colonial rule simply meant issuing commands. The natives were reduced to slavery unless they took refuge in the jungle. The German settlers were conspicuous by their absence.

Finally, to float a vast concern—and a colony is always this—one must have money to risk. Money was precisely what the Germans lacked, for in spite of the two hundred millions they took from France

in 1870, their finances a few years later were in a critical position.

It was after the Boer War, and even then a little prematurely, that the adventurous Hohenzollerns, with their hereditary impetuosity, intoxicated the mind of Germany with vaster ambitions. The hour was at hand, the hour of the Weltpolitik, the hour of the Imperial visits to Jerusalem and Tangier. But the hour may sound too late in the history of a nation, just as it may sound too late in the life of a man. And too late it was in very truth. The places were taken, other factors had intervened in the welter of political forces. All the German enterprises woefully miscarried.

In Africa, Germany extricated herself with difficulty from the Herero revolt, became involved in the scandals arising from the ill-treatment of the natives, and was entangled in scores of administrative difficulties, of which the debates they brought about in the Reichstag enable us to estimate the gravity.

In China hopes ran higher. Kiao-chau and Shantung had awakened in her ambitions of supreme domination in the Far East. She deemed that the Boxer Rebellion would enable her to realise them. She therefore resolved to play the principal rôle in bringing the insurgents to heel. But another Power had swiftly leaped into being across the water, who

threw into the scales a sword as weighty as it was unexpected. Japan did more than inflict a defeat on Russia at Port Arthur and Tsushima : she check-mated all the German ambitions into the bargain.

Finally, there remained the South American schemes. That Germany had thoughts of an Empire in the New World, there is not the shadow of a doubt. The demonstration before Valparaiso is a proof, and the proclamations at the time of the Morocco troubles, concerning the vital necessity for Germany to have ports on the Atlantic, are others. But in America, too, Germany came too late. The Monroe doctrine and the power of the United States were obstacles in the way of fresh enterprises in the ancient lands of Pizarro.

German colonial ambitions, which had swept forth like a flock of gerfalcons from their nest, returned again bearing no prey in their beaks. And so they take vengeance for their impotence—vengeance for coming too late into a world grown too old, and quarrel with those who have met with better success because they had come in time. Like ravening vultures, Germany's ambitions scream with shrill fury at England.

The Policy of Isolation

There remains the grievance that Great Britain with malign intent has isolated Germany and

robbed her of her allies and friends ; the grievance to which Bethmann-Holweg gave renewed expression in his speech of the 19th August, 1915.

To be sure Germany's position to-day is very far from being what it was a few years ago after the treaty of Frankfort. She no longer commands as a dictator, she merely intervenes as a partner. Whence comes this remarkable change ? To explain it we have to look some way back in the history of our times. Let us recall what happened in the diplomatic world after the Russo-Turkish War. Russia, the victor, had at San Stefano hewn for herself a lion's share of the spoils of the Sick Man of Europe, and had assumed for the Slavonic race a preponderating position in Eastern Europe. At this England took umbrage. Her preparations for war brought about a revision of the Treaty of San Stefano. But now, which Power was it that dictated its wishes at the Berlin Conference ? Was it England, at whose instance it had been summoned ? No. Beaconsfield held his peace that Bismarck might speak, and the victory of the Slavs became a victory for the Germans.

This piece of diplomatic pilfering, which is only to be explained by the extraordinary ascendancy Germany wielded over Europe, was also the origin of her future weakness. Russia, humiliated and full of resentment, cast about her, seeking the sup-

port of an ally. She met with another Power, also humiliated and lonely. That Power was France, and to her she stretched forth her hand. It was Bismarck who, in 1878, paved the way for the demonstrations of Toulon and Cronstadt and the Franco-Russian alliance. This he perhaps foresaw, but he told himself that by offending Russia he would please England, who viewed with misgiving the Slavonic expansion towards Persia and Hindustan. He was not mistaken. The Berlin Congress was followed by an Anglo-German friendship extending over a number of years. But when the youthful William II succeeded to the throne, German policy launched out into the Colonial adventures to which we have alluded above, and soon took umbrage at the dominant position held by England on the highways of the world.

It is at this juncture that begins the campaign of systematic disparagement and organised calumny with which we shall deal further later on.

England thus received clear warning that weapons were being sharpened on the opposite shores of the North Sea which would be used against her sooner or later, and sooner in proportion as she was more defenceless and more isolated. To continue the policy of splendid isolation which she had followed for so long was but to seek her own undoing. This the wise and clear-sighted Edward VII quickly

realised, and by joining in the Franco-Russian coalition—even to the limited extent in which that union was effected—he merely took a step which the safety of England and the peace of Europe imposed upon him.

It must be granted that this is not an interpretation of British policy that finds ready acceptance beyond the Rhine. There it is thought that the Entente Cordiale was a plan dictated by jealousy of Germany to enable the Allies to checkmate her in every field. You will even find it in print that the covert aim of this coalition was to destroy by force of arms the growing Empire of the Hohenzollerns.

It is scarcely necessary to call attention to these malicious misrepresentations of the facts. Since the beginning of the century England has shown herself unswervingly in favour of peace, and whenever she has intervened it has always been to avoid a conflict which the very pretensions of Germany appeared to render inevitable. This was conspicuously the case in 1905, when the Emperor by his speeches at Tangier, and the Chancellor by proposing an international conference for the settlement of the Morocco dispute, thought they had compelled France to fight or accept defeat.

For the rest England has always declared that the Entente policy would in no wise militate against

her preserving the friendliest relations, relations that might even be sealed by definite understandings, with Germany. And we can see clearly that if only Europe could be made secure from aggression inspired by Teutonic arrogance, England was eager to remain on terms of the closest affection with Germany.

True, England's friendship—for the time being at any rate—was worth more to Germany than was Germany's to England. But whereas what Sir Edward Grey had in mind was a friendship with due regard to understandings previously entered into with other countries and assisting, together with these latter, in maintaining the peace of Europe, the aim of the successive German Chancellors was a compact that should exclude all other engagements and be but the preliminary step to the realisation of their dreams of hegemony. In 1909, in the course of a conversation which took place between Herr von Bethmann-Holweg, the new Chancellor, and the British Ambassador at Berlin; and again in 1912 on the occasion of Lord Haldane's mission, Germany was for shelving the proposal for a limitation of armaments in favour of certain considerations of general policy, the object of which was neither more nor less than to extract from England a promise of benevolent neutrality in case hostilities broke out in which Germany was not the aggressor

or in which it could not be definitely shown who was the aggressor. That this was a trap is clear enough. Had England fallen into it she would have been obliged to look on while France and Russia were being crushed, obligingly waiting till her own turn should come. One can see which of the two—Germany or England—was the real practitioner of the policy of isolation. One can also see the object in view. If Germany was isolated it was due solely to the mistrust she had inspired around her. If she feels that the condemnation of Europe lies heavily upon her, she has but herself and her own inordinate ambitions to blame. But this Germany will not allow, and, regardless of truth though not of her own self-interest, she impudently lays the charge at the door of England.

The world must not be misled. If England, at a certain period in her recent history, did hearken, as all nations at one time or another have hearkened, to such imperialistic dithyrambs as those of Mr. Rudyard Kipling ; if for a brief while she lent an ear to the policy advocated by Mr. Chamberlain, she has long since abandoned an attitude that accorded so ill with her temperament and her traditions. The Transvaal War, and the revival of humanitarianism that resulted from it in Europe, afforded her a sound lesson in liberalism. There is nothing left of the spirit of aggression in England

to-day. The treatment she metes out to her possessions beyond the seas is transforming her Empire into what has been rightly termed a world-wide federation of free states. England is the type of peace-loving powers. She proved it by remaining neutral to the last minute, and in defiance of all the dictates of prudence, in the great conflict of the nations. England is the mighty champion of the smaller States and of the principle of nationality. It was because of this principle that on the 4th of August, 1914, she drew the sword that a regard for her own safety should have prompted her to draw a day sooner.

Liberal, peace-loving, the protectress of the weak, true to her word, these are, indeed, qualities that have gained for her the esteem of the world—and the hatred of Germany.

The foregoing chapter, then, has shown that England was compelled to take up arms; first, because her honour required it; secondly, in defence of her own interests, which were directly threatened by Germany. Did she employ all the resources with which she is endowed in the service of the cause she undertook to defend? That question we will now proceed to examine.

CHAPTER III

THE WORK OF THE FLEET

Some hypotheses

IN this war, apparently, the value attached by the public to the achievements of the different fighting forces operating throughout the world is determined by the spectacular effect rather than by the real usefulness and permanent effectiveness of their achievements. Thus, while bestowing unstinted praise on certain heroic incidents in an attack, the public too readily forgets the daily sacrifice and uncomplaining self-denial of the men standing knee-deep in the mud of the trenches engaged in the essential task of defending the line.

So with regard to the Fleet. I hear it said around me, by people who obstinately refuse to look at the course of events as a whole and only concern themselves with such immediate and obvious information as may be got from the official military communiqués, that the English are doing nothing in this war, because they still occupy only a comparatively inconsiderable section of the Western front. They deliberately overlook the magnitude of

the part played by the British Grand Fleet. Even among those who do take some account of it I hear it asked: "But what is the British Fleet really doing?" Such people seem to imagine that a fleet is only effectively performing its part when it can boast of having sunk a certain number of enemy ships and won on the high seas battles whose results may be stated in definite, concrete terms. Both alike fail to realise either the problems or the triumphs of the passing hour. They do not understand that each day that passes without the official communiqués making mention of naval operations constitutes, in fact, a silent record of victory for the British Fleet, and testifies to the signal services rendered by it to the cause of the Allies.

The more thoroughly to appreciate the value of these successes and these services, we have merely to ask ourselves what would have happened if the Allies had not been able to count on the protection of the British Fleet? This question has been put by all who have made it their business to clear away these misconceptions. Imagine the German Fleet dashing out to sea the instant war was declared, and reaching the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, having met with no rampart of British battleships in the North Sea to bar their passage. France would have been at the mercy of the foe. Her ports might have been instantly blockaded, and

however great the confidence that might have been reposed in the forces then under the command of Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, it would seem somewhat doubtful whether they would have been able to prevent a landing which, if it did not hopelessly disconcert, would have seriously impeded the mobilisation of her armies.

Whether it would have been possible to transport the invaluable African troops to the Mother Country is a matter of doubt. French trade and the power to import goods from overseas would have turned on the issue of a naval encounter of which none could predict the result. Nor would France have been the only one to sustain this blow in the heart. Italy also would have been compelled to forgo her rightful patriotic aspirations if her immense seaboard had been open to attack by the German Battle Fleet.

I freely admit that this is not a plausible hypothesis, for England owed it to herself to take sides with France and Russia. But let us just imagine for a moment what would have been the result if England, yielding to the current of pacifism and to the wave of economy which had latterly swept over the British public, had ceased to maintain the superiority of her Fleet and had abandoned the naval rivalry in which the Germans so stubbornly persevered.

The value of the English collaboration, viewed not only in its immediate results but in its subsequent potentialities, would have been conspicuously modified. How could the Expeditionary Force have been conveyed across to France if the Pas-de-Calais had been at the mercy of German raiders? How could troops have been conveyed across the ocean to Europe from far-off Colonies, or European troops have been sent to guard the threatened outposts of the Empire, if the oceans had been insecure? How could troops have been raised, armed, and trained in the British Isles if Britain itself had lain under the threat of imminent invasion? How would it have been possible to feed the civil population of the United Kingdom, France, and the other Western Allies, when English, French, and neutral vessels were being freely held up by hostile cruisers? Had it not been for the formidable superiority of the British Fleet, peace would have been promptly concluded.

The German Emperor, on the eve of his Waterloo, must be saying sorrowfully as Napoleon said a century before him, "Ah! if only I had had command of the sea!" For the certainty that he will be driven to utter this sorrowful ejaculation we have to thank England and her Navy, which have given us the most indisputable guarantee of victory.

The Service rendered to France

We should prefer to let a Frenchman speak of the service rendered to France by the British Fleet, and on this point Monsieur Paul de Rousiers, Secretary of the *Comité des Armateurs de France*, is particularly well qualified to give an opinion.

After reminding his readers that more than half of France's overseas trade has been brought to a sudden standstill by the war, he discusses in an article entitled, "The English Alliance and the Freedom of the Seas," the consequences of this freedom, and arrives at the following conclusions :

"In brief, the freedom of the seas enables us to provide our army with food, clothes, and boots ; to furnish it with munitions ; to maintain the supply of horses for our cavalry ; to guarantee our motor transport and air service ; to provide, for all industries connected with national defence and for the railways which are an essential element therein, those supplies of coal without which everything would be brought to a standstill. Even now the list is very incomplete. We are the less appreciative of the advantages resulting from the freedom of the seas because we have never been deprived of them. But little reflection is needed to show us the disasters that would follow if it were lost or even curtailed."

And, now, can it be supposed that the command of the seas would have been assured to us if England

had not come to our aid ? We sometimes complain that the German Battle Fleet keeps out of harm's way and voluntarily shuts itself up in the Baltic. It would unquestionably have come out if we had only our own Fleet to set against it, and we might possibly have had to submit to a sort of blockade similar in character to that which the combined Fleets are imposing on the Central Empires. In short, the position might have been reversed to our disadvantage. In any case we should have been compelled to undertake unaided the pursuit, destruction, or immobilisation of the several German cruisers and armed auxiliaries by which the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Mediterranean were infested. The task which, even under present conditions, has proved long and arduous enough, would have presented difficulties of a widely different order if France had been acting alone. Our trading vessels would have been exposed for a longer period to attacks by raiders such as the *Dresden*, the *Emden*, the *Koenigsberg*, the *Prince Eitel-Friedrich*, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, to say nothing of the much-talked-of *Goeben* and *Breslau* ; and a victory such as that of the Falkland Islands would have cost us a very big effort indeed.

Nor is this all, for the blockade of Germany would not have been so much as attempted by us if we had had to rely solely on our own resources.

The Figures

There are, moreover, in these matters certain figures which demand our attention. They are the figures which indicate the respective values of the Franco-Russian and Austro-German Fleets and of the Franco-Russian-English and the Austro-German Fleets. Furthermore, in our interpretation of these figures we must not lose sight of the fact that Russia and France have a much longer coast-line to protect than the Central Empires, and that a large part of the Russian Fleet was stationed in the Black Sea, thus giving the German Alliance an immense initial advantage from the attacker's point of view. In 1914 France had twenty-six large battleships and ten under construction; Russia had ten and seven under construction. The two Allies thus possessed thirty-six effective units and seventeen in process of building.

Germany, in 1914, had forty-six ships of equal value, and six on the stocks; Austria-Hungary had fifteen and two under construction. The Central Empires had thus between them sixty-one fighting units and eight building. Their superiority was therefore unquestionable. On the other hand, Germany and Austria could never dream of coping with their adversaries if England were in the scale against them, for the number of fighting units

opposed to them would then be ninety-seven, with thirty-six in course of construction.

As for the other naval units the proportion would be about the same.

<i>Battle Cruisers.</i>	Built.	Building.
Without England : France	0	0
Russia	0	4
	—	—
	0	4
With England : England	9	1
	—	—
	9	5
Germany	4	3
Austria-Hungary	0	0
	—	—
	4	3

<i>Cruisers.</i>	Built.	Building.
Without England : France	26	
Russia	12	
	—	
	38	
With England : England	47	
	—	
	85	
Germany	9	
Austria-Hungary	2	
	—	
	11	

<i>Light Cruisers.</i>	Built.	Building.
Without England : France	8	0
Russia	0	8
	—	—
	8	8
With England : England	65	20
	—	—
	73	28
Germany	41	6
Austria-Hungary	11	3
	—	—
	52	9

<i>Destroyers.</i>	Built.	Building.
Without England : France	88	7
Russia	84	45
	—	—
	172	52
With England : England	220	36
	—	—
	392	88
Germany	130	12
Austria-Hungary	17	3
	—	—
	147	15

<i>Torpedo Boats.</i>	Built.	Building.
Without England : France	143	
Russia	23	
	<hr/>	
	166	
With England : England	106	
	<hr/>	
	272	
Germany	80	0
Austria-Hungary	70	27
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	150	27
<i>Submarines (figures doubtful).</i>	Built.	Building.
Without England : France	54	26
Russia	22	18
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	76	44
With England : England	74	27
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	150	71
Germany	30	14
Austria-Hungary	6	5
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	36	19

These figures are convincing. Without the British Fleet the necessary command of the sea would have been subject to all the uncertainties and hazards of a naval battle ; with it that command

became a reality not only indisputable but undisputed. That is a fact of which we should never lose sight.

It should be noted that, as Gastone Chiesi pointed out in the *Secolo* of the 11th March, the war came upon the Fleet when the building programmes of the last few years were nearing final completion.

“Instead of dissipating its strength and exhausting its resources in prolonged and difficult operations; instead of using itself up in encounters with submarines or lesser German craft, the British Fleet is continually tending, in spite of the war, to renew its strength, to keep itself up to date, to make itself thoroughly complete in all departments. A large number of battle cruisers, of swift and powerfully-armed cruisers, and of smaller craft of every kind, were on the stocks, ready for launching, or else very near completion.

“During the last seven months the naval dockyards—both Admiralty and private—have concentrated all their efforts on accelerating the building of the vessels then under construction; while the arsenals, by working day and night, have succeeded in turning out the requisite equipment for the different types of vessel as and when they were launched. We have thus instances of one or two super-Dreadnoughts being completed and commissioned in less than fourteen months from the time they were laid down. We have seen the *Tiger*, which many people supposed still in process of arming, participating in the battle of the Dogger Bank, and, what is equally

remarkable, the super-Dreadnought *Queen Elizabeth* taking a share in the bombardment of the Dardanelles, where it appears that her new 15-inch guns wrought marvellous execution.

“If Admiral Jellicoe is in a position to detach from his main fleet a vessel which has hitherto been regarded as the most up to date of all the ships under his command to undertake a secondary operation such as the reduction of the Dardanelles Forts, it means that he has at his disposal other vessels still more modern and more formidably armed than the one sent by him to drive the Turks out of Constantinople.

“It is not possible to give exact details regarding this matter,¹ but, from personal knowledge, I can state with certainty that the energy with which work has been carried on in the dockyards and arsenals in these latter days has been simply staggering. Vessels are launched, armed, equipped, and put into commission with a rapidity that is little short of miraculous.

“It seems almost impossible that results such as those of which British naval construction works can boast could have been achieved by an organisation and discipline merely human. One after another these great cruisers leave the naval ports in the South of England and disappear into the mists of

¹ Since the above was written certain particulars have been furnished us. In the course of January, 1916, Mr. Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking in the House of Commons, said: “The new Fleet built by us since the war broke out is equal to the whole German Fleet.” It also includes vessels more powerful than any hitherto known.

the North Sea. We shall hear no more of them save by chance or when the war is over."

What is a Fleet expected to Perform?

Mr. A. J. Balfour answered this question in a letter to the *New York Herald* about the middle of 1915.

"If we desire to know," says he, "whether the British Fleet has during the last year proved itself worthy of its traditions, there is a very simple method of arriving at the truth. There are seven, and only seven, functions which a Fleet can perform.

- (1) It may drive the enemy's commerce off the sea.
- (2) It may protect its own commerce.
- (3) It may render the enemy's fleet impotent.
- (4) It may make the transport of enemy troops across the sea impossible, whether for attack or defence.
- (5) It may transport its own troops where it will.
- (6) It may secure their supplies and (in fitting circumstances)
- (7) It may assist their operations."

Let us consider if all these tasks found the British Fleet equal to what was expected of it.

The Mobilisation of the British Fleet

First and foremost it was necessary that it should be mobilised in time. It is, indeed, a matter of

common knowledge that it was Germany's idea to compensate for her numerical inferiority in ships by a blow struck suddenly at England before the latter had had time to mobilise. The plan failed, for, by a piece of good fortune, England had already assembled her forces before even the war broke out. It is important to recall these events, for their effect on the course of the European War was decisive. The naval correspondent of the *Westminster Gazette* has given us an excellent account of the matter in his article of the 20th August, 1915. He points out that early in the spring of 1914—doubtless in February—it was decided to effect a trial mobilisation of the Fleet, and on the 18th July a large number of Dreadnoughts, cruisers, destroyers, and air service units were assembled at Portsmouth. At this time, be it noted, the Austro-Serbian quarrel had already broken out. The mobilisation had, as a matter of fact, begun on the 15th, the various reserves having joined the vessels of the Third Fleet to undergo the annual training, while the crews of the Second Fleet had been brought up to full strength.

“The ten days' manœuvres really began on the 15th, when the various reserves had joined the ships of the Third Fleet for their annual training, and the ships of the Second Fleet had been brought to their full equipment of officers and men by the

depletion of the schools, the shore establishments, and the various barracks. The ten days' training of the reservists in the Third Fleet was completed by July 24th, and these reservists were dismissed to their homes—thus demobilising the Third Fleet. The tactical exercises which had followed the Review of the 18th were over, and all the ships of the Second Fleet returned to their home ports, and the First to Portland, on Saturday, the 25th. In the normal course the Second Fleet would have disembarked its additional officers and men to the schools, training establishments, and barracks forthwith. Had the Second Fleet *completed* this disembarkation by Monday, July 27th, it would have been as completely demobilised as was the Third. But apparently only a part of the crews was dismissed on Saturday, and those that left were only drafted back into the respective barracks. Again, had the routine been followed, many of the officers and men of the First Fleet would have been off holiday-making by Monday midday.

“ It was on Saturday, 25th, that the Serbian Prime Minister handed his reply to Baron Giesl at Belgrade. After a quarter of an hour's comparison of this reply with the Austrian Note, the Baron informed the Premier that it did not comply with Austria's requirements, and diplomatic negotiations were broken off. This news reached England on Sunday. Mr. Churchill was at Overstrand and Prince Louis was on the spot. He thereupon issued the order that has become historic. The First Fleet was told not to disperse for manœuvre leave, and the vessels of the Second Fleet kept at their home

ports in proximity to their balance crews. The Second Fleet, though partially demobilised by the loss of some of their crews, could thus be brought to full strength within an hour or two. On Monday Mr. Churchill returned to the Admiralty, and on Tuesday Austria declared war on Serbia. It must have been obvious that a European war was possible, and on Wednesday the First Fleet, under Sir George Callaghan, left Portland and was never seen or heard of again. It had undoubtedly gone to its war stations. On the following Sunday, August 2nd, Germany having declared war on Russia and France, a second Sunday order was issued, all the reserves were called out, and by Monday it was announced that the entire British Fleet was ready. Note first, then, that the order of July 26th was the first of a series of very important steps.

“ According to the Navy List of August last, the First Fleet consisted of twenty Dreadnoughts, the *Agamemnon* eight, *King Edward VII's*, four light cruisers, four fleet auxiliaries, and eight destroyers. Allied, so to speak, with the First Fleet was the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, consisting of *Lion*, *Queen Mary*, *Princess Royal*, and *New Zealand*; the Second Cruiser Squadron, *Shannon* and three *Natal's*; the Third Cruiser Squadron, the four *Devonshires*; and the Light Cruiser Squadron, the four *Southamptons*. And to this Fleet was attached the first, second, third, and fourth flotillas, each with a cruiser flagship and a depot ship, and comprising in all between seventy and eighty destroyers.

“ The Second Fleet, according to the sea authority,

consisted of the Fifth and Sixth Battle Squadrons, the eight *Formidables* in the first, the *Lord Nelson*, *Vengeance*, and five *Duncans* in the second. Of cruiser squadrons there were two, the fifth and sixth, all ships of old type and small fighting value ; and under the Admiral of the Second Fleet were four patrol flotillas, consisting of seven small cruisers, four depot ships, between seventy and eighty destroyers, and in addition some fifty submarines.

“ The Third Fleet was made up of the Seventh and Eighth Battle Squadrons and five squadrons of cruisers, all of older type than those in the Second Fleet.

“ I have enumerated these fleets at perhaps tedious length because if we are to see things in their right proportion it is important to distinguish between the war values of these different groups. The order of the 26th only affected the First Fleet to the extent of stopping manœuvre leave. Had the first batch of officers and the first watches amongst the men gone on leave the following Monday morning—that is, the 27th—they could undoubtedly all have been recalled the same evening, could have rejoined on the Tuesday, and Sir George Callaghan could have led his fleet away from Portland on Wednesday, exactly as if they had been kept on board. So far as the First Fleet is concerned, it is important to remember that it does not follow, if this order had not been given, that ‘ the country would have been left open to that surprise attack which for years it has been the German ambition to achieve.’ What made such an attack as this

impossible was the Fleet going to its war stations on the Wednesday, unless we are to suppose that the Germans, on hearing of the order given on the previous Sunday, at once realised that the game was up. But is not the real explanation of the German failure either to get on to the trade routes or to attempt a surprise attack of the Grand Fleet that neither the German statesman nor the German soldier thought that Great Britain would fight? To have done either of these things effectively would have needed far more preparation than was possible between July 26th and July 29th, when the First Fleet was in station and the German Navy paralysed.

“It appears to me that the most important factor to keep clear is that it was the movements of the First Fleet that were decisive in creating this position. It represents, after all, at least 80 per cent of the fighting value of the British Fleet, and considerably more than 50 per cent of its destroyer value. The battleships of the Second and Third Fleet clearly did not influence the position at all, and once the main fleet was in position, the mobilisation and distribution of the Second and Third Fleets were completely protected from hostile interruption.”

The moral of this detailed account from the strictly naval point of the events which preceded the declaration of war is pointed by Mr. Gastone Chiesi, English correspondent of the *Secolo*. “In this way,” he says, “Germany automatically lost

the command of the seas from the very first day, without a single shot being fired."

The German Fleet paralysed from the Beginning

The German Fleet made no attempt to carry out its long-cherished plans for striking a sudden blow. The game was up, for the British forces were mobilised before the German Fleet could even put to sea. The latter resolved to take shelter in the harbour of Cuxhaven and Hamburg, in Heligoland Bight and in the Kiel Canal. Since then it has not ventured outside its protected waters.

Germany having seen her plan for a sudden attack nipped in the bud by the rapidity of the British mobilisation, conceived the idea of doing to England by sea what General Joffre was doing to her own armies on land—of adopting, that is to say, the wearing down policy. They thus hoped to reduce the superiority of the British Fleet ship by ship and then to establish a position of equality between herself and her adversary. "This plan," as Mr. Balfour stated in August, 1915, "has failed completely. The desired equality is farther off to-day than it was twelve months ago." No one, indeed, could regard as serious actions the raids carried out by a few of von Tirpitz's cruisers on the East Coast of England.

By their bombardment of undefended towns like

Yarmouth, Scarborough, and Hartlepool ; by their slaughter of women and children ; and by the damage done to civilian property, they acted in contravention of international law and of the dictates of ordinary humanity. Their furtive and perturbed appearances were far from proving what Germany hoped to convey to the credulous, namely, that her fleet enjoyed full liberty of action, and that Great Britain was incapable of interfering with its comings and goings.

In no long time, indeed, they were completely stopped, and these raids were more costly to Germany than to England, since the latter suffered no loss to her forces, whereas the Germans lost the *Blücher* near the Dogger Bank, while the *Seydlitz* and the *Derfflinger* were set on fire by Sir David Beatty's squadron.

That, indeed, is the sum total of the work of the German Fleet. There must be added the exploits of a few notorious corsairs, light cruisers, or armed auxiliaries, which kept up a war of hide and seek for a few months in the early stages of the war and managed to inflict some losses on British trade, but which were soon brought to book. Such were the *Emden*, the *Koenigsberg*, and the *Karlsruhe*.

It may be safely said that each time the British Fleet has encountered the German Fleet at sea it has beaten it. On every occasion it has proved its

superiority : on the 28th August, 1914, in Heligoland Bight ; the 8th December, 1914, off the Falkland Islands ; the 24th January, 1915, at the Dogger Bank in the North Sea.

On the 31st May, 1916, a great naval battle took place off the coast of Jutland, in which the superiority of the British Fleet was completely demonstrated. The Battle Squadron under the command of Admiral Beatty joined battle with the German High Seas Fleet, without it being possible for the whole of the British Fleet to get into touch with the enemy. After a very brief action between the opposing forces the German Fleet fled in disorder and made for its own ports. Unfavourable weather alone saved it from complete destruction. The German losses, considered absolutely as well as relatively, exceeded those sustained by the British.

I have often heard it asked why the British Fleet, with its indisputable superiority over the German, does not force the latter to fight by going and throwing down the gauntlet in the very harbours and waters where it lies in hiding. The question is asked by people who apply to sea warfare the same line of argument as applies to land fighting. But a fleet bears no resemblance to an army. An army may be chased in any direction and destroyed, in fight after fight, by the army of the enemy, for on land it is not possible for one or other of the

belligerents to break off the action. The one that refuses to fight is incapable of resistance.

In naval warfare it is quite otherwise, and it is justly remarked by Mr. J. R. Thursfield that "one of the essential characteristics of naval warfare is that the most important ships of one of the belligerents can always be kept immune from attack by the other. All they have to do is to remain in their own harbours, and these harbours can be so easily defended that it is impossible to reduce them merely by attacking them from the sea. The enemy cannot be forced to accept battle if he refuses to come out into the open sea, and no method has been discovered up to the present of forcing him out to sea."

Furthermore, as Mr. H. A. L. Fisher rightly observes: "While a general may risk a battalion, or even an army corps, in a costly enterprise, where the losses may be repaired almost at once, grave damage inflicted at sea is not a temporary wound capable of being cured while the war is in progress, but a permanent and irremediable disaster." It takes nearly two years to build a Dreadnought, and many more to train a naval officer. The British Fleet, in view of the responsibility which rests on it for the safeguarding of trade and the transport of troops, is not in a position rashly to run such risks.

Moreover, if the end and aim of a fleet is to destroy the fleet of its enemies, need we do more than point out that the pressure exerted by the English Fleet on the German Fleet since the first day of the war has been so effective that the result is the same as if the immense and ambitious armada of Germany had never been built. Behind its mine fields and its hedge of submarines it is as powerless as if the forces of Sir John Jellicoe had long since sent it to the bottom of the sea.

The Safety of Transports

The British Fleet has from the outset of the war enabled large contingents of troops from India, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to be brought to Europe. With its co-operation the Expeditionary Force was conveyed across the Channel in 1914 without loss of any kind, and since that time, without any interruption whatever, fresh troops—amounting to a total of more than a million men—have been conveyed to France, while, thanks to it, British Divisions were landed safe and sound in Egypt and the Dardanelles.

Nor must we omit to remark that out of the vast number of transports that have ploughed the seas for more than a year, the enemy has only succeeded in sinking one or two in the Ægean. Does not that fact bear silent and indisputable

witness of the continuous ascendancy exerted by the British Fleet ?

Furthermore, side by side with the transport of troops, England has succeeded in sending munitions and material to all the various scenes of the world war. Never was there a mightier task, and this will be recognized when it is understood that in some cases—that of the Dardanelles for example—it was necessary to bring from a great distance every single thing the troops needed—including even water—the nature of the country making it impossible to obtain supplies on the spot.

Then, again, thanks to the command of the seas maintained by the British Fleet, munitions and stores have been freely imported into France and England from the United States. To this the *Temps* drew the attention of its readers.

“ If, at the outbreak of war, we were able to complete the equipment of our army with a rapidity which was not the only nor the least cause of surprise to the German General Staff, we owe it to the Fleet that has given us the command of the seas. We were short of horses. They were brought from Argentina and Canada. We were short of wool and of raw material for our metal industries. We applied to the stock-breeders of Australia. Lancashire sent us her cottons and cloth, the Black Country its steel. And now that the consumption of meat threatens to imperil our supplies of live stock, we are enabled to avoid the

danger by the importation of frozen cargoes. For the present situation the mastery of the sea is not only an advantage but a necessity. In view of the fact that the greater part of our coal area is invaded by the enemy, the loss of the command of the sea by England would involve more than her own capitulation. She indeed would be forced to capitulate through starvation. But France also and her new ally Italy, being deprived of coal and therefore of the means of supplying their factories and military transport, would soon also be at the mercy of their adversaries."

Mr. H. A. L. Fisher points out that it is owing to the command of the seas being safeguarded by England that Serbia was enabled to obtain fresh supplies of munitions, which indirectly explains how it was that the Serbian army succeeded in December, 1914, in so far recovering itself as to drive out the Austrian invaders from their soil, make 60,000 prisoners, and recapture the city of Belgrade.

After the great Austro-German offensive in the Balkans, Serbia in her hour of trial was, once more, effectively aided by the British Fleet. Thanks to the latter one hundred and thirty thousand Serbian soldiers were rescued from the deserts of Albania and conveyed to Corcyra, where they were re-equipped. Thence they were transported to Salonica to join with the forces of General Sarrail.

But while the Allies were able, undisturbed, to

transport men and material from the remotest parts of the world, and in circumstances of immense difficulty, England completely prevented Germany from doing anything of the sort. Germany was compelled to look on helplessly at the loss of her most cherished colonies: Samoa, Togoland, New Pomerania, the Cameroons, German South-West Africa. Moreover, the combined efforts of English, South African, Indian and Belgian forces are now being directed towards reducing German East Africa.

Germany has been unable to transport either men or stores. No aid has reached her from without, save by clandestine trade. Contraband of war reaching her in neutral bottoms is shrinking day by day. It would be impossible to estimate the number of vessels handed over to the Prize Court without instituting an enquiry throughout India and the Colonies.

Finally, it must be noted that the Fleet has played a direct and most effective part in several military operations. The colossal share—not unmarked by heavy losses—which it bore in the attack on the Dardanelles is widely known. People are less familiar with the work wrought by it, with the assistance of the Japanese, at Samoa, in the Marshall and Caroline Islands; in the Cameroons where the French lent their aid; in Walfisch Bay

and in East Africa ; at Tsingtau with the co-operation of the Japanese ; in the Persian Gulf ; in the Suez Canal ; in the Gulf of Alexandretta ; in the port of Smyrna ; in the Falkland Islands ; and, more recently, at Dedeagatch.

We must also bear in mind the valuable assistance rendered by the British Fleet in the operations in Flanders, particularly during the first battle of the Yser ; and in Serbia, where an English naval officer on duty on the Danube was decorated by the Serbian King. Nor must we overlook the repeated bombardments of the Belgian coast, especially of the submarine base at Zeebrugge.

Nor, again, must we lose sight of England's assistance in policing the Mediterranean in times of stress and difficulty. If the German submarines have won an unenviable notoriety by sinking merchant ships and drowning innocent victims it is the pride of the British submarines that they have performed none but military tasks—and performed them well. They have made successful attacks on the *Moltke* and other German ships in the Baltic, disputed with Germany the command of those waters, and put a stop to trade between Germany and Scandinavia. In the Sea of Marmora they have succeeded in torpedoing many Turkish troopships and more than two hundred trading vessels.

Destruction of Enemy Commerce

The activities which we have hitherto considered have been chiefly military ; but, in addition, the Fleet has another duty to perform of first-rate importance. According to *The Times History of the War* it is an axiom recognised by all the highest authorities, and proved by historic fact, that the power to destroy enemy commerce or to drive it from the seas, while maintaining one's own more or less intact, is a certain road to final victory, even against a military state of great superiority. And England has determined to carry out the blockade of Germany.

It is no exaggeration to say that Germany's seaborne trade entirely ceased on the day war was declared. At the beginning of August, 1914, the number of ships of the German Mercantile Marine engaged in foreign trade was 1491. Austria had 323. All were shut up in port, sunk, or seized by the combined fleets of England and the Allies.

Let us quote the exact figures. At the outbreak of war 69 German vessels were detained in the ports of the United Kingdom ; 34 in British ports in other parts of the world ; 26 were detained in English ports after war was declared ; 116 have been captured at sea by the British ; 121 were detained by England's allies (including Italy) at

the outbreak of war ; 26 have been captured or sunk by the Allies ; 27 have been captured or sunk in German ports occupied by the Allies ; 18 have been captured in the region of the Suez Canal ; 3 Austrian vessels have been seized in the region of the Suez Canal ; 35 Austrian vessels were detained by Britain's Allies, including Italy, at the outbreak of war ; 3 Austrian vessels were captured by England's Allies, and 2 by English vessels ; 7 Austrian ships were detained in English ports at the outbreak of war ; 10 Turkish vessels have been detained, captured, or sunk.

We will let the Germans themselves tell us the importance of the English blockade. In its issue of the 20th August, 1914, *The Times* quoted a prophetic article from the *Vorwärts*, which merits preservation.

“ If the British blockade took place imports into Germany of roughly six thousand million marks (£300,000,000) and exports of about eight thousand million marks (£400,000,000) would be interrupted—together with an oversea trade of 14 milliards of marks (£700,000,000). This is assuming that Germany's trade relations with Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden remained entirely uninfluenced by the war—an assumption the optimism of which is self-evident. A glance at the figures of the imports shows the frightful seriousness of the situation. What is the position, for example, of the German

textile industry if it must forgo the imports of over-sea cotton, jute, and wool? If it must forgo the 462 millions (£23,100,000) of cotton from the United States, the 73 millions (£3,650,000) of cotton from Egypt, the 58 millions (£2,900,000) of cotton from British India, the 100 millions (£5,000,000) of jute from the same countries, and further the 121 millions (£6,050,000) of merino wool from Australia, and the 23 millions (£1,150,000) of the same material from the Argentine? What could she do in the event of a war of longer duration without these raw materials which in one year amount in value to 830 millions (£41,500,000)?

"It may also be mentioned," said the *Vorwärts*, "that Germany received in 1913 alone from the United States about 300 millions (£15,000,000) of copper, and further that the petroleum import would be as good as completely shut down. The German leather industry is largely dependent on imports of hides from oversea. The Argentine alone sent 71 millions (£3,550,000) worth of hides. Agriculture would be sensibly injured by the interruption of the exports of Chilean saltpetre from Chile, which in 1913 were of the value of not less than 131 millions (£6,550,000). The significance of an effective blockade of German foodstuffs is to be seen in the following few figures: The value in marks of wheat from the United States is 165 millions (£8,250,000), from Russia 81 millions (£4,050,000), from Canada 51 millions (£2,550,000), from the Argentine 75 millions (£3,750,000)—372 millions (£18,600,000) from these four countries. There will also be a discontinuance of the importa-

tion from Russia of the following foodstuffs: Eggs worth 80 millions (£4,000,000), milk and butter 63 millions (£3,150,000), hay 32 millions (£1,600,000), lard from the United States worth 112 millions (£5,600,000), rice from British India worth 46 millions (£2,300,000), and coffee from Brazil worth 151 millions (£7,550,000) should be added to the foregoing. No one who contemplates without prejudice," said the *Vorwärts*, "these few facts, to which many others could be added, will be able lightly to estimate the economic consequences of a war of long duration."

Protection of the Allies' Trade

With regard to the protection afforded by the British Fleet to national and allied commerce, there can be no question about its value. Trade between England and France has been carried on in time of war with almost the same degree of immunity as obtained in time of peace. In considering this aspect of the matter we must differentiate between two distinct periods. The first menace to sea-borne trade were the raids carried out by certain German cruisers, to which we have already alluded. A report of the British Admiralty gives us the following information in regard to the matter.

"The percentage of loss is much less than was reckoned on before the war. Out of 4,000 British ships engaged in foreign trade, only 39 have been

sunk by the enemy, just under one per cent in all. The rate of insurance for cargoes, which on the outbreak of the war was fixed at five guineas per cent, has now been reduced to two guineas per cent without injury to the solvency of the fund. For hulls, as apart from cargoes, the insurance also has been considerably reduced. Between 8,000 and 9,000 foreign voyages have been undertaken to and from United Kingdom ports, less than five per 1,000 of which have been interfered with, and of these losses a large number have been caused by merchant vessels taking everything for granted and proceeding without precaution as if there were no war. On the other hand, the German oversea trade has practically ceased to exist. Nearly all their fast ships which could have been used as auxiliary cruisers were promptly penned into neutral harbours or have taken refuge in their own. Among the comparatively few German ships which have put to sea, 133 have been captured or nearly four times the number of those lost by the very large British mercantile marine."

This statement was made when seven or eight formidable raiders were still at large.

The second period dates from the declaration of the blockade of England by submarines. From the outset both Press and public regarded this declaration as another instance of German bluff. The idea that twenty or thirty submarines were going to extinguish the sea-borne trade of the

British Isles struck them as absurd; and, while not hesitating to admit to the full the loss inflicted on British tonnage by the German submarines, it may be safely asserted that the statistics confirm the original estimate of the significance of the campaign. Life in the English ports goes on pretty well as calmly as it did before the war, and the seafaring population show not the smallest signs of perturbation.

Let us glance at the following list of Transatlantic sailings of ships of all nationalities over 300 tons, starting from or arriving at English ports :

(a) Before the submarine blockade.

(b) Since the blockade began (18th February, 1915),

and we shall see how insignificant has been its influence on British shipping as a whole.

<i>Week ending</i>					
January	27	.	.	.	1503
February	3	.	.	.	1420
„	10	.	.	.	1413
„	17	.	.	.	1438
„	24	.	.	.	1381
March	3	.	.	.	1474
„	10	.	.	.	1557
„	17	.	.	.	1539

<i>Week ending</i>						
March	24	1450
„	30	1559
April	7	1234
„	14	1432
„	21	1519
„	28	1441
May	5	1604
„	12	1427
„	19	1438
„	26	1323
June	2	1382
„	9	1335
„	16	1347
„	23	1469

Net tonnage of British vessels entered and cleared with cargoes from and to the United States of America during the seven months ended July, 1916, compared with the corresponding period in 1914.

A. During seven months ended July, 1916.

<i>Vessels entered.</i>	<i>Vessels cleared.</i>
Tons.	Tons.
3,672,927	2,015,070

B. During seven months ended July, 1914.

<i>Vessels entered.</i>	<i>Vessels cleared.</i>
Tons.	Tons.
3,767,729	3,060,626

The Germans had boasted that they were able to reduce the population of the British Isles to starvation. What has been the measure of their success? Mr. H. A. L. Fisher puts the matter very clearly as follows :

“ We have now experienced five months of the so-called blockade. Our imports for June, 1915, when compared with our imports for the same month in 1914, have risen 28·6% ; and our imports for the last five months, when we compare them with those for the corresponding period of last year, show an increase of 17·8%.

“ We need not therefore be surprised to learn that there has been a considerable advance in our total imports of meat since last year, a rise amounting to £9,794,000, or 36·2 per cent, for the last five months (February to June, respectively), and to £2,500,000, or 50 per cent, for the month of June. But these figures, though furnishing a remarkable illustration of our continuing ease of importation despite the activities of the German submarines, are less striking than the record of our importation of grain and flour during the same five months. The value of imported cereals has arisen in this period from £26,753,000 to £45,887,000—an increase of 71·5 per cent. Nor has there been any decline in the staple luxuries of the poor. On the contrary, the United Kingdom has imported for the six months ended June 30th, 1915, 163,860,760 pounds of tea, as against 123,230,277 imported last year and 117,460,581 imported in 1913.

“ That there has been a considerable shortage in tonnage since last autumn is true enough. The German and Austrian shipping tonnage, which is about one-seventh of the world’s tonnage, is practically unavailable, and the requisitioning of shipping by the Admiralty and other Governments—and it must be remembered that our Admiralty has taken up about one-sixth of the total number of steam vessels belonging to the United Kingdom—has accentuated the shortage and led to a rise of freight rates. Nevertheless, the position does not seem to be getting materially worse either as regards freight rates or as regards the quantity of tonnage available. Indeed, an examination of certain typical freight rates from March 1st to June 30th, *i.e.*, grain freights from the River Plate to the United Kingdom and coal freights from the United Kingdom to the Mediterranean, show that the tendency has been, on the whole, downwards rather than upwards, and at the end of June, in both cases, freights were some 25 per cent lower than at the beginning of March.

“ There is then, as yet, no indication that the United Kingdom will be starved into submission by the German submarines. We are importing freely, we continue to carry the greater part of the world’s trade, and if the available tonnage falls short of the demand, the congestion of our ports is more accountable for the shortage than any apprehension of peril from submarines. It would seem then that we are in a position, so far as our food supplies go, to continue the war indefinitely. Our enemy, it is true, relies upon his new type of submarine, but if a few fast cruisers did not materially

affect our overseas trade at the beginning of the war, a few fast submarines will be no more effective now when our general naval power and special experience in meeting submarine attacks have been greatly increased.”¹

The British Mercantile Marine has been of immense service to the allied nations, as was emphasised in a speech delivered by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords on the 3rd May, 1916.

Over 43 per cent of British shipping had been requisitioned for the naval, military and essential civil needs of the Allied Countries.

Fourteen per cent had been occupied in carrying foodstuffs and raw materials on behalf of the Government, or the Allies; and the remaining 43 per cent had been left to the British shipowners under State Regulation as to its use. Out of a total of between 3000 and 4000 British ocean-going steamers, we had dedicated over 500 to the exclusive use of France, Russia and Italy. . . .

The loss by normal wastage had been rather less than usual :

Seventy ships were interned in German ports, but these were almost exactly balanced by enemy vessels captured as prizes. Since the beginning of

¹ If the reader wishes to have more detailed information concerning England's commercial relations with other countries, the tabular statement given at the end of this chapter will furnish him with full particulars.

the war 450 enemy ships had been detained, seized, or captured. The number of British merchant ships lost through war causes was almost exactly balanced by the new ships added to the merchant service since the beginning of the war.

In bringing this chapter to a close, we cannot more fittingly conclude than by letting the First Lord of the Admiralty himself answer the questions put by him, and quoted by us, regarding the functions of a fleet.

“All these functions have so far been successfully performed by the British Fleet. No German merchant ship is to be found on the ocean. Allied commerce is more secure from attack, legitimate and illegitimate, than it was after Trafalgar. The German High Sea Fleet has not as yet ventured beyond the security of its protected waters. No invasion has been attempted of these islands. British troops, in numbers unparalleled in history, have moved to and fro across the seas, and have been effectively supported on shore. The greatest of military Powers has seen its colonies wrested from it one by one, and has not been able to land a man or a gun in their defence. Of a fleet which has done this we may not only say that it has done much, but that no fleet has ever done more. And we citizens of the British Empire can only hope that the second year of the war will show no falling off in its success, as it will assuredly show no relaxation of its efforts.”

APPENDIX

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF BRITISH TRADE WITH
FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR 1915 AND 1916*Total Imports : 1915 compared with 1916*

	1915	1916	Increase (+) Decrease (-)	
	£	£	Total	Per cent.
January . . .	67,246,391	74,948,241	+ 7,701,850	11.4
February . . .	65,200,472	67,348,243	+ 2,147,771	3.2
March . . .	75,462,049	86,092,894	+ 10,630,845	14.0
April . . .	73,638,582	75,685,362	+ 2,046,780	2.7
May . . .	71,600,894	83,814,530	+ 12,213,636	17.0
June . . .	76,008,588	87,036,349	+ 11,027,761	14.5
Total for six months	429,156,976	474,925,619	+ 45,768,643	10.5

Exports of United Kingdom : 1915 compared with 1916

	1915	1916	Increase (+) Decrease (-)	
	£	£	Total	Per cent.
January . . .	28,247,592	36,757,167	+ 8,509,575	30.1
February . . .	26,176,937	36,335,782	+ 10,158,845	38.8
March . . .	30,176,066	37,598,119	+ 7,422,053	24.5
April . . .	32,169,733	36,817,839	+ 4,648,106	14.4
May . . .	33,618,992	47,024,411	+ 13,405,419	39.8
June . . .	33,233,568	47,274,563	+ 14,040,995	42.2
Total for six months	183,622,888	241,807,881	+ 58,184,993	31.7

Exports of Foreign and Colonial Merchandise : 1915 compared with 1916

	1915	1916	Increase (+) Decrease (-)	
	£	£	Total	Per cent.
January . . .	6,895,465	8,830,172	+1,934,707	28
February . . .	6,809,710	8,529,796	+1,720,086	25.2
March . . .	8,067,133	8,811,497	+ 744,364	9.2
April . . .	9,957,054	8,093,449	-1,863,605	18.7
May . . .	10,243,319	11,000,577	+ 757,258	7.3
June . . .	9,350,339	8,872,694	- 477,645	5.1
Total for six months	51,323,020	54,138,185	+2,815,165	5.4

Total Imports of United Kingdom for year 1915 amounted to £853,756,279, being an increase of £157,121,166 on 1914.

Exports :

Total Exports of United Kingdom in 1915 amounted to £384,647,336, a decrease of £46,074,021 on 1914.

Re-exports in 1915 :

These amounted to £109,575,037, an increase of £3,322,957 on 1914.

Imports (less re-exports) of Food, Drink and Tobacco : 1915 compared with 1916

(Including Grain and Flour, Dead Meat, Butter and Margarine, Cheese, Eggs, Raw Cocoa, Sugar and Tea.)

	1915	1916	Increase (+) Decrease (-)	
	£	£		
January . . .	28,607,948	32,821,704	+ 4,213,756	
February . . .	26,222,595	26,513,544	+ 290,949	
March . . .	29,469,917	34,330,138	+ 4,860,221	
April . . .	27,602,934	30,628,689	+ 3,025,755	
May . . .	27,732,245	36,326,103	+ 8,593,858	
June . . .	31,256,920	36,853,149	+ 5,596,229	
Total for six months .	170,892,559	197,473,327	+26,580,768	

Total Imports (less re-exports) of Grain and Flour : 1915 compared with 1916

	1915	1916	Increase (+) Decrease (-)
	cwts.	cwts.	
January	17,338,222	19,486,205	+2,147,983
February	12,169,058	12,665,410	+ 496,352
March	16,191,820	17,070,295	+ 878,475
April	14,204,540	15,172,238	+ 967,698
May	15,121,139	16,393,342	+1,272,203
June	14,548,000	18,167,298	+3,619,298
Total for six months .	89,572,779	98,954,788	+9,382,009

The British Blockade

The Blockade, the most effective of all England's weapons against Germany, is steadily and surely accomplishing its objects.

German statesmen endeavour to maintain that Great Britain is inflicting her economic pressure on Germany, not only by inhumane, but by illegal methods. Viscount Grey, however, disposes finally of the whole fabric of the present German arguments against the Blockade in the following statement :—

“ Inasmuch as the stoppage of all food-stuffs is an admitted consequence of blockade, it is obvious that there can be no universal rule based on considerations of morality and humanity, which is contrary to this practice.”

The policy of the British Blockade was outlined by Lord Robert Cecil in the House of Commons on March 9th, 1916, when he stated that "the policy of the Government was to abide by the principles of International Law, whether they were in our favour or not, and to adhere to them and them only. . . . The vital thing was to succeed in stopping German commerce. Economic pressure exerted by a belligerent, by cutting off the commerce of its enemy, was not only a legitimate and an effective, but a humane method of warfare."

The aim of Great Britain to prevent, as far as possible, all goods from reaching or leaving Germany is pursued with due regard for the rights of neutrals. The means by which this aim is being attained are well described by Mr. Archibald Hurd in his pamphlet *Germany Besieged*, from which the following passages are quoted :

"It may be asked : Is the Blockade effective ? On that matter there can be no serious doubt. . . . The constructive influence of the British Fleet is supplemented by diplomatic and commercial action, with the result that Germany is on something less than ordinary prison diet ; her neighbours are being rationed, their supplies being measured out to them with scrupulous care. Those are the effects of the British action, and in carrying out the triple policy—naval, diplomatic and commercial—we have sacrificed no friendship. In that lies the triumph

of the Blockade. . . . Germany with her 70,000,000 persons to feed is besieged as no country was besieged before."

In an article in the *Daily Telegraph* of June 29th, 1916, Mr. Hurd states further :

" The Ministry (of Blockade) has created a series of sieves through which everything in the way of trade to or from the Northern Powers must pass.

" The sieves are of two varieties—commercial (resting on mutual arrangements), and naval :

" (1) We are the coal suppliers of the marines of the world. By supplying or refusing to supply bunker coal . . . we can and do exercise great influence on shipping under neutral flags.

" (2) In Holland an Oversea Trust has been established, and in Denmark there are two trading associations, the functions of which are familiar. By these means, trading with the enemy is, if not stopped, so strictly limited as to be of slight importance. . . .

" (3) In the United States a system of issuing what may be described as letters of assurance has been put in practice, so that traders may know before shipping to Northern countries what they may and may not send.

" (4) Finally, the Navy maintains its patrols at both ends of the North Sea."

The way in which the British Blockade works is described by Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, who commanded the Tenth Cruiser (Blockade) Squadron

in the North Sea, from August, 1914, to March, 1916, in an interview with an American journalist, from which the following are extracts :

“ The British Blockade in the North Sea is concentrated throughout an area to the east and north of Scotland, maintaining a guarded district which completely intercepts all traffic to and from the Scandinavian countries and Denmark. . . . We have a complicated network of cruisers scattered over the North Sea areas—a network through which it is impossible for any steamer, sailing ship or trawler to pass, without coming under our direct observation. . . . To maintain our blockade, we have chosen a type of warship known as an auxiliary armed cruiser, usually a converted passenger ship or merchant trader. . . . The majority of blockade officers are drawn from the Royal Naval Reserve. These men, many of whom have had splendid careers in the British Mercantile Marine, are peculiarly fitted for blockade work ; they are accustomed to manifests and ships’ papers ; they know how to make a quick, comprehensive and judicial inspection of cargoes. . . . It is impossible to examine a large cargo in mid-ocean, and in heavy weather . . . neutral captains invariably prefer to be sent into a British harbour. The delay is reduced to a minimum and the inspection is accomplished with safety and despatch.”

The Blockade is under the supervision of a new Ministry presided over by Lord Robert Cecil.

As a result of the Blockade, the Export Trade

(overseas) of Germany has been substantially destroyed. With regard to imports, some of the most important, such as cotton, wool, and rubber, have for many months been excluded from Germany. Others, like fats and oils and dairy produce, can only be obtained there, if at all, at famine prices.

Controversy has recently arisen regarding the increased imports from the United States of certain food-stuffs by the neutrals adjacent to Germany, but, whereas previously, these countries imported a certain proportion of their supplies from Germany, they are now obliged to obtain their entire supplies overseas, and it is therefore maintained that they are receiving no more than they require for their own internal consumption.

Speaking in the House of Commons on August 23rd, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil summarised the present position with regard to the neutral countries, when he stated that "Imports into Denmark had been materially reduced by the agreement with Danish associations. He believed that these associations were carrying out that agreement with absolute loyalty. . . . He also thought that, on the whole, there was every reason to be satisfied with the working of the Netherland Overseas Trust. He did not believe any appreciable quantity of goods sent to Holland had gone to Germany. There was one aspect of the Dutch situation which caused

anxiety. Holland was an exporting country so far as its agriculture was concerned. . . . Undoubtedly, before the war, it sent us a very much larger share of its produce than it had sent since . . . That was not a satisfactory position from our point of view . . . but he could assure the House that a very decided improvement had taken place in the last few weeks. He had every reason to hope that the improvement would not be less in the future than it had been in the past : and that we should have every reason to be—he would not say satisfied, because he would not be satisfied while a single ton of food went into Germany—but free from serious cause of complaint.”

CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARY EFFORT—THE ARMY OF YESTERDAY

Kitchener's Contemptible Armies

THE Naval effort surprised no one, for no one questioned the might of the British Fleet. We have said, on the contrary, that superficial people are astonished that it has not done more than it has. The Germans themselves acknowledge its overwhelming superiority, but they make up for their reluctant admiration of the British Fleet by the scant esteem in which they profess to hold the British Army. General von Bernhardt speaks of "this worn-out and fossilised army," and the Press merely dismissed it with the single epithet "contemptible." Other nations—allied as well as neutral—formed a juster estimate of the worth of the professional soldiers of the Expeditionary Force, but regarded it as open to doubt whether England could furnish any additional support, or, at all events, any really effective support, over and above the force in question. The same misgivings prevailed in England itself. How-

ever, they were livelier among those whose minds were inclined to dwell on the setbacks England had suffered at certain periods of her military past, rather than among those who bore in mind the army reforms recently effected throughout the Empire.

A Backward Glance

If the War of American Independence, the Napoleonic Campaigns, the part played by England in the Crimea, and the South African War bore witness to the defects of the British military system, they have also resulted in the application of the reforms necessary for their cure.

The real cause of the defects in question is to be found in the definitely anti-militarist character of the English people. In the case of most Continental nations the land army is the symbol of the security and honour of the nation—terms which are practically synonymous. A country feels that its honour has suffered outrage if it has failed to maintain the integrity of its frontiers. To do this requires regiments both numerous and sturdy. It is not the Army that guards British territory from invasion, but the Fleet. It is, then, the Fleet that an Englishman looks upon as his real protector and champion, and Mr. H. A. L. Fisher has justly referred to it as the “spoiled child” of the House of Commons. The Army has never

been employed save where the issue at stake was one of *amour propre*, or some enterprise of more or less subsidiary importance ; but never the honour of the country as a whole. So it comes about that the English have never looked upon their Army with that sacred enthusiasm which on the Continent has wellnigh become a cult. There were, indeed, periods in England's history when the Army was regarded almost as a danger. May we not, in fact, view the history of the British Army as the record of the struggles between the Parliament and the absolute power of the Monarchy ?

We must, however, beware of drawing too rigid conclusions from all this. We must certainly not infer that England is devoid of military traditions or of affection for her Army. She has, in point of fact, always taken a very special pride in her various regiments and their victorious achievements. But though she plumed herself on their valour and its fruits, the pride she felt was a pride that was much more akin to the enthusiasm of the athlete than to the fervour of the patriot. For the Army in the past has never been in really close touch with the country. It was not composed—I am here speaking of the men and not of the officers, who were always men of birth—of the choicest stock, of the finest flower, of the nation.

The Army was a necessary evil, and though it could

boast its epochs of glory and brilliance, the average Englishman was not disposed to devote to it more than he could help. If a war broke out recourse was had to foreign mercenaries, particularly to those of the little German Principalities, who furnished them in abundance. As for the English troops proper, who had to be maintained at home for garrison duty or sent overseas for foreign or colonial service, they most assuredly were not drawn from the upper strata of society. Certain colonels contracted to form regiments and received funds from the State for the purpose of raising, maintaining and equipping the men. It usually happened that the recruiting sergeants were none too scrupulous about the sort of people to whom they offered the King's shilling, so that, at a time when the people of Continental countries had come to regard military service as a glorious branch of a citizen's duty, Englishmen still looked upon it as a more or less unenviable means of subsistence.

In a book recently published we are afforded a striking example of the moral character of the men who used to compose these armies. The incident quoted occurred during Wellington's campaign of 1813. The people of the South of France would not take Spanish money, and the General, being hard put to it for supplies, thought of the plan of transforming the coins into five-franc pieces stamped

with the effigy of Louis XVIII. In order to supply the lack of the official minting stamps he called on any coiners of base money there might be in the regiments under his command to come forward. Within a few days he had as many as thirty at his command.

However, these rapscallions made the finest possible soldiers. All through the Napoleonic Campaign they fought like lions, and the story merely tends to show that in England the sentiment of military duty is not ingrained in the national character as it is in France. The anecdote indicates the starting-point of a whole process of psychological development which is now approaching its culmination, and of which the course was prophetically adumbrated by Mr. Rudyard Kipling in a story he gave to the world some fifteen years ago. In the old days the British Army was commanded by gentlemen and composed of rascals. It did wonders, for the men never argued as to what they were fighting about; they only thought about fighting. Nowadays it is still commanded by gentlemen, but the men have passed through the Board Schools. They think about things, but, as their reasoning powers do not carry them far, they fail to understand what they are fighting about, but argue about it and fight badly. The day will come when the Army will still be officered by

gentlemen but when the soldiers composing it will have sufficient insight and acuteness to know why they are fighting and to fight with whole-heartedness and intelligence. And when that day comes, the British Army will again become one of the best in the world.

To-day we have arrived at the third panel of the triptych. But to complete it, has required not only a material but a moral transformation. Both have combined to make the soldier of Sebastopol into the soldier of Neuve Chapelle and Ypres. Though there may be nothing to choose between them so far as courage is concerned, the latter are undoubtedly the moral and spiritual superiors of the former.

Reforms

Since the disastrous events of the Crimean War, two great reforms have been carried out. These reforms are in fact the foundation on which the whole British Army of to-day is based. The first dates back to 1870 and 1871, and was due to Lord Cardwell. The second was the work of Lord Haldane, the Secretary of State for War in 1906. They will repay a brief examination.

Lord Cardwell, 1881

The lessons afforded him by the triumphs of Prussian militarism during the "année terrible"

were not lost on Lord Cardwell. When he came into power the military forces of England were split up into three groups recruited on the voluntary system, which seemed, even up to quite recently, to be one of the cardinal dogmas of the English political creed so far as the Army was concerned. The first of these groups consisted of the regulars. They could be employed either at home or abroad. Lord Cardwell substituted the short-service system for the long. Each soldier, no matter to which branch of the service he belonged, remained for twelve years at the disposal of the military authorities, but his period of actual service varied according to the training which his particular duties required him to undergo. Thus, an artilleryman had to be eight years with the colours and four in the reserve, whereas a driver only spent two years with his regiment and ten in the reserve. This principle of creating a reserve was applied to a new territorial army which combined the militia and the volunteers. This force was divided into regiments of two battalions subject to the same conditions and *régime* as the Regular Army. One of these battalions remained at home, the other was employed on Colonial service and drew on the other for its reserves, these reserves being reliable and well trained. Lord Cardwell bestowed every attention on this matter of training. He took care to secure

co-ordination of effort by means of annual manœuvres confined first of all to England but subsequently extended to the Indian Empire. Nor did he show himself less zealous in accomplishing another task of equal moment, namely, the improvement of the moral character of each individual soldier. He obtained excellent results from the abolition of corporal punishment. Finally, he suppressed the system of buying commissions, which had made the Army a sort of speculative hunting ground. Henceforth the Woolwich Academy (Artillery and Engineers) supplied the Regular Army with capable officers. For additional bodies of troops recourse was had to a special system. The undergraduates at the Universities, whatever line of study they followed, had enough leisure to undertake a course of military training which, after a certain stage had been reached, made them into capable commanders. This explains how it was possible to find officers for Kitchener's new armies.

Lord Haldane, 1906

Lord Haldane's reforms, which were effected during his six years of office—1906 to 1912—had a double object in view: to strengthen the Army by increasing its numbers, and to add to its cohesion. Before his day, the several units were not united

under a single general staff until war made co-ordinated action indispensable. Until then each followed its own independent existence. Lord Haldane remedied this by creating a supreme General Staff. He raised the Expeditionary Force from 80,000 to 165,000 men, without reckoning the 100,000 on garrison duty abroad, and he supported it with a body of reserve troops known as the Special Reserve. He put the whole military system on a new basis, and increased the artillery, the weakness of which had been demonstrated by the South African War, at the expense of the infantry of the line. He added to the efficiency of the Territorial Army by the addition of Field Artillery, Transport and Service Corps. The military value thus given to it enabled it to furnish numerous effectives for the Egyptian Campaign, for Garrison Duty in India, and for the Dardanelles Expedition.

Thanks to the two statesmen to whom we have referred, the United Kingdom found itself, when war broke out with Germany, in possession of an army whose services at the crucial moment were, as we shall see, very far from negligible. The following table indicates its strength at a glance :—

Table showing contemplated strength 1913-14 and 1914-15 and effective strength in 1915

Strength of the British Army.	Estimated.		Actual. 1915.
	1912-1914	1914-1915	
Regular Troops in the United Kingdom and Abroad	167,868	168,500	156,100
Regular Troops in India	75,897	73,896	78,456
Colonial Troops and Native Indians	8,765	8,771	8,771
Army Reserve	145,000	147,000	147,765
Special Reserve	78,714	80,120	63,089
Militia	—	—	—
Militia Reserve	90	60	69
Channel Islands Militia	3,166	3,166	3,067
Malta and West Indian Militia	2,894	2,894	2,703
Territorial Army, including Permanent General Staff	314,438	315,485	251,706
Officers' Training Corps ¹	1,099	1,110	795
Total	797,931	801,002	711,589
Horses and mules at home and elsewhere	28,849	28,742	—
Horses and mules in India	21,458	21,458	—

Thanks to them England was able to put into the field, without delay, first of all in the plains of Mons and later in the Soissons offensive, that Expeditionary Force which through manifold vicissitudes of fortune proved worthy of its traditions. One of the most conspicuous services rendered by England to the Allied cause was that at the very outset of hostilities she showed herself in a position

¹ The Junior Division of the Officers' Training Corps (Public Schools' Contingent) consisted in 1912-13 of 444 officers and 18,189 cadets.

to support them with troops of exceptional quality, seasoned in many a previous campaign—troops which, despite their inferiority in numbers, kept at bay during an arduous strategic retreat, the gigantic hosts opposed to them. A marvellous achievement, that, when one comes to think how little of militarism there was in England and how inadequately prepared she was for a Continental war.

Two Aspects of England's War

Mr. Balfour, in a speech delivered at the London Opera House in July, 1915, said :

“ We never claimed (and those who valued our assistance know that we never claimed) to have at our disposal a large standing army. We said that we could send 160,000 men.”

And doubtless if England had limited herself merely to fulfilling her undertakings to France, Russia, and Belgium, she would have been perfectly justified in regarding her obligations as fully discharged by supporting them with the Fleet and the Expeditionary Force. Sir Edward Grey had practically said as much to the French Government in his dispatch of the 30th July, 1914. This was so far as France was concerned. As regards Belgium, England's guarantee was limited to sending whatever force she might have available at the time being.

But events quickly revealed to her that matters were taking quite a different turn. For one thing she could no longer look upon herself merely as a party to a treaty. She perceived that in the war on which Germany had embarked it was she who was the principal foe, the enemy finally reserved for destruction ; and from the moment she realised that her interests, her very existence, were at stake, she was no longer able to refrain from making the utmost sacrifice in her power, to defeat the common foe.

On the other hand, she perceived that her signature involved her in liabilities far in excess of the forces immediately at her disposal. The dictates of honour—even if she had not felt that her very existence was imperilled—would have made it incumbent on her to extend her individual effort to the very uttermost. She had thus a double reason for gathering together her new armies.

The New Armies

New Armies ! It is difficult to realise the number and magnitude of the problems which such an undertaking involves. Not only is it necessary to recruit the men, provide the necessary officers, arms, and equipment, furnish them with artillery, see to the reserves of munitions, organise the various auxiliary services, provide camps and barrack

accommodation ; but all these vast numbers of men have to be trained at high pressure, the several regiments have to be practised in that spirit of cohesion and unity of command which constitutes the principal asset of a modern army. Formidable tasks these ! It would scarcely seem that six months could have possibly sufficed for their fulfilment, and yet they were carried out with a thoroughness beyond all expectation, thanks to two almost providential circumstances. One was the intervention of a soldier and organiser of genius, Lord Kitchener ; the other, the uprising of a spirit of popular enthusiasm without parallel in the history of England.

Lord Kitchener

Lord Kitchener is one of the most remarkable combinations of soldier and administrator that the annals of England—fertile as they are in such types—have to show.

Born in 1850, of Irish descent, and the son of a soldier, he also chose to follow the profession of arms. He began his studies at Woolwich, and in 1871 joined the Royal Engineers. His promotion was rapid. After seeing service in Palestine in 1874, and in Cyprus in 1878, he was appointed to the command of the Egyptian cavalry—a post which he held from 1882 to 1884.

We next find him in charge of the Nile Expedi-

tion, sent to relieve Gordon. He then became Governor of Suakim, and had charge of various enterprises, among which was the famous advance on Khartoum in 1898, which he commanded as Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, and for which he received a peerage with the title of Baron Kitchener of Khartoum. In 1902 he was created a viscount, and received for services rendered in connexion with the Boer War the special thanks of the British Parliament.

For seven years he was Commander-in-Chief in India, and in 1911 he returned to Egypt as Consul-General. He still held this post at the outbreak of war, when he happened to be in England. He was indeed actually on his return journey to Egypt when he was recalled to take up his duties of Secretary of State for War.

Public opinion was unanimous in pointing him out as the most brilliant of organisers, the only man who, by his untiring activity, was capable of administering the War Office at a time of such paramount importance for the Empire.

Before the end of the first month of War, the first 100,000 men of "Kitchener's Army" were already in training. To-day the fifth million is marching in their footsteps. Lord Kitchener's career was cut short while still in the full tide of unexhausted powers and possibilities. He was

on his way to Russia in H.M.S. *Hampshire*, to take counsel with our Russian allies, when a mine sank the ship, in a great storm off the Orkney Islands, on June 5th, 1916. His dramatically sudden death found him in harness, as befits one of the most strenuous workers of this most strenuous time.

Lord Kitchener was an extraordinary figure. He towered over all his contemporaries in individuality, as he did in inches. It is the great armies which he called into being which will enable England to do her part in winning the fiercest and the most momentous of all the wars that she has waged. They are his living monument, and no nobler monument has been raised to man.

Sir Douglas Haig in a telegram to the King on June 6 says :

“ His memory will remain with us as an incentive, and we will not rest until we have brought his work to its culmination in an enduring victory.”

The Spirit of the People

Slowly and surely, with that deliberation which is so marked a characteristic of their psychology, the English came to the conclusion that their Fleet was not sufficient to defend their interests and their independence, but that they needed an army of continental dimensions to guarantee the integrity of the country.

The threats which Germany did not trouble to

dissemble assisted towards this conclusion. Doubtless these threats had not passed unrecognised in England before the war, but, so far as the general public was concerned, they had not always been taken at their true value. They had been regarded as mere bombastic braggadocio or Utopian theorisings, and though the Press occasionally drew attention to the matter, the public paid but little heed to its warnings.

When, however, the catastrophic events of August, 1914, proved how deep was Germany's hatred of England, the seriousness of the menace was at length brought home to them, and, little by little, with that slowness with which ideas penetrate the minds of the masses in countries where tradition has taken deep root, the public was aroused and with one accord began to take energetic measures of defence. Then, and not till then, did the nation as a whole perceive—what the more enlightened among them had understood years before—that the German policy as outlined by such writers as von Bernhardi was a serious matter and no idle menace. The German plan—of which little secret was made—was to isolate Russia, crush France, and then bring England to her knees. The destruction of England was their chief and ultimate aim, and to the accomplishment of that aim the two first items in the programme were merely subsidiary,

or, rather, preparatory. Germany saw herself compelled to undertake these preparatory measures of destruction because of the line of policy followed by the three Powers in question, whose aim it was to maintain at all costs the balance of power in Europe—an old shibboleth for which German interests and German ambitions had no use. If we are to credit what Herr von Reichthofen, formerly Secretary of the German Embassy at Washington, is reported to have told a neutral journalist who was interviewing him on behalf of the *Echo de Paris*, Germany would have preferred to be relieved of the preparatory part of her scheme. She would even now be willing to come to terms with France and Russia “in order to continue the struggle with our arch-enemy, England.” This is but the up-to-date version of a long-standing truth, since, as far back as 1897, Bley in one of his works stated emphatically that the English must be blind if they do not recognise that “Great Britain had no bitterer foe than Germany.”

Moreover, the rash and overweening speeches of the Kaiser, whose perfervid oratory, by reason of his morbid passion for travel, came to be heard in the four corners of the globe, confirmed it in many an arrogant declaration.

It was on the morrow of Great Britain's ultimatum to General Kruger that William II gave regretful expression to the following sentiment: “We have

need of a mighty German fleet." When the first proposals for increasing the fleet were brought forward there was a transparent allusion to England. "Germany," said the Emperor, "must have a fleet so strong that the mightiest power will think twice before going to war with us." And the naval preparations which followed quickly showed the furious energy with which the German Government set itself to obey the order.

If Germany's aim was to equal and surpass the power of the British Fleet it was because the world supremacy of which she dreamed could only be won if she could wrest from her rival the trident which the old poet Mercier rightly calls the "sceptre of the world." The motto, "Our future is on the water," which figures as the motto of the Articles of the Naval League of 1900, requires to be supplemented by another phrase which we quote from a speech in eulogy of the Colonial League. "The necessary consolidation of our world position demands the extension of our Colonial Empire"; and further, "English and German interests will enter into conflict in every part of the world."

"England must be destroyed, for England is the arch-enemy, the only enemy, to-day." Such is the doctrine that has been avowed, preached and proclaimed throughout Germany for the past fifteen years. The oracular "*Ceteram censeo*

Carthaginem esse delendam," which Maximilian Harden took as the motto of his celebrated review, was but a harmless manifestation of this hatred; for if there was a Galliphobe literature in Germany denouncing the immorality, the weakness, the degeneracy of Paris, France and the Latin races in general, the anti-English literature was still more abundant. The Historic School, headed by Treitschke and Bley, gave it out authoritatively, with the weight attaching to the *ex-cathedra* utterances of University professors, that the British Empire was the outcome of political duplicity and military violence, and well deserving of the decay that had begun to disintegrate it. The publicists blazoned abroad the intellectual incapacity of the British people, pointed to their failure in the Colonial field, delivered the most violent attacks on their civil and national life, their laws and government their Church and Universities, their morals and their army. Such a campaign of calumny was only carried on once before in the history of modern Germany. Then it was directed against France, and a few years later war broke out. The parallel is significant.

Once convinced that action is necessary, the Englishman acts, vigorously his resolution being all the firmer because he has taken time to make up his mind. Mr. H. A. L. Fisher has shown us in its

true light what was really involved in England's decision to enter the war.

“When a country is invaded, its homesteads fired, its women folk assaulted, its wealth plundered, its innocent civilian population terrorised by a brutal soldiery, no artifice is required to bring the terrors of war before the minds of its population. The manhood of an invaded country fights under a stern and unremitting stress of bitter determination to free the sacred soil from the insolent presence of the barbarian. Every man knows his duty instinctively. It is plain and palpable before him. But in the case of Great Britain and her colonies there was no such clear and unmistakable message to the mind and conscience of the common man. The whole territory of the British Empire, with the important exception of the South African Union, was by reason of the supremacy of the British Fleet immune from invasion. Nobody in Great Britain had the slightest fear that the Germans had it in their power to devastate Kent or Suffolk, to burn down Canterbury Cathedral, or to shoot batches of shopmen and country parsons; and a nation of narrow-minded egotists might have been contented with this measure of security. But the crucial fact to be retained by all who would understand the strength and purpose of the British Empire is that, without the prospect of invasion, the United Kingdom and its Dominions have behaved almost as if invasion were actually taking place.”

CHAPTER V

THE MILITARY EFFORT—THE ARMY TO-DAY

CONSCRIPTS OR *VOLUNTEERS*?

CONVINCED of the reality of this redoubtable German menace, feeling herself compelled to take up arms to avenge the violation of Right and the principle of Nationality, England put forth an immense effort.

At the outset there were debates as to how the formation of the new armies should be set about. People asked themselves whether the old voluntary system would be resorted to or whether the House of Commons would be compelled to adopt the conscriptionist measures of which Lord Roberts had been so strong an advocate.

The view is generally held on the Continent, and particularly in France, that the English voluntary system is worthy of small respect. Looked at from the point of view of the commonweal, a nation which, when danger threatens, refuses to submit to a general and uniform discipline jeopardises not only its existence but its very right to exist. It is also

laid down, from the individual point of view, that in voluntary service, as understood in Great Britain, selfishness was a more potent factor than patriotism.

It is not without interest to recall the arguments of the anti-conscriptionists. Apart from their instinctive and traditional disinclination to tamper with the liberty of the individual, they held that the actual results of the two systems would be practically the same. Mr. Hilaire Belloc in an article in the *Daily Chronicle* of the 21st November, 1914, put the number of men that Great Britain could withdraw from her population for Military Service at five millions. He arrived at this figure by comparing the populations of Great Britain, Germany, and France and the actual number of men of the two latter nations serving with the colours. From this total he deducted one million rejected on account of physical unfitness, two to two and a half millions already serving and necessary for home defence, thus bringing, according to him, the total available for service abroad down to one and three-quarter million. From this total there should also be deducted the large number of men required for the public service and for the carrying on of the various manufactures which England—who was called on to make good the loss sustained by the Allies owing to the fact that Belgium, the Pas-de-Calais and Poland were occupied by the enemy—was alone

able to secure. Let us now hear what Mr. John Buchan has to say on this same point (Oxford Pamphlets, 25th December, 1914).

“According to the latest figures, we have in the British Islands just over eight million men of military age—that is between eighteen and forty-five. Taking a percentage on the French precedent, we must deduct two millions as unfit. We must also allow large deductions for men required to run our industries, for at present we are manufacturing war material and supplies for all our Allies as well as for ourselves. That is good for the British manufacturer, but it is a good thing, too, for our Allies, and clearly such industries must be kept going. So let us deduct two million men for this purpose. We shall not be far wrong if we allow 500,000 as the amount required for the Navy and purposes connected with the Navy; and at least another 500,000 for the men between thirty-eight and forty-five, since thirty-eight is the age limit we have fixed for enlistment. So we get three millions as our maximum of possible recruits. Our British forces, as we have seen, will presently be very little below two millions, and that is 66 per cent. Britain has never professed to be a military power. Her main preoccupation is her Navy, and the appeal she is now making must be regarded as a special effort, something quite outside her common line of interests, and something for which the machinery has had to be improvised. With this in mind the percentage must surely seem creditable, and every month it will go on rising.”

The anti-conscriptionist argued that a compulsory service bill would merely endorse a *fait accompli*; and it would indeed appear that the men actually recruited for Kitchener's armies under the voluntary system were not far short of the total that a conscriptionist measure would bring in.¹

Whatever value there may be in the arguments adduced by the opponents of conscription, the people of England were brought to recognise that the enormous extension of the war area required a greater effort on their part. They saw that, though a measure of legal compulsion might wound the susceptibilities of a certain section of the nation, the international conscience, so to speak, of the Entente as a whole would equally suffer if England were to be the only country for which military service was to remain optional. For it is not only, or even principally, a question of figures. Even if the proposed reform did not add a single recruit to Kitchener's armies it would, at all events, present

¹ King George's message to his people gave the number of men who have voluntarily enlisted as at the 25th May, 1916, as 5,041,000, dating from the beginning of the war. The population of the United Kingdom being 45,370,000, the army thus represents far more than ten per cent of the nation. True, the British Army includes contingents from the Colonies, but deducting these from the total it is still true that the British Army, recruited on a purely voluntary system, is, in proportion to the population, equal to the armies of the most conscriptionist countries in the world, namely, France, Germany, Austria, and Serbia.

an undeniable advantage of the highest value in the maintenance of the general confidence ; it would make the obligation of sacrifice the same for all the nations engaged in the struggle, and prove to the world at large that England was ready to spare no effort to bring about the triumph of the common cause.

Lord Derby's Plan

It was in the autumn of 1915 that the voluntary system began to disappoint the expectations of its adherents and to fall short also of the essential requirements of the situation. Forty Liberal-Unionist Members of Parliament gave expression to the misgivings felt by the public, and urged the Government to introduce a measure substituting compulsory service for the voluntary system then in force.

The Government adopted a sort of transitional plan, and the task of putting it into execution was entrusted to Lord Derby, who was made Director-General of Recruiting.

Lord Derby's scheme modified the previous system in two very important respects. On the one hand he redoubled the urgency of the appeal to men to come and join the colours ; on the other he inaugurated a system of calling men up in successive groups, of which there were forty-six in number. The first twenty-three consisted of single,

and the remainder of married, men, age being the basis of classification in each case.

The results of Lord Derby's campaign were as follows: 2,829,263 men, married and single, including those who had been rejected as physically unfit, joined for immediate or deferred service. According to the census taken in August, 1915, the total number of men of military age was 5,011,441. Consequently 2,182,178 men, married and single, had failed to answer the call; 1,029,231 single men refused to place themselves at their country's service. Of this number 378,071 were considered indispensable for the carrying on of work of national importance. Thus there were clearly left 651,160 single men who had not enlisted.

These results rendered the introduction of a compulsory service bill inevitable. Public opinion would never have suffered so large a number of single men to be allowed to carry on their ordinary civilian avocations at home while the greater part of the male population were serving with the colours.

On the 5th January the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, introduced a Bill for making military service compulsory for single men between the ages of 18 and 41. The proposal, which gave rise to lively discussion and widespread comment, was adopted with a majority that increased at each

successive reading. It brought about no trouble in the Cabinet except the resignation of one solitary minister. In the provinces the only opposition encountered took the shape of threats of strikes on the part of the Welsh miners, threats which soon came to nought. The people had at length come to understand what they were very far from understanding when war broke out, namely, that the idea of duty leads straight to the consecration of that duty by law rendering its performance obligatory for all. It is a notable indication of the change that took place in the attitude of the masses that measures which would have called forth the most energetic protests in August, 1914, were received by them not only without complaint, but with feelings of something like relief.

Recruiting—An Impression

Up to 1916 it was the old time-honoured system of recruiting that was adhered to. The task was tackled with might and main. Let us conjure up the scene to ourselves as one would picture some quaint old-world custom.

It was in London, in the great Metropolis, whose inhabitants amount to a seventh part of the total population of England, that the recruiting campaign was carried on with the greatest activity. The recruiting posters imparted quite a strange aspect

to the city, which, despite the war, has lost none of its wealthy and animated appearance. Immense placards blazon forth their graphic appeal all over the Nelson column in Trafalgar Square. Others just as large are fixed up on the lofty façades of Oxford Circus. Smaller ones are plastered upon walls and fences, even in the remotest suburbs, and present a most startling medley of riotous colour. In Hyde Park, the well-known hunting-ground of the politico-religious stump-orator, recruiting-sergeants have popped up alongside the Quaker and the suffragette, appealing to the crowd with their varied eloquence and objurgatory gestures. In the streets, bands, companies of Scottish soldiers clad in their tartans and playing their pipes, or Tommies sounding the bugle, pass by from time to time, followed by brakes for the conveyance of would-be soldiers to the recruiting station.

In London the immense throng of civilians pursuing their ordinary occupations prevents these military demonstrations from completely monopolising public attention ; but in the provinces they exercise their full sway, for in every town, in every village of the kingdom, the same recruiting campaign has been going on for a year, gathering force as the needs of the army became more urgent. It assumed a variety of singular forms well calculated to excite the amazement of Continental folk little

accustomed to the essentially British idea that the military career is a business just like any other business, and that a man is under no more of an obligation to be a soldier than he is to be a clerk or a doctor,—an idea which is disappearing with the change in public opinion to which we have adverted, but which is still operative in the recruiting methods at present obtaining.

It is a sight worth seeing,—one of these recruiting parades. Let us take our stand for a while in the High Street of a country town, filled with a noisy crowd who have come in from a neighbouring coal-field to spend their Saturday half-holiday and to throw about their money with a recklessness that would shock a thrifty Latin. Suddenly, rising above the noise of the crowd, is heard the sound of a brass band, blatant, harsh, and crude. It is playing commonplace tunes, and playing them in a hurry as if the only object was to get through as much noise-making as possible. It comes to a stop, only to begin again immediately.

The crowd has made for the spot where this volcano of sound has been let loose. On a flat roof, flanked on either side by the gables of the adjoining houses, the band has taken up its position amid a great display of bunting. The bandmaster, clad all in scarlet and silver braid, waves his staring white gloves above the heads of his apoplectic musicians

ablaze with crimson and braid. And now trombones and cornets strike up the jerky strains of "Tipperary," while the crowd join in, whistling or singing. Then the band, growing more subdued, solemnly plays "God Save the King," with a note or two out of tune here and there, and then stop.

At this point a young non-commissioned officer dressed in brand-new khaki, with brand-new belt and straps, comes to the front of the platform. He waits until the applause called forth by his appearance has ceased, one hand on hip and the other on the knob of a swagger-cane which the British non-commissioned officer invariably carries with him. At last he begins. His speech is alternately genial, bantering, brutal, and pathetic. His eloquence is of the popular order, punctuated with sallies and smart sayings. He reminds his hearers of the infamous bargain which Germany offered to make with Belgium and England ; the horrors of Louvain, Dinant, Tamines ; the bombardment of Scarborough, the murder of Miss Cavell. His audience shudder as he speaks of the cries of the drowning on the *Lusitania* ; they thrill with pride when he tells them of the triumphant return of the warriors of Neuve Chapelle. Then he takes the audience into his confidence, so to speak. Where is the man who does not long to join these troops and strike a blow for the Right ? What answer will the young

men of England make to the brave fellows who are giving their lives for their country and for the world? What name will history give to the men who let them die without going to their aid? And the speech ends with a solemn appeal to all to hurry off to the recruiting station and join King George's Army.

The band blazes forth once more. The tramways, which had stopped while the speech was going on, start again and follow in quick succession. The crowd wrangles, laughs, and moves away. A few groups, however, still linger on in front of the house, the roof of which had been turned into a rostrum.

One of these groups consists of a few young fellows—clerks or shopmen—cutting a fine dash in their Sunday clothes. The recruiting sergeant is having a man-to-man talk with them. Why don't they join? Don't they know what such and such of their chums have done already? Are they physically unfit? They would be ashamed to say that when every Sunday sees them out in the recreation ground playing a keen game of Rugby or sending in some smashing returns at tennis. Besides, the doctor is on the spot ready to put them through their paces. Let them come inside, just to put themselves right with their own conscience and their country. They have now set foot in the corridor, on the way to the recruiting office. Mean-

while there are other little knots still looking up at the front of the building. Over the doorway is posted up, "Recruiting Headquarters," and the whole window is plastered with posters; the heroic and the glorious, vengeance and pathos, all are depicted in garish or romantic designs emphasised by innumerable appeals, such as "Join the army before it is too late." These posters are masterpieces of ingenuity and psychological insight. They touch on every kind of motive calculated to impel a man to the field of battle. "Remember Belgium!" cries a fierce-looking soldier, gazing over a tract of devastated country showing burning villages and women and children fleeing for their lives. "Remember Scarborough!" is the suppliant message of a town in ruins. Hard by the stern features of Lord Roberts remind his countrymen of glories that are still fresh. "He did his duty. Have you done yours?" Lions on a barren headland, silhouetted against a stormy sky, are gazing eagerly towards the horizon. There are countries across the Channel scanning the mists of Great Britain, and saying, "Will the British lions never come?"

See, they are coming, pressing onward behind a glorious Britannia unfurling the flag stained with the blood of the motherland: "Your country is calling you; come and join now." A brawny

arm, stretching forth a great, clenched fist, is tattooed with the words, "Lend your country the strength of your right arm." A young boy scout is looking up enquiringly into his father's embarrassed countenance and asking what he did for his country in 1915 when she was fighting for the freedom of the world.

"We shall win," cries a wounded soldier as he charges the foe with the bayonet; "but you must come and help." Merry, good-tempered, and bantering, a party of soldiers on the march shout out, "Follow us, boys!" Nor is it only to such as are able to fight that the posters appeal. "If you cannot join the army get a recruit. Women of England, send us men!"

A few thoughtful-looking miners stand gazing at the window with its manifold appeals to the spirit of glory, sacrifice, and patriotism. They contemplate the representative of the Territorial Army, all resplendent in red and white, and the dashing boys of the new Army in their khaki standing about the doorway. In the dim-lighted corridor are flags, arms, trophies, and more posters—more practical and more persuasive—giving them to understand that the British Army is better fed, better equipped, and better paid than any other army in the world. Round about them is a group of inquisitive spectators quite ready to bet on their decision as it still

trembles in the balance. At one of the street corners are to be seen newspaper placards announcing a victory.

The miners make their way into the dim-lit building, the band overhead blaring out louder than ever its fierce martial airs. Its great achievement is apparently the popular farewell ditty of the music-halls, the gay "Tipperary" that is now whistled by all and sundry. A song of farewell, indeed, and of triumph, too, for Great Britain has cast her nets of pride, adventure, and devotion, and enmeshed a fresh batch of soldiers.

The moment they have signed on they are sent off to learn the rudiments of their military duties. Then they are drafted to one of the training camps that are scattered broadcast all over the country. It is only when one gets there and sees these vast townships of canvas, wood, or galvanized iron, that one realises how tremendous is England's effort, and understands the immense resources she commands and is bringing to bear on the task. These are the places to visit if you would learn confidence and optimism.

That was strikingly brought home to me in September, 1915, when, as a special favour, I was permitted to visit the camps at Aldershot.

My impressions were necessarily superficial, seeing the vast extent of the military organisation

the Government had built up round about the little town. A permanent camp has been in existence there since 1855, and in 1914 it accommodated about 27,000 men. When I visited it, however, seven divisions, or about 140,000 men, were mustered there and were completing their training. These figures of themselves are enough to convey an idea of the gigantic extensions that have been carried out there.

It is a magnificent place for a day's excursion ; the diversity of the country is delightful. Sandy hills covered with flowering heather and crowned with dark pines afford a varied and extensive landscape, and make delightful pictures in the pale sunlight. The various camps are situated a few miles out of the town. One comes upon them suddenly in the hollows and on the crests of the hills. In the pleasant, mist-softened atmosphere the white canvas of the tents, the huts of wood or galvanized iron come into view, and there men in thousands are seen hastening hither and thither busy as ants in an ant heap. Here, you may catch sight of them in the woods beneath the trees, there set in sharp outline with their horses and waggons silhouetted against the sky. The whole forms a most picturesque and animated scene.

Sweeping away on all sides from the buildings of the General Staff is the broad common where

the soldiers carry out their various evolutions. Some are to be seen marching past in company formation. Others are seated on the ground round a sergeant who is explaining their instructions to them. Others, again, are at trench-drill; and dotted over the common, each particular group presents its own special interest. A drum and fife band passes along the road; a captain on horse-back rides along at the head of his company. The men are admirably equipped, all of a pattern in their khaki uniforms and well-polished leather accoutrements.

A few miles off, the transport services are stationed with their mules and carts; further on are the pontoniers and the engineers; and beyond again there is a whole camp made up of railway mechanics, and yet another of everything and everyone connected with aviation. But everywhere are soldiers, soldiers—in the camps, on the roads, each one going about his work coolly and resolutely.

Nowhere are there any signs of haste or flurry. The buildings are put up as if they were intended to last indefinitely. The wooden huts are erected on brick foundations and fitted with perfect sanitary arrangements.

Let us look in for a moment at the Canadians' dormitory. A great, fair-skinned giant of a fellow who has just been performing his ablutions, tells

us he has come from a long way off and is longing to get away again into the very thick of the fighting.

Everything has been provided for in this huge township, even the edification and amusement of the soldiers. There are chapels and cinemas. Here, for example, is a concert hall where a performance is advertised for the evening—a performance given “by the boys for the boys.”

At certain places, along the main arteries that have been cut across the heath, shops and even a branch bank have been opened. The whole life of the place runs full and strong. In the camps and round about them, along the roads for miles and miles, it is nothing but soldiers, soldiers on foot, on horseback, in lorries, in motor-cars, on motor-cycles, and in those side-cars that are now so much in vogue in London.

Nearly all of them are very fine men, tall and sturdy, with their muscles developed by every kind of sport, and conveying, every one of them, the general impression of health, manliness, and almost of gaiety.

There are special butts for shooting practice, and a flag and notices are there to warn people not to enter the danger area. The crack of the rifles is heard incessantly. Along the white roads and among the gentle undulations of the purple heath

—everywhere—one sees but soldiers, who merge into the colour of the ground as soon as they get a little distance away.

Sometimes, as you pass on from one camp to another, you may catch a glimpse of more peaceful scenes that afford a striking contrast with all these warlike excursions and alarms. In the shade of some lofty trees you may see a little cottage engarlanded with flowers, a packhorse tethered to the gate—just the sort of delightful scene that English landscapists are so fond of depicting. And, beyond, a field of wheat which, by the very peacefulness of the contrast, recalls the martial spectacle of the tented field.

When one reflects that these great camps at Aldershot have their counterparts over the whole of England, and that there are even some of them in France—I recollect seeing a big one at Boulogne round about the monument raised to commemorate the camp formed by Napoleon I in connexion with his projected invasion of England—one can really form some sort of idea of the magnitude of the task which England has achieved in raising such an army in less than a year, and in setting herself to cope with the peril revealed to her by the great conflict that is now in progress.

*The Effects of Recruiting on the Economic Life
of the Nation*

One marked effect of the war is the scarcity it has brought about in the labour supply. It is not at all exceptional to hear of factories that have lost from 30 to 35 per cent of their operatives. In certain departments the proportion is often much higher, and the men who have gone are naturally the most competent and efficient.

A good example of this came under my notice in connexion with a very specialised type of industry, namely, a pottery. The younger people employed in these works—and here I am speaking of the manufacture of porcelain, earthenware, and ceramics of every description—have thronged to the colours, the “placers” having been specially conspicuous for their patriotic enthusiasm. Without these skilled workers the manufacture of china cannot be carried on at all. Picked labour has had to be replaced by casual labour, the result being a falling off in the quality and, consequently, in the price of the goods; while the time taken in their manufacture is increased 30 per cent.

A similar condition of affairs prevails in an industry of such prime importance as the milling trade. At a large flour mill I know of in the neighbourhood of the London Docks the manager in March,

1915, took on 700 permanent hands to fill the places of 700 others who had joined the army. This mill is one of the largest in the place, and pays very good wages. Scarcely three months had elapsed when, of these 700 new workmen only five remained, the others having gone to join Kitchener's Army. Now the work is done either by elderly people or by younger people unfit for military service. Recourse has also been had to female labour. Millers who in 1914 would have laughed at the suggestion of putting a woman to perform even the humblest task in these works now speak of their female employees in terms of high admiration. The women work day and night. They display magnificent enthusiasm and willingness in thus keeping open the places of their soldier husbands until the latter return again in triumph. And this is not one of the least praiseworthy or least significant of the changes that have taken place in the minds of the English people in their attitude towards problems of national importance.¹

¹ *Notable recruiting figures. Great Western Railway*

By December 31st, 1915, the number of employees of the G.W. Railway who had joined the Forces or attested under Lord Derby's scheme was 38,827=49 per cent of the pre-war staff of the Company, and at least 82 per cent (computed) of those of military age.

Coal-miners

Number of enlistments over the first thirteen months of the war amounted to 250,750, and of these 56,850 had enlisted during March to August, 1915, inclusive.

(Cp. Report of Departmental Committee on conditions pre-

The Figures

The War Office for a long time carefully refrained from disclosing the exact number of soldiers at its command. This commendable reserve, based on the desire of only giving to the public results that were definite and not conjectural, had the effect, abroad, of giving rise to the suspicion that England was not really putting her full strength into the struggle. These suspicions were assiduously fostered by Germany's agents, and unwittingly propagated by the pusillanimous.

It must furthermore be borne in mind that the fact of Great Britain's being an island differentiates her position from that of the other Allies. The

vailing in coal-mining industry. White Paper, January 11th, 1916.)

Teachers

From *The Times*, February 25th, 1916.

"According to the *Schoolmaster* 11,400 men teachers are serving with the Forces and about 9000 have attested under the Derby scheme. In addition there are 147 serving with naval forces, and 236 women acting as nurses. Teachers have already gained five Victoria Crosses, while 232 have been killed, 118 wounded, and nine are missing."

Metal and Chemical Factories

Many of these have been converted to munition-making.

At the beginning of the war 20 per cent of the employees in these industries enlisted. Nevertheless between mid-July and mid-December, 1915, 462,000 men and 95,000 women (total, 557,000) were brought into Government or other factories in these two trades.

Many of the skilled employees who enlisted have had to be brought back to munition work.

French, Russians, and Italians, when they combat the enemy are at the same time safeguarding the integrity of their respective countries. England, however, is confronted by two problems wholly distinct one from another. She has to defend herself from invasion, and though the great strength of the British Fleet makes such a contingency highly problematic, prudence nevertheless demands that adequate precautions should be taken to guard against a surprise attack. Such precautions inevitably absorb a large body of troops, and consequently reduce the number of men that can be sent across the Channel to render effective assistance to the Allies.

On the 7th August and the 10th September, 1914, the British Parliament voted credits for an army of 500,000 and 1,000,000 men respectively. Towards the end of October some three-quarters of a million had voluntarily presented themselves for service. On the 4th May, 1915, Mr. Lloyd George announced that two million men had joined the colours. On the 15th September Lord Kitchener gave the number as close on three million, and on the 21st December estimates were passed for the addition of another million men. At the present time, therefore, the British Army numbers four million, excluding the troops from overseas; and the terms of Lord Derby's report show how con-

siderable are the resources that still remain untapped.

These troops give daily proof of their efficiency. Speaking in the House of Lords on the 15th September, 1915, Lord Kitchener was able to announce that the British Front had been considerably increased, an important section of the line previously occupied by the French having been taken over. By the 17th September eleven new divisions had taken their place side by side with the older ones.

“In August, 1914, our Army at home consisted of 6 Regular and 14 Territorial Divisions, in addition to the garrisons overseas, which may roughly be estimated at 6 divisions—that makes 26 in all. We have now to-day in all, 42 Regular and 28 Territorial Divisions—that is to say 70, and if you add the Naval Division, and I think you ought, 71.

“In addition, if one wants to estimate the contribution of the Empire as a whole, you must add, excluding India for the moment, 12 Divisions, which makes 83 divisions in all. . . . The total military and naval effort of the Empire from the beginning of the war up to this moment exceeds 5,000,000 men.”

In the House of Commons on May 4th, 1916, the Prime Minister, in answer to Sir F. Banbury, stated that each one of the above 83 divisions might be taken to equal 25,000 men.

In December, 1915, the Prime Minister informed

the House that over a million and a half British troops were engaged in the various theatres of war throughout the world, and in February, 1916, he was in a position to say : “ In the actual theatres of war, . . . where fighting is going on, without counting those who are for the time being in these islands for home defence, for reserves, for training, and for the necessary garrison duties, we have at this moment ten times our original Expeditionary Force.”

The Losses

To complete our estimate of Great Britain's contribution in the present war we must add to the figures relating to the new armies the number of casualties, as announced in the House of Commons by the Under-Secretary of State for War.

The casualties as at the 9th December, 1915, amounted to a total of 528,227 officers and men, made up as follows :—

FLANDERS AND FRANCE.

	<i>Officers.</i>	<i>Other Ranks.</i>
Killed . . .	5,138	82,130
Wounded . . .	10,217	248,990
Missing . . .	1,691	52,344
	<hr/> 17,046	<hr/> 383,464
Total . . .	<hr/> 400,510	

DARDANELLES.

Killed . .	1,745	26,455
Wounded . .	3,143	74,952
Missing . .	353	10,901
	<u>5,241</u>	<u>112,308</u>
Total . .	.	<u>117,549</u>

OTHER THEATRES.

Killed . .	918	11,752
Wounded . .	816	15,165
Missing . .	101	2,656
	<u>1,835</u>	<u>29,573</u>
Total . .	.	<u>31,408</u>

TOTALS.

Killed	128,138
Wounded	353,283
Missing	68,046
Grand Total . .	<u><u>549,467</u></u>

On March 2nd, 1916, the Prime Minister stated that it was not advisable to publish casualty totals at regular intervals. Figures will be given from time to time as the military situation may permit.

Though the British Army at the outbreak of war was inconsiderable so far as numbers were concerned—England not being a military country—it must be noted that, having regard to the quality of the troops composing it, its fighting value was of an exceptionally high order. Those who witnessed the landing of the Expeditionary Force in August, 1914, were amazed at the perfection of its discipline and organisation. Its

artillery was in the highest state of efficiency, its transport service worked with perfect regularity, and it boasted an aerial branch for scouting work far superior to anything possessed by the enemy. In the field the Expeditionary Force was the admiration of all who saw it. The coolness, the courage, the doggedness, and the initiative displayed by the professional soldiers of England are in everybody's mouth. I can speak with the authority of an eye-witness. I beheld them a few hours before the battle of Mons, and their admirable *sangfroid* greatly reassured our people in those tragic times. Since then I have met innumerable countrymen of mine, all of whom speak in terms of the highest admiration of the deeds they saw the first British Division perform. These, moreover, were men who had become soldiers because it was their good pleasure so to do. And though it is true that armies raised on the Conscriptionist system are possessed of a sense of patriotic duty that is an invaluable moral asset, it is equally incontestable that men who take up the profession of arms from choice are likely to be unsurpassed as fighting men. Moreover, these professionals possessed a skill derived from prolonged and intensive training, and they thus had the advantage of long experience over all other troops then in the field. Finally, while the French and German

armies had had no practical acquaintance with real war, the British Expeditionary Force were endowed with the experience and tenacity of veterans, for the vast majority of the men composing it had been through the arduous Transvaal campaign. The British that landed in France were, then, a body of picked men, and the French military critics were right when they said of them that their strength was far beyond what might have been expected if one had judged of them solely from the numerical standpoint.

Right up to the very end of the difficult retreat which they were called upon to carry out against an enemy that outnumbered them by three to one, never losing their foothold so to speak, but keeping the torrent of their foemen systematically in check, driving them back in desperate encounters when their onrush became too threatening, the men of the British Expeditionary Force set an example of the most indomitable courage and the most reassuring good humour. They never lost confidence, because they knew their own superiority as fighting men. In the very height of the retreat a general said gleefully : " Our cavalry go through the Uhlans as though they were going through brown paper." And this is how a subaltern of an English regiment of infantry describes a charge of the Hussars at a critical juncture :

“ A hellish look of rage and terror gleamed in the eyes of the Germans when, finding themselves trapped, they endeavoured to cope with their new foes. We stopped where we were, looking on in silence, doing nothing for fear of hitting our own cavalry. They only had a few minutes to make up their minds. With a frightful yell, which I shall remember to my dying day, they turned and fled as though all the devils of hell were at their heels. They were mown down like wheat. It was at this point that our men took the largest number of prisoners. Rifles, cartridge-cases, helmets, anything they could throw away, all were sacrificed that they might run the faster, and many of the terror-stricken fugitives showed more speed than the tired horses of our Hussars.”

As a proof of the good spirits the men were in, here is a letter written by a sapper after the first few trying days of the great retreat :

“ The soldiers take everything quite coolly. You would have thought they were at a football cup-tie. They were lying in the trenches with German shells flying all round, and they would make bets as to how many Germans they would kill and had killed during the day. They were laughing and joking all the time. A party of the King's Own went into one battle shouting out, ‘ Early doors this way ! Early doors, ninepence ! ’ There were chaps, too, coming in and having their wounds dressed, and going off again to have another go at the Germans. Our men fought simply grand.

At Landrecies, while our men were lying in the trenches there were a couple of fellows playing marbles with bullets from shrapnel shells which had burst around them."

We must quote one more passage from these letters, constituting as they do such important documentary evidence for the minor history of the war, and for the study of the moral qualities called forth by it. A gunner who had been wounded and taken to hospital, writes: "I want to get back to the front as soon as ever the doctor says I am well enough to serve a gun; I don't want to stop here."

It was the moral quality of such soldiers as these that enabled them to maintain so unequal a contest and, by their strategic retreat, to protect the French left against the threatened outflanking movement. It was also owing to the unshakable *morale* of these men that the retreat was so swiftly changed into a victorious offensive in the great days of the Ourcq and the Marne.

Nor is the spirit of the new armies a whit inferior to that of the professionals of the Expeditionary Force.

Mr. H. A. L. Fisher justly quotes as one of the finest episodes in the war the magnificent exploit of the Canadians who, when the Zouaves had been driven back before the unlooked-for stream of asphyxiating gas, themselves undertook to defend

the approaches to Ypres, and held the enemy at bay from the 22nd to the 26th April. "Another exploit," he continues, "no less sublime, was the landing of the Lancashires at the Dardanelles beneath a storm of missiles from rifles and machine guns and heavy artillery and through every obstacle of spike and wire which modern science could oppose. Each of these feats was performed by a body of volunteer soldiers, enlisted on grounds of patriotism, and recently levied, yet showing under the most adverse and desperate circumstances qualities of courage, resource, and persistence which have never been surpassed by the most seasoned veterans of a professional army. Of these new levies only a small portion has, as yet, measured itself with the enemy, but there is no reason to doubt that the splendid fighting qualities which that portion has displayed will be equally evident in the battalions which have not yet crossed the sea."

What the British Army did. First Belgian Campaign

Let us now give a rapid summary of the operations of the British Army from the outbreak of the war.

The mobilisation was very rapidly carried out. The troops began to concentrate on the 5th August ; by the 21st the concentration was complete. The

length of time taken to carry out these operations has been made the subject of adverse criticism. People compared the English performance with the French which, though their forces were vastly more numerous, was carried out nearly as quickly ; and with the Belgians, where the forces were about equal, and the time occupied very considerably less. If, however, we remember the difficulties that have to be overcome in mobilising and concentrating troops out of their own country, we may reasonably enquire whether any grounds for criticism remain.

On the 23rd August the British Army, 80,000 strong, took up its position on the Mons-Condé Canal, with Mons as their centre. General von Kluck, at the head of four army corps, came in contact with the British, who put up a gallant fight but found themselves compelled to retire in consequence of their numerical inferiority, the giving way of the French line on the Sambre, and the fall of Namur.

The Campaign in France

From that time onward General French's army was called upon to carry out an arduous and difficult strategic retreat in order to frustrate von Kluck's endeavour to outflank it. By the 24th the British Army had got back nearly as far as Maubeuge. Next day it withdrew to the Cateau-

Landrecies line and emerged intact from this difficult ordeal, thanks to two most brilliantly fought engagements. These were the battles of Landrecies and Le Cateau, fought by the second army corps under General Smith-Dorrien and the fourth division under General Snow. It was in consequence of these battles that the retreat was henceforth carried out under less difficult conditions, and on the morning of the 27th Sir John French's army reached St. Quentin.

From the 27th to the 31st the retreating forces suffered less molestation, though the English were involved in a violent cavalry action east of Compiègne.

On the 4th September the British were able to take up the positions they were destined to occupy during the great attack, which General Joffre ordered on the following day.

On the 6th, von Kluck bore down on the British front, hoping to pierce and envelop the Allies' centre ; but, being himself attacked in the rear by the 6th French Army, on the Ourcq, he was compelled to beat a hasty retreat, with the British in hot pursuit. Sir John French's most important contribution to the great victory of the Marne thus began on the 8th September, and was marked by actions at Rebais, la Trétoire, and le Petit Morin. These were followed, on the 9th, by the passage of

the Marne and the battle of La Ferté ; on the same night, by a violent onslaught on von Kluck's right ; and on the 10th by the pursuit of the rearguard of the fleeing enemy. That day 2000 prisoners fell into the victor's hands.

The month of September was spent by both sides in the organisation of defensive works on the Aisne. The British Army was transferred to the north, where it was in closer contact with its supply bases. During October 6000 British marines were sent to help in the defence of Antwerp, which they were unfortunately not able to save. I myself saw them as they hurried to the scene, amid the cheers of the Flemish populace. No sooner had they arrived than they demanded the honour of fighting alongside the Belgian soldiers.

These operations must not be looked upon as haphazard or isolated. They formed part of a big plan of the Franco-British General Staff, which aimed at forming a line that should link up the forts of Antwerp with the French line. This plan it was found impossible to carry out. Instead, the line had to rest on the North Sea, near Ostend, and it was there that the Antwerp garrison bore the brunt of the first attempt on the part of the Germans to break through to Calais.

Almost simultaneously the British were called on to withstand another onslaught. During the last

fortnight in October General Smith-Dorrien, commanding the Second Army Corps, held the Germans in check at La Bassée under circumstances of peculiar difficulty.

Second Belgian Campaign

But it was at Ypres that the British had their hardest task to perform. This battle, the greatest the British Army has ever fought, lasted a whole month. The Allies, whose forces scarcely totalled 150,000 men, succeeded, thanks to prodigies of valour and endurance, in holding up more than half a million Germans. Here, for two whole days, the British 7th Division held a line eight miles long against the onslaught of three German Army Corps. Among the most glorious and most trying days of this protracted struggle, those which merit special mention are the 29th and 31st October, 1914, when, the salient at Ghelinwelt having given away, the situation was saved by the British Second Division ; the 6th and 7th November, 1914, when the Germans attacked Klein Zillibeke and were repulsed by the Guards Brigade, under Lord Cavan, and the Household Cavalry ; and the 11th November, 1914, when the Prussian Guard was crushed by the First Corps.

The German aims in the direction of the Pas-de-Calais were frustrated, and both sides began to

settle down to trench warfare, with all its trials and monotony. It was marked by various successful actions. Calling for special mention among them are the engagement in which the Indians took part at La Bassée in the middle of December, 1914, and the brilliant piece of fighting at Neuve Chapelle which lasted from the 10th to the 12th March, 1915, when the English succeeded in penetrating the German positions to the depth of a mile over a front three miles long, but were unable for divers reasons to attain all the results that might have been anticipated.

Third Belgian Campaign

On the 17th April, 1916, the British had possessed themselves of Hill 60. This was part and parcel of a plan which aimed at clearing the road to Lille, Hill 60 being in close proximity to the German lines of communication with that town.

On the 20th the Germans, in order to prevent the British from bringing up reinforcements, bombarded Ypres, and on the 22nd they made use of asphyxiating gas for the first time, against a French division. This division falling back, a brigade of Canadian troops was left in a critical position. However, by prodigies of valour, these gallant fellows proved themselves equal to the emergency. For four days the Germans repeated their gas and shell attacks and compelled Sir John French to

take up a new position slightly to the rear of his original lines. "This," said *The Times*, "is the first indication of the new German plan,—to defend their lines with fewer men and more guns, so as to keep our infantry at a distance and thus compel us to wage an artillery duel at long range." These tactics had the effect *inter alia* of causing the Allies to reorganise their output of munitions and war material.

The September Offensive, 1915

At the end of September, 1915, the British played their part worthily in the general offensive on the Western front. After two days' uninterrupted bombardment the 4th Army Corps gained possession of Loos, the 5th carried Cité, Sainte Eloi, and a part of the village of Haisne. The 1st Army Corps was not so fortunate. Owing to lack of support it was unable to maintain itself in the ground it had won. For divers reasons these brilliant tactical engagements did not result in the strategic success that had been looked for.

At the end of the year Sir John French requested to be relieved of his responsibilities. He was succeeded in the Chief Command of the British Forces by General Sir Douglas Haig.

The Career of Sir John French

The Times (December 16th, 1915) on the occasion of the relinquishment by Sir John French of his command of the British Armies in France and Flanders, published the following biographical notice :

“ Sir John French was marked out for high promotion by his brilliant work in the South African War, first under Sir George White and afterwards under Lord Roberts. Born in 1852, he was originally destined for the Navy and served for four years as Cadet and Midshipman. In 1874, however, he entered the Army. He served with his regiment, the 19th Hussars, in the Sudan in 1884-5. From 1889-93 he commanded his regiment and in 1897, after holding several staff appointments, was appointed to the command of a cavalry brigade. After the South African War, from which he returned Lieutenant-General, K.C.B. and K.C.M.G., his rapid promotion continued and in 1907 he was appointed General, and two years ago, Field-Marshal. He has served as Inspector-General of the Forces, and First Military Member of the Army Council.” . . .

On December 15th, 1915, the War Office announced that “ since the commencement of the War, during over sixteen months of severe and incessant strain, Field-Marshal Sir John French has most ably commanded our Armies in France

and Flanders, and he has now at his own instance relinquished that command. His Majesty's Government with full appreciation of and gratitude for the conspicuous services which Sir John French has rendered to the country at the front, have, with the King's approval, requested him to accept the appointment of Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the troops stationed in the United Kingdom, and Sir John French has accepted that appointment. His Majesty the King has been pleased to confer upon Sir John French the dignity of a Viscount of the United Kingdom."

In its leading article on December 17th *The Times* said :

"He shares with the French leaders the glory won at the battle of the Marne, when he joined in the prompt renewal of the offensive despite his severe losses and the great fatigue of his troops. . . . He has known how to nurse the new Armies and how to bring them, gradually and cautiously, towards the day of their ultimate trial. . . . England has instinctively believed in Field-Marshal French, just as France has believed in General Joffre."

Sir John French was in command of the British troops in France for exactly 500 days.

Sir Douglas Haig

On December 16th, 1915, the War Office announced as follows : "Sir Douglas Haig has

been appointed to succeed Field-Marshal Sir John French in command of the Army in France and Flanders." Upon this occasion *The Times* published the following summary of his career :

" Sir Douglas Haig is 54 years of age, and is, like his predecessor, a cavalry officer. From Clifton he proceeded to Brasenose, Oxford . . . and joined the 7th Hussars in 1885. He also passed the Staff College. His first war service was in the Sudan in 1898 when he obtained promotion. In the South African War he earned great distinction as a cavalry leader, and later held the post of Inspector-General of Cavalry in India. From 1907-1909 he was director of Staff duties at Army Headquarters, and in 1909 he returned to India as Chief of Staff.

" In the present war, Sir Douglas Haig was appointed to command the 1st Army Corps, which was singled out by Sir John French for its magnificent work on the Marne. In November, 1914, he was promoted to be General (Super-numerary to establishment) for distinguished service in the field.

" Last July Sir John French in his despatch on the second battle of Ypres, specially mentioned 'the valuable services rendered by General Sir Douglas Haig in his successful handling of the troops of the 1st Army throughout the battle of Festubert.' " . . .

Complete understanding and co-operation have always existed between Sir Douglas Haig and

General Joffre. On March 10th, 1916, during the most critical stage of the battle of Verdun, the French Commander-in-Chief sent this message to General Haig :

“ The French Army remembers that its recent call on the comradeship of the British Army met with an immediate response.”

That meant that the British had extended their line. On July 1st, when the present Allied offensive was launched, Sir Douglas Haig controlled a front of ninety miles, reaching from the north of Ypres to the Somme. What he has accomplished on that front will be found in the summary of the Somme operations.

*British Operations on the Somme from July 1st to
September 14th, 1916*

After preparatory bombardment of great intensity, the first great infantry attack was delivered on July 1st. The main German front line, from above La Boisselle on the left to near Carnoy, east by Mametz—positions protected by elaborate defensive works—was then penetrated. The villages of La Boisselle, Fricourt, Mametz and Montaubon, with all the intervening entrenched ground, were captured. Altogether a front of 10,000 yards to an average depth of 2000 yards was broken through. In two days 4000 prisoners were captured. On

July 5 this total was increased to 6000. Desperate local fighting during the next ten days yielded a gain of another 1000 yards in depth, the village of Contalmaison, the whole of Mametz, Bernafey Woods and the village of Ovillers-la-Boisselle falling into British hands. Without intermission the grand attack on the German second line was begun on July 14th, when a front of about 5000 yards was shattered as completely as the first line had been a fortnight earlier. This success yielded the villages of Bazentin-le-Grand and Bazentin-le-Petit, with their respective woods, as well as the greater part of Longueval and the lower edge of Delville Wood. In the centre High Wood was reached; on the right Trônes Wood was cleared and captured.

Another period of fierce local fighting followed. A subsidiary and successful attack on July 16th-17th gave the British another 1300 yards of the German second line and brought them to a point due east of Pozières, captured in its entirety on July 26th.

The third phase of the battle, which occupied over a month, saw the British gradually pushing their way up the final slopes and over the bare, shell-swept summit of the ridge. Though less spectacular than the first two phases, this phase was not less arduous and certainly not less successful. In ten days a sequence of stunning blows, each with its hurricane bombardment, carried

the British from a little above Ovillers to some 700 yards below Thiepval. By August 24th Delville Wood had been completely cleared and the British line extended well to the north of it. Equally brilliant was the operation which forced a passage from Pozières to Mouquet Farm and over the high ground and beyond the Windmill on the Bapaume Road.

On no single day during this third phase did the British fail to make some ground. Nowhere were they thrown back; nowhere were the Germans able to stem their advance. The intensity of fighting is shown by the number of prisoners. On one day nearly 1000 were captured; on several other days between 400 and 500. Unquestionably the *morale* of the enemy had been severely shaken.

The fourth phase began on September 3rd, when the French and British forces attacked on a front of 6000 yards between the region north of Maurepas. Large enemy forces were swept away. The French captured the villages of Le Forest and Cléry-sur-Somme as well as the German trenches from the north of Le Forest to Combles. The British captured part of Ginchy and the whole of Guillemont, while an advance was made on the east of Mouquet Farm. The Allies captured 3000 prisoners between them, besides many guns.

By September 5th, despite stubborn enemy resist-

ance and heavy rain, the British had advanced their line 1500 yards east of Guillemont and gained a footing in Leuze Wood. Further south the whole of the enemy's strong defensive system on a front of 1000 yards in and around Falfemont was taken.

On September 9th, after desperate fighting, Ginchy was in British hands. Sir Douglas Haig was able to report on September 10th that, as a result of a week's campaign, his army had advanced 6000 yards to a depth varying from 300 to 3000 yards. Strong counter attacks both in the neighbourhood of Ginchy and in the vicinity of Pozières were beaten off on September 11th with heavy losses to the Germans. But in their official report of September 12th the Germans were obliged to admit the loss of Ginchy. The French resumed a vigorous offensive south of Combles on September 12th.

During the whole of the operations outlined above the British developed a systematic aircraft attack, clearly establishing their ascendancy over the enemy in this department.

Achievements of the British Armies outside Europe

The operations of the British armies outside Europe were subsidiary only in the sense of being less directly aimed at Germany, though their achievement was one of the principal counter-balances to the enemy's capture of Allied territory.

The German possessions in the Pacific were seized during the first two months of the war by Australian and New Zealand troops accompanied by some Imperial warships and the Australian Navy. On November 10th Kiao-chau, the only German possession on the Asiatic Continent, was formally handed over to the Japanese and British, after a skilful siege of the chief town, Tsing Tao, had been pressed to a successful issue. In West Africa, Togoland, a colony of about the same size as Ireland, was occupied by British and French troops by August 27th. Kamerun, a German colony farther south, which is one-third larger than the German Empire in Europe, presented great difficulties owing to its vast spaces and poor communications. The first raiding columns from Nigeria were too weak to achieve anything, and the winter of 1914-15 was spent in raid and counter-raid across the borders. The port Duala was made the British headquarters and gradually columns began to cross the country to meet French troops and the useful little force from the Belgian Congo. In spite of the numerous strong places in the country the enemy was pursued from one position to another until, by the end of 1915, the bulk of his force was driven into the south-east corner of the country. Yaunda, the new capital, was seized on New Year's Day, 1916, and the strong hill station at Mora capitulated

the following month ; but the main force fled to Spanish Muni and was interned.

South-West Africa was, like Kamerun, a country devoid of communications, and the speed with which it was overrun gives no suggestion of the hardships the troops had to overcome. Sandstorms tore their tents and even their clothes to shreds ; land mines killed the unwary who ran to the water-courses. Yet in the first months from January, 1915, when the campaign really commenced, General Botha's converging columns, after several fierce engagements, compelled the surrender of the capital (and wireless station) Windhoek. The Germans fell back to the north-east of the colony and in June the British troops commenced by forced marches to cut them off from Angola. On July 9th they were caught and, recognising their defeat, surrendered. German East Africa, which is twice the size of the German Empire in Europe, held a larger enemy force and it made good use of its opportunities, raiding the neighbouring British colonies and avoiding decisive action. The wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam was destroyed in August, 1914 ; but the small British forces which attempted to invade the colony were defeated in November at Tanga and in January, 1915, at Jassin. At the end of the year General Smith-Dorrien was appointed to the chief command ; but he had to

resign through ill-health in two months and General Smuts succeeded him in February, 1916. In two months the whole of the northern part of the colony was overrun, and a column entering the southern half took Neu Langenburg on May 30th. Wilhelmstal, the new capital, was occupied a fortnight later ; and the worst of the organised resistance was overcome.

The entry of Turkey into the war in November, 1914, opened a vast area of attack, and a British force at once landed in the Persian Gulf, took Basra on November 23rd, Kurna six days later, and, in spite of almost insuperable difficulties in transport, the British force consolidated its position against lateral attacks and went forward. The following September Kut was taken and, after a rest, General Townshend continued his advance towards Baghdad. A successful action was fought on November 22nd at Ctesiphon, eighteen miles from Baghdad ; but the water giving out and Turkish reinforcements coming up, he fell back in good order on Kut. There he was besieged until April 29th when he was compelled to surrender. The victory which seemed to be in the grasp of a British force, in one of the attempts to relieve Kut, was lost by a blunder.

The campaign against the Dardanelles was also unsuccessful, though the heroic landing of British and Australian troops in April, 1915, will live in

history. The end of the Gallipoli peninsula was firmly in British hands when a new force was landed in Suvla Bay in August ; but again victory which was virtually won was allowed to slip away through slowness in pressing home the attack. Lord Kitchener and Sir Charles Monro visited the position towards the end of the year and in accordance with their views it was quietly evacuated during the nights of December 19th, 1915, and January 8th, 1916. The evacuation, like the landing, was a feat worthy of a more successful campaign ; but each of these operations in Mesopotamia and Gallipoli served its purpose in weakening the forces available for the defence of Armenia, by which Russia profited, and in rendering very difficult a really serious attack on Egypt.

The capture of the Suez Canal which, being the main artery of the British Empire, would have been the principal objective of the Turkish forces was never near achievement. In February, 1915, an abortive attack was made and though the British did not follow up their success in beating it off, the troops were so roughly handled that no further attempt was made for over a year. Meanwhile the Senussi who attacked on the western frontier of Egypt were met and dispersed ; and a punitive expedition was successfully conducted in May, 1916, against the Sultan of Darfur. A more formidable attempt

to capture the Canal was made in August. By this time General Sir Archibald Murray, Lord French's Chief of Staff at Mons, was in command. The Turks with the German detachments were some 14,000 strong. They attacked on a front of seven miles with a number of guns; but they were decisively defeated and driven off with great loss. Over 3000 unwounded prisoners were taken.

Towards the end of the year 1915 a French and British force was landed at Salonica to assist Serbia; and, by their aid, the retreat of the Serbs was covered and the enemy was robbed of one of his main objectives in the Serbian campaign, an outlet to the Mediterranean. Under General Sarrail the Allied forces lay entrenched at Salonica until, reinforced by Russian, Italian and Serbian troops, they were able to take the offensive in the summer of 1916. While French, Russians and Serbs marched towards Monastir, the British crossed the Struma and imposed a gradually increasing strain upon the Bulgars which was of critical value to the Rumanians in their campaign to the north.

Zeppelin Raids and Losses

On August 22nd, 1916, Major Baird, who represents the new Air Board in the House of Commons, stated that up to that date there had been 34 Zeppelin raids, in ten of which there had been

no casualties. The whole number of persons killed was 334 civilians and 50 soldiers. The military damage was absolutely nil.

Seven Zeppelins had been destroyed, and five others had been damaged to such an extent that there was reason to hope that they had in fact been destroyed.

The Allies as a whole had accounted for 35 Zeppelins.

By September 13th, 1916, there had been three more raids and two more persons killed.

Another Zeppelin was brought down by an aeroplane and totally destroyed on the night of September 2nd-3rd. On the same occasion a second Zeppelin was, according to an official report (September 6th) "believed to have been very seriously damaged."

In the raids which took place at the end of September four more Zeppelins were brought down, to the joy of the beholders who had collected in crowds in the streets and witnessed the doom of the burning monster as it fell to earth turning night into day.

The Tanks

Among the war inventions, mention must be made of the appearance of some other particularly formidable devices known as "Tanks." During the battle of the Somme these mysterious things

made their way across trenches, barbed wire, brick walls, etc., crushing everything that came their way. They struck terror into the hearts of the enemy.

Submarine Warfare

Suspended for a time owing to American protests, the submarine campaign was reopened by the sinking of several vessels off the entrance to New York Harbour on the 8th October, 1916.

Home Police Arrangements

The success and effectiveness of the military operations are continually being jeopardised by hostile espionage. Here, again, England was slow to realise the necessities of the situation. England is the country of individual liberty, and it was a long time before she could make up her mind to restrict the freedom of anyone who had settled within her borders. Sincerity and good faith are essentially English qualities, and it was only by degrees and under pressure of circumstances—particularly the anti-German riots at Hammersmith in May, 1915—that the English came at last to understand that there were people whom it behoved her to suspect and keep under observation. An Englishman would quite readily admit that Germany was his country's enemy; but he was loth to believe that the *Germans* were

his enemies. For a long time, therefore, German agents had a free hand in London and elsewhere. They scarcely went to the trouble of calling themselves Swiss. More than once we viewed with misgiving the excessive guilelessness on the part of the English who, despite the atrocities which we had seen with our own eyes, continued to show consideration for the accomplices of the barbarian hordes that had laid Belgium in ruins. German prisoners in England have been treated like gentlemen and with a wealth of regard that has frequently struck us as excessive.

The Germans, of course, did not fail to profit handsomely by this over-benevolent attitude. They kept up relationships in England with people who not only pursued a disintegrating propaganda with the object of fomenting internal troubles, but adopted measures of a still more practical character. How can one fail to recognise their criminal hand in the many accidents that have occurred—accidents too numerous to have been merely the result of chance, such as fires and explosions in motor and aviation works, in factories engaged on war work, in the magazines of men-of-war ?

Gradually the English became alive to the need for precaution. Day by day the meshes of the postal censorship grew finer and finer. At present the system is nearly perfect and imposes a con-

siderable handicap on the enemies' clandestine activities. But spies are ingenious folk, and whenever there are secrets to overhear and betray, attentive ears are never lacking.

The surveillance of foreigners can be carried out without any great difficulty. It is easy to keep an eye on the passengers arriving or departing by boat. The various formalities such as passports and declarations form a suitable corollary to the post-office censorship.

The censorship of the newspapers is hardly complete. It strictly prohibits any criticism of the Allied Governments, but permits free discussion of the actions of the British Cabinet. Towards the end of 1915 the diplomatic censorship was completely abolished. The British system exhibits more tolerance than the French, and more again than the German, thus affording an interesting object lesson in comparative practical democracy. Free circulation has frequently been accorded to articles of a bitter and pessimistic nature, and these had a bad effect on the Continent and caused correspondingly great rejoicings in Germany, but men of unimpeachable patriotism considered their publication necessary in order to stir their countrymen to action.

CHAPTER VI

THE MILITARY EFFORT FROM THE INDUSTRIAL POINT OF VIEW

The Shortage of Munitions

ON the 14th May, 1915, *The Times* Military Correspondent on the Western front wrote that the absence of an unlimited supply of high explosives had proved a fatal obstacle to success. In saying this he gave free and open expression to criticisms that had been rife in the lobby of the House of Commons and in private circles for a long time past. The failure of the British Army to reap the full fruits of its splendid achievements at Neuve Chapelle, and the ebb and flow in the defence of Hill 60 on the 17th April were cases in point. An energetic campaign was organised in the newspapers after the publication of *The Times* letter. Questions were put in the Commons. Popular feeling was deeply stirred.

This feeling was unquestionably justified. The War Office had displayed a lack of foresight in its arrangements for the production of munitions, a shortcoming which it shared, however, with the

other partners in the Alliance ; of that the Russian reverses afforded decisive proof.

The daily output of munitions did not equal the necessary consumption. How immense this consumption is, it would be difficult to realise did we not know that the number of shells consumed at Neuve Chapelle alone was greater than the total employed in the whole South African campaign.

Moreover, the English factories had manufactured a great quantity of shrapnel, but only a comparatively restricted supply of high explosives. This was diametrically opposed to the requirements of the situation. In fact the nature of the terrain and the strength of the enemy's defensive works were such that, before an infantry attack could be launched, even under protection of shrapnel fire, it was necessary that the hostile positions should be subjected to such a deluge of high explosives as to render the most thoroughly organised defences untenable.

These defects having been made manifest by bitter experience, measures were taken to remedy them.

A Ministry of Munitions

The 25th May, 1915, witnessed the formation of the Coalition Government in England. Mr. Lloyd George became head of a newly-created department—the Ministry of Munitions. No better

appointment could have been made. Mr. Lloyd George was endowed with conspicuous organising ability and possessed great influence with the working classes. The new Minister lost no time in setting to work. He remedied the most urgent defects and, a month later, laid on the table of the House the Munitions Bill that was to solve the great problem once for all.

*How to Mobilise Labour. The Problem and its
Solution*

To realise the immensity of the task performed by the present Ministry of Munitions it is necessary to read the two speeches delivered by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons on the 23rd June and the 28th July, 1915. These frank and open statements show us both the difficulties that had to be confronted and the manner in which they were overcome.

The problem may be stated as follows :—

Experience had shown that of the two opposing forces the advantage would rest with the one that could outdo the other in the expenditure of munitions. From that time onwards the question ceased to be a purely military one : it became a labour question. It was in the workshops, the factories, the arsenals, that victory was to be wrought out.

This had been perfectly well understood by the

Germans, and in this as in so many other respects they had the advantage over the Allies of preparation and foresight. These preparations were of two kinds. They consisted, in the first place, in the accumulation of reserves of munitions and of the raw material necessary for their manufacture ; and, secondly, in the measures ensuring the immediate and effective mobilisation of the national industries for the sole and exclusive purpose of carrying on the war. The Central Empires were able to turn out 250,000 shells a day, or nearly 8,000,000 a month. The British rate of production was 2500 high explosive shells and 13,000 shrapnel shells a day. Thus, the problem before the Allies was first of all to equal and then to surpass the formidable productive capabilities of their adversaries. The sooner they did so, the sooner victory would be theirs.

England's reserves in the matter of labour and machinery were immense. But they were all un-systematised. The problem was to organise these resources, and to organise them without delay.

Mr. Lloyd George's first step was to select his staff. A large number of business men, technical engineers, and others freely placed their services at his disposal, most of them without demanding any remuneration from the State. Each one of them was put in charge of a particular branch, *e.g.*,

metals, explosives, machinery, labour, chemical research, and so on.

But Mr. Lloyd George's principal aim being to obtain quick returns, he regarded it as an urgent necessity to decentralise the work as much as possible. The United Kingdom was split up into a certain number of districts ; special committees were formed for the purpose of organising the work in each district. They consisted of local business men who were familiar with the resources and the labour conditions of the place ; of engineers who, in order to fit them for their duties, had undergone a brief period of service in the Government Arsenals or in one of the following works : Elswick, Vickers-Maxim, or Beardmore ; and of a technical engineer and a Secretary in touch with the Ministry of Munitions.

One of the great difficulties was the matter of raw material. Some England possessed in abundance, some could only be obtained with difficulty. The department had also to see to it that no attempt was made by unscrupulous suppliers to make a corner in their goods. The doings of the metal markets were carefully looked into, with immediately beneficial results.

Having provided the raw material, the next thing was to get to work on it. Where was the plant to come from ?

A vast registration scheme was set on foot, and in a short time the Government had an accurate idea of the machinery at their disposal. As soon as the process of classification was completed it was of course evident that what was chiefly lacking were certain machines required in the manufacture of large shells. The Government thereupon took all the big machine works under its direct control for the duration of the war. Henceforth these works were Government works, and on the 28th July, 1915, Mr. Lloyd George remarked with satisfaction that there had not been a word of protest on the part of any machine-tool manufacturers, although the change involved a considerable diminution in their profits. Owing to this measure, supplemented by the creation of a committee of machine-tool manufacturers of the United Kingdom, the output of material required for the manufacture of munitions was greatly increased, and will increase still further as time goes on.

The Government was thus able to reorganise the production works themselves. These were of two kinds. First, there were the munition works properly so called, where it was necessary to extend the plant or increase the rate of production. Then there were factories which had to be altered so as to adapt them to the new kind of work. Finally, the Government decided to create sixteen large

works—a number subsequently increased to twenty-six—the equipment of which is being carried out with the utmost dispatch.

The next thing was to organise the labour and recruit fresh hands. There was a choice of two methods, the compulsory and the voluntary. After going into the matter with the Trades Union leaders it was the latter method that was decided upon. It was more in accordance with English traditions and sentiment. A vast recruiting campaign was started, the headquarters being the town hall, in one hundred and eighty different centres. It lasted a week, and was an immense success. Mr. Lloyd George stated, on the 23rd July, 1915, that the Government had got together 100,000 workmen, most of whom were experts in machinery and shipbuilding. True, it was not possible to employ them all, some already doing Government work, others being indispensable to the civil life of the country. But when all deductions were made it was found that the number of men was amply sufficient for present needs. To them we must add the skilled workmen who had joined the army and who, as far as possible, were brought home to serve their country in an industrial capacity.

All the workmen were assigned either to the works already in existence—which in many cases were short of hands and unable for this reason to

fulfil their contracts—or else they were allotted to the new factories.

But in view of influence wielded by the Labour Unions, various provisions were inserted in the Munitions Act. They related to the settlement of labour disputes, and to the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs the grounds for which had not been submitted to the Board of Trade.

To obviate such disputes, which were generally called forth by the excessive profits accruing to the employers and the demands of the wage-earners, the system of "Controlled Establishments" was instituted. Every establishment engaged on munition work was placed, so far as the regulation of profits and salaries was concerned, under direct Government control. Any modification in the rate of wages had to be submitted to the Ministry of Munitions, which had power to refer the question to an Arbitration Board specially set up by the Act.

To complete this rapid survey it must be added that a department was created by the Ministry of Munitions, under the control of an Under-Secretary, whose special business it was to examine war inventions.

Results

On the 20th December, 1915, Mr. Lloyd George, in a speech delivered in the House of Commons,

summarised the results of the first six months of his tenure of office.

From every point of view his report was exceedingly satisfactory. We will take a few points.

Orders placed before the formation of the department were delivered with an increase of 16 per cent on previous deliveries. The number of new orders placed increased by 80 per cent.

The State regulation of the metal market resulted in a saving of from 15 to 20 million pounds sterling.

The present output of shells for a single week is three times as great as the entire output for May, 1915, which means that the rate of production is twelve times as great.

The enormous quantity of shells consumed during the offensive of September, 1915, was made good in a month. The time will soon come when a week will suffice.

The output of machine guns is five times as great ; that of hand grenades is increased fortyfold.

The production of heavy artillery has been accelerated, and the heaviest guns of the early days of the war are now among the lightest.

An explosive factory in the South of England which on October 15th, 1915, started to fill bombs at the rate of 500 a week with a staff of 60 was in March, 1916, turning out 15,000 a week, with a staff of 250.

An entirely new factory which started work at the end of October, 1915, with one filling shed and six girl fillers and an output of 270 a week, was, in March, 1916, employing 175 girls and handling 15,000 bombs a week.

The Ministry of Munitions has built, or is building, housing accommodation for 60,000 workers, and canteens and mess-rooms in munition works now give accommodation for 500,000 workers a day. . . .

The number of strikes was reduced to three.

The number of controlled establishments as on the 7th July was 4000.¹ To these must be added the Government Arsenals and factories, including the new works, the number of which the Department considers it inexpedient to mention.

These figures speak volumes in themselves.

Mr. Kellaway, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to Dr. Addison (Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Munitions), stated on July 7th, 1916, the following facts :

“ Of the 4000 controlled firms now producing munitions, 95 per cent had never produced a gun, shell or cartridge before the war. In ten months they produced more shells than all the Government

¹ On the 20th August, 1915, it was 539. One merely has to compare these figures to realise how vast and effective has been the work of the Munitions Department.

arsenals and great armament shops existing at the outbreak of war ; and that was only a very small percentage of the total weekly production of shells in the country. Ninety arsenals have been built or adapted, and all except a very few are producing heavy guns, howitzers, big shells or explosives. Our weekly output of .303 cartridges is greater by millions than our annual output before the war, while the output of *guns* and *howitzers* has been increased by several hundreds per cent. . . . One of our leading armament firms has a factory devoted entirely to the provision of a particular gun for the French Government ”—“ Russia has been supplied with great quantities of grenades, rifle cartridges, guns and explosives. . . .”

The Munition Workers

We have already referred to the eagerness with which the workers responded to the appeal made to them by the Ministry of Munitions. As soon as ever the people understood the urgency of the situation thousands upon thousands of fresh hands—both men and women—thronged to offer their services at factory and workshop.

It should be noted that women were among the very first to come forward, even before the Munitions Act came into force. In one of the largest and best-known arsenals in the north, as far back as January, 1915, thousands of young girls were at work, and 65 per cent of them were quite new to

the task. They came to it straight from their villages.

Mr. F. Kellaway gave (on July 7th, 1916) the following figures :

“ There were 184,000 women engaged in war industries in 1914. To-day there are 660,000.

“ The total number of war workers in 1914 was 1,986,000 ; now it is 3,500,000.

“ Women are engaged on 471 different munition processes, including 19 operations in connection with aeroplane production, the manufacture of howitzer bombs, the making of shrapnel bullets, filling bombs with smoke, explosives, gas, and other lethal contents ; 31 processes in the production of machine tools ; 6 processes in connection with marine mines ; and 31 processes in shipbuilding. Two-thirds of these operations had never been done by a woman previous to twelve months ago.”

Be it noted that 77,000 women have taken the men's places in the metal trade and industry ; 14,000 in the leather industry, and 274,000 in miscellaneous trades.

In addition to these regular workers there are now whole relief brigades consisting of women of first-rate education, who have no need to earn their own living but who have merely learned munition work for the sake of relieving the regular hands when the latter have their weekly day off.

One may see them training at Lesney House in order to serve as relief shifts at Vickers' works. That is only one out of hundreds of cases that might be cited. In some places, even before the Government factories were erected, people were "getting their hand in" so as to be able to start work as soon as possible.

What is true of munitions is also true of the manufacture of equipment generally. The work was carried on day and night, and female labour was employed on an extensive scale. Nightly, crowds of women are at work on the manufacture of fuses, bombs, cartridges; cutting leather, making equipment of every description from saddles to respirators, from rivets for ships to tents for soldiers.

I have seen in one building alone 3000 women busy making tents. Their ages varied from 18 to 55. Tent-making is a hard, difficult, and wearisome business, and these women had for the most part been accustomed to work of a totally different order. They were dressmakers, bookbinders, shop assistants, or domestic servants. None of them had previously been engaged on night work, night work for women being illegal in England. A great number of men also took up tent-making, working at sewing machines alongside the women, and receiving their orders from the most capable of them. The men belonged to a wholly different

class. They were people who followed a totally different occupation, who, after they had got through their day's work, compelled themselves to undertake half a night of manual labour in a tent factory. Included in their number were doctors, barristers, clerks, and journalists, each proud to contribute his quota to the great national effort.

On Sundays 2000 men of this class took over the work of the regular employees so that the latter might enjoy their weekly rest. Every week sees an increase in the number of these volunteers, although their only incentive is the satisfaction they derive from having cheerfully done their duty to their country—for it cannot be denied that tent-making is a monotonous task and one generally considered unworthy of a man.

The tangible results of this rivalry of effort have been immense. At present the all-important question of munitions and equipment has been solved so far as Great Britain is concerned. The extension of the British front proves not merely that the British are numerically in a position to take an increased share of the burden, but that they have sufficient reserves of ammunition to await an enemy attack, or to take the offensive themselves, with equanimity, unbeset by any of the anxieties that troubled them at Neuve Chapelle.

Looking at the moral aspect of the thing, the

manner in which the English people, so strongly individualistic in their ideas, so stoutly opposed to State interference, came to recognise the necessity of submitting to a discipline as strict as that introduced by the Munitions Act, is a fresh proof that the gravity of the present crisis and the loftiness of their duty are alike appreciated by them.

Conclusion

This immense effort is bound to result, not merely in the British Army's having everything it requires and in its being enabled to carry on the campaign with effect: it enables a similar service to be rendered to the Allies, whose industrial centres are in the hands of the enemy.

"We know," said Mr. Lloyd George, "that the Allies are awaiting an effort on our part which seems to be almost superhuman. That effort we shall make. To-morrow we shall be in a position to provide the people who are fighting with us for the cause of humanity with all that they need for the common task. It should be known that our wealth, like our natural resources and the output of our factories, is a common patrimony which we shall share with our Allies. . . . There is not a sacrifice which our people—the whole of our people, from the highest to the lowest—is not prepared to make. We are, and shall be, sparing in nothing; we are seeking day and night for an opportunity of doing

more, and there is nothing, nothing in the world, we are not determined to attempt. Tell those who have been disturbed by the Labour situation, of the magnificent sacrifices which have been made by our trade unions in renouncing until the end of the war their dearest privileges. Tell them that our workmen are fully conscious of the vital importance of the task which is entrusted to them. Tell them that the Government has now under its control all the factories capable of producing guns, rifles and shells, as well as all the foundries and machine-tool factories, and that all this world of industry does not produce a single pound of metal which is not destined for the needs of the armies. A numerous and expert body of labour is concentrated in these immense workshops and I have not hesitated to bring back from the front all the engineers and other useful workmen. Both in the firing line and in the country there is not a single person who does not understand our needs, and who has not endeavoured to facilitate my task. . . . As long as there remains a single German soldier on the soil of France and Belgium, no Englishman will ever consent to dream of peace.”¹

¹ These declarations clearly show the definite and decisive character of the plan of action with which Mr. Lloyd George undertook the Premiership in December, 1916.

CHAPTER VII

THE FINANCIAL EFFORT

The Other Blood

THIS happy phrase was recently applied by an Italian to the funds required to carry on the war. And if we look at what England has done from this point of view, we shall find that here too she has shown herself generous to the point of prodigality.

No one was surprised at this. Whenever England intervenes, people expect to see her spend her money freely. She is so rich! But this very view of things is somewhat calculated to detract from the real merit of the pecuniary sacrifices she undertakes. Some there are who seem to think that, for a country possessing such mighty resources, it is no excessively meritorious achievement to find money for every requirement.

Must we here once more observe that in England, as in other countries, the State, as such, neither possesses nor creates wealth, and that the wealth it has, and is able to dispose of, is necessarily furnished directly or indirectly by the individuals

composing the State, and that the English taxpayer is worthy of no small praise for accepting, without a murmur, the heavy charges to which he is now put and the still heavier ones in store, in order to provide for the country's defence? Moreover, the expenditure to which the British Government has agreed is, even for a rich nation, on so colossal a scale, that it ought to command respect. "The other blood" has flowed in torrents indeed!

More than Five Millions a Day

In a speech delivered before the House of Commons in September, 1915, Mr. McKenna, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when submitting the new taxes for the approval of the House, stated a few facts regarding the cost of the war. The daily expenditure he put down as about four million pounds, while in the fourth war Budget (April, 1916) it had reached five millions, a truly fabulous figure, and, when we consider it in relation to the length of time the war has been going on, we are enabled to realise, without any other evidence, how immense is the financial burden that England has taken on her shoulders. We must quote in full the opening part of the speech referred to. It is a model of lucid and accurate expression. We must quote it not merely in order to give people food for thought regarding the enormous financial

outlay entailed by the war, but also to show how imperturbably England regards expenditure on a scale so immeasurably in excess of any ordinary estimate as to become almost fantastic and beyond our comprehension.

Official Figures

The following is Mr. McKenna's speech :

“ The Budget which I am about to propose is the third since the outbreak of war. The first was introduced by my predecessor last November, when he proposed new taxation, which it is now estimated will bring in a revenue of sixty-eight and a half millions sterling in a full year. Last May my right hon. friend the Minister of Munitions proposed another Budget, but he did not then include any new taxes, although he warned the country and the House that at a later period in the year another Budget would be necessary. It has fallen to my lot to introduce a third Budget, in which I must ask the House to assent to additional and unprecedented *burdens*, which, great as they are, I feel confident if the taxes are approved, will be accepted by the country. Before I come to the subject of the new taxes, the Committee will wish to know how we stand with regard to revenue and expenditure. A preliminary consideration is essential. The Committee will understand that the difficulty of estimating in a time of war is *overwhelming*. New military requirements, a change in the method of carrying on the war, entail addi-

tional expenditure far beyond what would have been anticipated. Estimates which are framed in one month fairly and accurately in accordance with the knowledge of the time may prove to be hopelessly inaccurate in the succeeding month. Subject to this caution, I will give to the Committee such estimates as I can. In 1913-14, that is to say, in the last year of peace, the revenue and expenditure nearly balanced at about £198,000,000.

“In 1914-15, the first year of the war, our revenue, including the new taxation proposed by my right hon. friend, rose to £227,000,000 (I am giving round figures), and our expenditure to £561,000,000. The deficit for the year was, accordingly £334,000,000. The estimate of revenue made last May for the current year was £267,000,000, and on the hypothesis that the war would last at least until the 31st of March next the estimate of expenditure was £1,133,000,000. With later experience these estimates have now to be revised. On the existing basis of taxation the revenue may be put at £272,000,000, an increase of £5,000,000, and the expenditure is now estimated at £1,590,000,000, or an increase of £457,000,000. Great as is this total, I am sure that the country is prepared to face it with courage and with confidence, and to meet resolutely every demand which the continuation of the war may entail. To enable us to cope with our colossal task every section of the nation must be called upon to contribute and to make great sacrifices. It is obvious that by taxation alone a small part only of the deficit could be met. On a previous occasion it

was my duty to submit to the House proposals for raising a loan, and hon. gentlemen will remember how magnificently the country responded. On some future occasion I shall have to borrow again. Now I have to lay before the House proposals for taxation which, however little they may do in the way of meeting the deficit, must be upon a scale never before imposed. I do so in the firm assurance that both the House and the country will be prepared to support the Government in carrying through whatever measures of taxation are deemed to be necessary both now and in the future for the successful prosecution of the war.

The Dead-weight Debt

“ I have given the total expenditure of this year at £1,590,000,000, and on this basis we may estimate the dead-weight debt at the close of this year at £2,200,000,000. Our accumulated wealth is great, and a National Debt even of this magnitude will by no means cripple our resources. But with regard to our expenditure, there is a consideration which should be borne in mind. We must not overlook the *strain* which that expenditure imposes upon our sources of supply. The expenditure of £1,590,000,000 *within the year means that goods and services to that value have to be found for our own support and for the support of those whom we are assisting. So far as goods and services can be obtained by us by loan from neutral States, or as the price of securities sold abroad, there is an immediate relief to the burden cast upon our own powers of*

production. But subject to this relief the whole of the burden to provide the balance of the goods and services falls upon the shoulders of the country. When our expenditure is reaching such gigantic proportions, and while it is still rising, I am sure that the Committee will not think it out of place for me to call attention to the real burden which it imposes upon our powers of production. Four and a half months ago, in a forcible passage in his Budget speech, my predecessor described the triple task which this country had assumed in the war—to keep the command of the seas, to maintain an army, to assist our Allies by furnishing them with supplies, and by aiding them *in financing their purchases in countries* other than their own. My predecessor pointed out the interdependence of these military efforts, and their mutual limitations. When he spoke he had in mind a Navy which during the current year was to cost £146,000,000, an Army which was to cost £600,000,000, and external advances to the amount of £200,000,000. We have now to contemplate a Navy costing £190,000,000, an Army costing £715,000,000, and external advances to the amount of £423,000,000. Grave as was the warning of my right hon. friend last May his words have a far weightier significance to-day. I make no apology for *dwelling* upon our expenditure. It is a subject upon which hon. members when they are asked to vote taxation ought to have all the information which is in my possession. When the Prime Minister introduced the Vote of Credit last Wednesday he gave £3,500,000 as the current daily rate of net expenditure from that

Vote. As the Committee know, we have to meet expenditure from votes other than the Vote of Credit, and we have to form an estimate of expenditure over a longer period than the Prime Minister could take into view in moving his particular motion. My survey extends to the end of the financial year, and it includes our expenditure on all services. Taking the whole period until March 31st the best estimate which can be formed of the total daily rate of expenditure on all services from now onwards is upwards of £4,500,000, and in the later weeks of the financial year it may have risen to more than £5,000,000 a day. The Committee will realise what this rising scale of expenditure must mean in the ensuing financial year. I will complete to the Committee the details of the expenditure in the current year. In addition to the main heads to which I have already referred, the Navy, the Army, and external advances, there is a charge of £36,000,000 for *pre and post moratorium bills*, etc., arising out of certain arrangements made in the City at the outbreak of war, and £170,000,000 for our ordinary national services, excluding the Army and Navy but including charges for debt. Food supplies and some minor items, together with allowances for *contingencies*, make up the total to £1,590,000,000. A total of this kind has, of course, never before been reached, but I go further and venture to say that there is no record of a nation having voluntarily accepted *liabilities* bearing so high a proportion to the total national income for *which provision has to be made* within a single year. Such is the account I have to give to the Com-

mittee of the expenditure, past and future, during the present year."

Resources and Precedents

How was such colossal expenditure to be met ? In a speech delivered on the 17th November, 1914, Mr. Lloyd George, who preceded Mr. McKenna at the Exchequer, already indicated the line that British Political Finance would take when he quoted certain interesting precedents showing how easily British finance had borne the charges of previous wars.

" It is," he said, " far and away the largest sum that Great Britain has ever had to meet in the course of a single year. No war has been as costly. The cost of no war has even approximated to the cost of the present war. The largest amount spent by Great Britain on war in a single year before the present war was £71,000,000. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars cost in the aggregate £831,000,000 ; that war was spread over twenty years. The Crimean War cost £67,500,000 ; that was spread over three financial years. The Boer War cost £211,000,000 ; that was spread over four financial years. The first full year of this War will cost at least £450,000,000. We are continually increasing the number of men, and therefore the rate of expenditure increases.

" It is obviously out of the question to raise the whole of this sum of money by taxation. The first question I should like to ask the Committee to

consider is this: *Is it worth while raising any,* and, if so, what proportion by means of taxes? If we do not tax and tax heavily, it will be a serious departure for the first time from the honoured traditions set and hitherto maintained by this country in every single war in which it has ever been engaged. Let us examine one or two of the precedents. The first great precedent to which I shall call the attention of the House is the precedent of the French wars at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. The total cost of those wars, as I have already stated to the Committee, was £831,000,000. The amount raised by loans came to £440,000,000. The amount raised by Pitt and his successors out of taxes came to £391,000,000. The next precedent is the precedent of the Crimean War. The total cost of that war was £67,500,000. Of that, £32,000,000 was found by means of loans, and £35,500,000 was raised by means of special taxes during the war."

Taxes

Germany did not increase her taxes. She issued heavy loans which had no other guarantee save her hope of being able to compel the Allies to defray the cost of the war.

The British Government, however, called on the people, immediately and without hesitation, to furnish a largely increased amount to the national exchequer—a circumstance which not merely affords

a proof of the country's patriotism, but lends firmness and stability to the national credit.

In round figures the British national revenue from taxation prior to the war may be taken as £200,000,000 per annum. These taxes were doubled. First, in November, 1914, they were increased by £100,000,000. It was anticipated that a similar sum would accrue from the fresh taxes introduced by Mr. McKenna in 1915.

Let us now quote the words employed by Mr. McKenna when he presented the details of his scheme to the House, and pay our tribute of admiration to the prudence and sense of fairness by which his plan was inspired.

Most conspicuous in his scheme was the increase in the Income Tax. The proposal was to raise the existing rate by 40 per cent, and to fix the taxable limit at £130 instead of £160.

“The addition of 40 per cent to the income tax with 20 per cent for the remainder of this year, after an allowance for relief which I have just described, is estimated to bring in £11,274,000, and in a full effective year £37,400,000. The reduction of the exemption limit to £130 is estimated to bring in in a full effective year £939,000. The reduction of the abatement from £160 to £120, with the consequential changes, is estimated to produce £3,821,000 in a full year, and the increased liability under Schedule B

is estimated to bring in £2,240,000. The total effect of these charges in 1915-16 will be to increase the revenue by £11,274,000, and in a full effective year by £44,400,000."

The next proposal was to revise the super-tax:

"Henceforth the charge will be 2s. 10d. between £8,000 and £9,000, 3s. 2d. between £9,000 and £10,000, and 3s. 6d. on the surplus of all incomes above £10,000. The effect of this revision of the scale will be to produce £2,150,000 this year, and £2,685,000 in a full effective year."

Yet another source of revenue was henceforth to be at the Government's command, namely, the tax on what Mr. McKenna calls "excess profits": that is to say, on profits resulting directly from the war.

Since the war broke out, a rather singular idea has obtained possession of the mind of the English working-man, namely, the "War Bonus" idea. Its corollary is to be found in the "War Profit" of the manufacturer. In England, where "business is business," a war profit is looked on as a legitimate compensation for the abnormal pressure under which work has to be carried on. The whole idea is a strange one and not over-patriotic, but it throws a valuable light on certain aspects of the individualistic and practical character of the English people.

If we allow that a "war profit" is a legitimate thing, there could certainly be no objection to putting a tax on it. Plainly, people who derive additional income from the war should be compelled to contribute a share to the cost of carrying it on. This new tax, then, met with general approval. This is how Mr. McKenna describes it :

"I come now to my next source of additional revenue, which I hope to obtain from what I will call the Excess Profits Tax. It is proposed to introduce a special tax in respect of profits which have increased during the war period. The tax is to extend to all trades, manufactures, concerns in the nature of trade, and businesses, including agencies whose profits for any business year of account ending on any date between 1st of September, 1914, and 1st of July, 1915, exceeded the profits on the income tax assessment for 1914 by more than £100. It is proposed that £50 per cent of the surplus above £100 shall be taken as the special tax."

What amount are these taxes expected to yield? That Mr. McKenna tells us when, in the course of his speech, he enumerates the chief additional sources of revenue.

Mr. McKenna then proceeds to examine accessory taxes. The first of these is the tax on sugar : "We have now a duty on sugar amounting to 1s. 10d. a cwt. I propose to increase the duty to 9s. 4d. a cwt."

The increased tax on sugar is expected to bring in £5,360,000 this year, and £11,700,000 in the course of a whole financial year.

Next come the taxes on tea, tobacco, chicory, and dried fruits: "The financial effect of these changes will be to increase the revenue in a full year from tea by £4,500,000, from tobacco by £5,100,000, from cocoa, coffee, and chicory by £290,000, and from dried fruits by £180,000."

Then the duty on motor spirits: "On motor spirits I propose an increase of duty of 3d. a gallon, thereby raising the existing rates of 3d. and 1½d. to 6d. and 4½d. a gallon respectively. The proceeds of the tax will, for the time being, be retained in the Exchequer and not paid out to the Road Improvement Fund. The yield this year is estimated at £550,000, and in a full year at £1,100,000. The figures I have given relate to the additional tax, but I hope that the whole of the tax will be retained in the Exchequer during the war. Then I propose to double the patent medicine duty, with an addition to the revenue in a full year of £250,000."

Then certain imported goods are made liable to duty, namely, motor-cars, bicycles, cinema films, clocks, watches, musical instruments, plate glass, hats:

"On each of these I propose an *ad valorem* duty of 33⅓ per cent or its equivalent in the form of a specific tax, that is to say, on weight instead of

price, and I anticipate a total revenue from the duty on these articles in a full year of £1,950,000, of which motor-cars account for £1,150,000 and cinema films for £400,000."

Another source of revenue was the following :

" Some important changes in postal, telegraph, and telephone rates are proposed, which are estimated to lead to an increase of revenue in a full year of £4,975,000."

Below is Mr. McKenna's balance-sheet for the current year :

" I have now come to the end of the proposals and to make up my final balance-sheet of estimated revenue and expenditure for the current year. On the existing basis of taxation the revenue amounts to £272,110,000. New taxation amounts in the present year to £30,924,000 ; revenue from postal charges £1,980,000, making a total of £305,014,000, or in round figures, £305,000,000. The estimated expenditure is £1,590,000,000, and the deficit for the year is accordingly £1,285,000,000. This is the balance for the current year. Last year the realised deficit was £334,000,000, giving an estimated combined deficit for the two years of £1,619,000,000. In arriving at the total of anticipated national indebtedness up to next March we must add to the figure I have just given the amount of pre-war debts, with an allowance for the effects of conversion and for loss on stock issued at discount.

" These calculations, for which full data are not

yet available, lead me to the estimate which I have already given of £2,200,000,000 as the total of our dead-weight debt at the close of the financial year. We shall, then, face the new financial year with a dead-weight debt of £2,200,000,000 and an estimated revenue of £387,000,000. We shall treble our debt and double our taxes. A heavy liability and an immense charge. We have sought in these proposals to make a due allocation of the burden between the present and the future, and in devising new taxation to have careful regard to the distribution of the taxes according to ability to pay."

The fourth War Budget was introduced by Mr. McKenna in April, 1916. It included new taxes on amusements, matches, table-waters and an increase in the existing taxes on income, petrol, cocoa, coffee, chicory, sugar, and excess profits.

The revenue for the financial year 1916-17 was estimated at £509,000,000 of which the war profits tax was expected to yield £86,000,000 and other taxes £423,000,000.

Expenditure for 1916-17 was estimated at £1,825,000,000, viz. £5,000,000 a day. There would thus be a deficit for the year in question of about £1,323,000,000.

"We are fighting," said Mr. McKenna in conclusion, "not only with our incomparable Navy and our heroic Army, but with the whole financial and productive power of our people, which is being thrown into the struggle on behalf of ourselves

and our Allies. . . . The ability and willingness of our people to bear the burden of taxation have established our national credit on an unshakable foundation."

War Loans

It is hardly necessary to remark that the new taxes, large—nay, unprecedented—as they were, could only meet a portion of the extraordinary expenses occasioned by the war.

Over and above the Treasury Bonds, issued to meet current expenses, Bonds which total to-day £200,000,000, with varying rates of interest but averaging about $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, England has issued three War Loans: one in America conjointly with France, the other two at home.

England's share in the American Loan of September, 1915, was £50,000,000; the interest was 5 per cent. It was underwritten at 96 per cent and issued to the public at 98 per cent.

The first loan in England was contracted in December, 1914, and was for £350,000,000. The rate of interest was $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent and the issue price 95 per cent.

It was this loan to which Mr. Lloyd George alluded in his speech of the 27th November, quoted in *Through Terror to Triumph*, under the heading "The Bases of British Credit," when he said: "We are about to contract the biggest loan ever known in the history of the world."

It fell to England to surpass her own effort before the year was out. A loan for an unlimited amount was raised in July, 1915. It was offered direct to the public, and reached the astounding total of £600,000,000. Interest was at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent and it was issued at par.

If any decisive proof was wanted of England's unique financial position, none could be more cogent, more irrefragable than those figures. The result is all the more remarkable when we remember that it was achieved by perfectly open and legitimate methods.

No pressure was brought to bear on banks, or holders of Stock. The public were appealed to fearlessly and straightforwardly, and the method employed to enlist their interest was similar to that used in the recruiting campaign. Countless posters were affixed to walls and hoardings, which, though often open to criticism from the purely artistic point of view, displayed a power of suggestion which argued a very thorough knowledge of the national psychology.

On one of these posters Mr. Lloyd George was depicted with a smiling face. The *motif* of the picture was his "silver bullet" speech on the 8th September, 1914. From a hand full of silver coins, some are falling and turning into rifle bullets as they fall.

This appeal of the hoardings was particularly directed to the small investor. In fact, in order to popularise the loan, subscriptions were invited for sums varying from £5 to 5s., payable in any post office. One poster represented a heavy-looking Teuton soldier, stifled beneath the weight of silver, while underneath were the words : " Lend us five shillings to crush the Germans." Another showed a large key—the key of victory, with three teeth, " Men, Money, and Munitions," and underneath : " Send us your five-shilling piece, and help us to turn this key." Next there was a picture of a cleric looking at a body of soldiers off to the front : " Lend a hand, like them, in the country's defence. Give your money, they are giving their lives."

Ingenious and striking as they were, these advertisements left everyone to do as he chose, only appealing to his sense of duty and patriotism. We have already seen how magnificently the people responded. The results achieved are shown in the following statistical record :

The Effort of the Small Investor

(a) *Post Office Exchequer Bonds*.—Total applications to May 13th, 1916, £609,000 ; total amount, £20,000,000.

(b) *War Saving Certificates* (15s. 6d. each).—Cash

value of War Savings Certificates up to May 13th, 1916, £3,008,082.

War Investments and Thrift

(Mr. J. A. Pease's speech in the House of Commons July 3rd, 1916, on the Post Office Vote.)

"Through the medium of the Post Office nearly £31,000,000 had been invested by what might be regarded as the Savings Bank Public in the 4½ per cent War Loan between the end of June and the middle of July, 1915. . . . From the sale of 5 per cent Exchequer Bonds between January 10th and May 31st, the Post Office received £22,000,000, and War Savings Certificates, . . . purchased up to June 30th, 1916, represented £5,600,000, making a total of £64,000,000 of War investments during the year.

"Although £18,000,000 was withdrawn from the Post Office Savings Bank for investment in the 4½ per cent War Loan, there had been subsequently a steady increase in Post Office Savings Bank Deposits, and at the end of May the balance was £187,500,000, which was within £1,000,000 of the highest balance of recent times."

Exchequer Bonds

In the year 1914-15, £47,700,000 3 per cent Exchequer Bonds were sold.

In the year 1915-16: (1) £242,000 3 per cent Exchequer Bonds; and (2) £153,689,000 5 per cent Exchequer Bonds were sold.

By 31st March, 1916, the total amount raised by the sale of Exchequer Bonds since the war was £201,631,000.

Towards the end of 1915 a fresh loan was floated in America. The object was not so much to obtain funds as to steady the exchange and to provide the dollars of which England stood in need for her transactions with the United States.

This loan was a complete success. It is interesting to recall in this connexion that the rate of the pound sterling has hardly fluctuated at all, whereas the mark has been dropping steadily in all neutral countries.

Finally, on the 18th December, 1915, the Bank of England, and on the 31st of that month all the post offices in the Kingdom, had on sale 5 per cent Exchequer Bonds, redeemable on the 20th December, 1920. They were issued in values of £50, £20, and £5, so as to be within reach of the small investor.

Not the whole of the Tale

After being bled to this extent, a less opulent body would have been on the point of succumbing. But England is not at the end of her resources. If you express astonishment to her prominent men at the vastness of her financial undertakings they will answer imperturbably, "We are not at the

end of our tether. If fresh taxes and fresh loans are wanted, fresh taxes we will have ! ”

The Moratorium

Reference has sometimes been made in pro-German publications to the establishment of the moratorium and the prohibition of the export of gold, as tending to show that all was not well with English Finance.

But England did not forbid the export of gold ; while the moratorium was merely a precautionary measure intended to prevent chaos and confusion in the business world. Its adoption was optional and the public did not avail themselves of it. It was consequently dropped.

Moreover, Mr. Davies in his work *British and German Finance*, has clearly shown that the measure in question chiefly benefited the neutrals.

“ London being the financial centre of the world and the free market of the globe for gold, gives enormous credits to bankers, merchants, and all classes of traders in all parts of the world. When a merchant in Scandinavia, Holland, or even in Germany, Austria, or elsewhere, buys goods, produce, etc., in America, India, China, Australia, or other part of the globe, he obtains a credit either direct or through a banker in his own country from a London banker, and instructs the seller from whom he buys to draw on the London banker, at

two, three, four, or six months ; in many cases these credits are confirmed by the accepting banker. The exporter in America, India, or other part then sends the goods to Scandinavia or Holland or other country, as the case may be, and attaches to the documents covering the shipment a bill drawn at two, three, four, or six months. This bill can be discounted immediately in the city where the exporter resides. The negotiating banker sends the bill to London for acceptance, together with the documents, and the banker in London then accepts the bill, takes possession of the documents, which he forwards to the merchant or banker in Scandinavia or Holland, who is thus enabled to obtain possession of the goods when the ship arrives and has two, three, four, or six months to realise the value of the cargo before it is necessary for him to buy exchange on London to reimburse the banker who has to meet the acceptance given on his behalf at maturity.

“ When the war broke out, so many bankers, merchants, and corporations abroad wanted to buy Sterling in their different markets to pay for such bills and/or to provide for coupons maturing on loans raised in London, etc., that the demand for Sterling transfer was unprecedented. All neutral countries know how difficult it was to buy Sterling ; the sovereign appreciated daily in value until, in some cases, the pound Sterling was worth in foreign currency more than 27 shillings. To explain this clearly, the following examples will suffice. The normal rate of exchange between New York and London is about 4 dollars 86½ cents

per pound Sterling, so that a merchant having to remit £100,000 to London in payment of a debt would pay 486,500 dollars in New York for this sum, but in August last, owing to the demand for London transfer, the rate in New York reached 6 dollars 50 cents per pound Sterling, so that the American merchant was forced to pay 650,000 dollars for £100,000—a loss to him of 163,500 dollars, representing more than 25 per cent. The same conditions prevailed in all parts of the world due to British supremacy in financial matters, and the British Government wisely decided to proclaim a moratorium. The effect of this moratorium made itself felt in all parts of the world, and it immediately relieved the situation. Financial houses in this country had accepted for account of foreign bankers, merchants, and others large lines of bills to finance trade between neutral countries, and, as the majority of neutral countries would have suffered very severely if Great Britain had insisted on these debts being immediately paid, the English sovereign having appreciated so considerably and Sterling exchange being so difficult to obtain, it was necessary in the interests of all concerned to proclaim a moratorium, and this wise step saved neutral countries which were indebted to London enormous sums of money. It also enabled the Government of Great Britain and bankers here and abroad to study all the various difficulties connected with the foreign exchange market, and gave time to neutral countries either to renew the credits they had obtained from England or to make arrangements for purchasing

Sterling exchange at more normal rates, especially as Great Britain and her Allies would naturally have to buy large quantities of goods, foodstuffs, etc., abroad, which would tend to restore the normal rate of the Sterling exchange in those countries where the purchases were effected.

“The following table, showing the rates of exchange current immediately prior to the war and the highest and lowest quotations since, will demonstrate how the moratorium allowed neutral countries to remit Sterling to London at rates which spared them the great losses they would certainly have incurred had they been obliged or able to remit at the outbreak of war :—

Cheques, Telegraphic Transfers, Mail Transfers.	Rate just prior to War.	Since War.	
		Lowest.	Highest.
Paris	25·18	24·00	25·54
Amsterdam	12·14	11·70	12·60
Switzerland	25·18	24·00	26·40
Italy	25·30	24·00	28·50
Madrid	26·15	23·85	26·60
Lisbon	46½d.	32½d.	41d.
Petrograd	96·10	105	125
Scandinavia	18·25	18·30	19·70
New York	4·88½	4·77½	6·50
Rio Janeiro 90 d/s	16d.	11¾d. nom.	14⅞d.
Valparaiso 90 d/s	9¾d.	7d.	9d.
Buenos Aires 90 d/s	47¾d.	46⅝d.	49d.
Montevideo 90 d/s	51½d.	45½d. nom.	54d.

It is interesting to note that immediately Germany declared war against France, her exchange went to a discount, in spite of her selling large

quantities of securities in neutral markets, whereas with Great Britain just the reverse was the case—the *foreign exchanges went in favour of England, the sovereign becoming more valuable abroad, whilst the mark depreciated*. As, therefore, foreign countries were only indebted to Germany, if they were indebted to her at all, to a negligible amount, as was and is shown by Germany's exchange, they had not to remit large amounts to that country to pay for bills accepted on their behalf by German bankers, and a moratorium was in no way necessary in Germany because German bankers had not accepted the bills that finance the trade of the world and enable neutral countries to receive raw materials, goods, etc., without previous payment, and thus develop their industries and commerce.

Although a moratorium in its full sense was not necessary in Germany, as explained above, that country was nevertheless forced to resort to a *partial moratorium*, as appears from the legislation of August 7th, 1914, which is to the effect that, "Every German trader, in respect of debts contracted in Germany previously to the 31st July, may obtain a respite of three months from legal proceedings; the fact of a time extension for payment will permit of the two parties coming to terms as to the mode of settlement." Moreover, the Bundesrat has suppressed all legal expenses in connection with

the time extensions in question for amounts under 100 marks. "No debts contracted abroad prior to the 31st July, even by bill of exchange, can form the object of legal proceedings." Then with regard to the German legislation on bankruptcy, fresh measures have been taken: "with a view to the prevention of failures, the Bundesrat passed on the 8th August the decree of supervision of commercial houses; to the request for supervision the trader must affix a list of his creditors and a statement as to his means; supervision is granted provided it appear that the trader will be able to meet his liabilities after the war." The same law of the 8th August suppresses certain clauses of the Commercial Code: ordinarily, in the event of a company being unable to meet its liabilities, the administrators are bound to declare for bankruptcy proceedings; this arrangement is suppressed. The regulation of the 6th August, 1914, prolongs by 30 clear days the delay allowed for protest. In all branches of the Imperial Bank advantage has been taken of this facility: "In case of occupation of the country by the enemy, the respite is extended to six days after the re-establishment of normal conditions"; the Bundesrat (regulation of the 29th August, 1914) has increased this limit from six days to two weeks.

With regard to rents, in all the large centres a

special Board of Arbitration has been formed, which can impose on proprietors a reduction of their rents or grant to tenants a time limit for payment, extending to the end of the war or several years after the war. On the other hand, the community comes to the aid of the proprietors who are unable to meet their mortgages; by this means it is hoped to avoid a fall in the value of property.

Great Britain the Banker of the Allies

It is not only for carrying out her own share in the war, but for the war considered in its full extent, that England has shouldered these financial burdens, to which additions are continually being made.

In a speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 4th May, 1915, Mr. Lloyd George spoke as follows :

“ I think the Allied countries *ought* to determine the part they wish Britain to play in the combination, and the best service she can render. What service can Britain render to this great combination? She can keep command of the seas for the Allies. She has done so, and she will maintain complete control to the end. That is the invaluable service which she is rendering to the Allies. It is essential to the ultimate success of their arms, especially in a prolonged war, because the longer the war the more the command of the sea counts. Supplies come from overseas, there is the freedom to choose *the point of attack, and there are various*

other points which I need not labour. What is the second service which Britain could render? She could, of course, maintain a great Army, putting the whole of her population into it, exactly as the Continental Powers have done. What is the third service? The third service which she can render is the service which she rendered in the Napoleonic war, of bearing the main burden of financing the Allied countries in their necessary purchases for carrying on the War—purchases outside their own country more especially; and also to help the Allies with the manufacture of munitions and equipments of war.”

In fulfilment of Mr. Lloyd George's promise England has already advanced large sums to the Allied nations. They total to date more than £423,000,000, and measures have been taken for additional advances amounting in the aggregate to more than £450,000,000.

Be it noted, *inter alia*, that the British contribution to the French Loan—the Loan of Victory—amounted to £24,000,000 sterling.

Individual Effort

Hitherto we have only made mention of the part played by England as a nation. To this we must add the sacrifices voluntarily made by individuals who have given their money with unprecedented generosity to every cause connected with the war.

As is well known, England is, *par excellence*, the sphere of private charitable effort. Benevolent institutions of the most diverse description exist in their thousands and none of them appeal to the public in vain. No Englishman with money, be it much or be it little, but considers it an imperative moral duty to contribute to charitable organisations. One never hears of a rich Englishman dying and failing to endow on a munificent scale some hospital, university, or charitable institution. Many a man does not wait till his life's end to discharge, with lavish hand, what he considers his debt to society.

The war broke out and brought with it many fresh appeals to compassionate hearts. Organisations of every description sprang up and multiplied, in order to succour folk on whom the scourge had descended. All these organisations lived and prospered, thanks to the ready support they received.

A few of the totals reached in the last few months will serve to show how considerable these organisations are.

National Relief Fund.—By September 15, 1916, £5,953,938, of which £3,463,925 had been allocated for Distribution for Relief.

Other Funds.—"Times" *Red Cross Fund*, by Nov. 15, 1916, £5,082,309. *Officers' Families Fund*, by June 19, 1916, £290,654. *Indian Soldiers Fund*, by June 22,

1916, £160,191. *Wounded Allies Fund*, by June 23, 1916, (about) £94,000. *Polish Relief Victims*, by June, 1916, £128,000. *Serbian Relief Fund*, by October 17, 1915, over £150,000. 1916, April 3rd : King George's gift of £100,000 to the nation, to be applied as the Government think fit.

And this free and unforced generosity, called forth by motives of the purest altruism, the most genuine patriotism, is yet another manifestation redounding to England's credit.

The Aid to the Belgians

A Belgian who beheld the pitiable exodus of his fellow-countrymen and their arrival in England in the October of 1914, must here be permitted to devote a brief space to putting on record the gratitude he feels towards the whole nation who afforded them refuge. Some two hundred thousand Belgians, driven forth from their homes by the abominable cruelties perpetrated by the German invaders, arrived in London in woeful plight. They had not a thing to their name, for they had been unable to bring away any of their belongings from their ruined dwellings. But in England they all found the warmest of welcomes, just as warm as their brothers had found in France when forced to flee before the Teuton hordes. They were greeted like friends and heroes. Shelter, food, clothing, and

money were given to them and that with a delicacy and affection that were singularly touching.

A few figures by way of example will suffice to give an idea of the manner in which the people of England freely gave their assistance to the Belgian refugees. The subscription opened by a newspaper, the *Daily Telegraph*, to raise a fund to be placed at King Albert's disposal at Christmas, 1914, realised £150,000. The fund entitled "British gifts for Belgian Soldiers" brought in £17,000. The total subscribed to the Belgian Relief Fund, the National fund for relief in Belgium, the War Refugee Committee, exceeds £2,000,000. And there are many other cases which will be set down in detail in commemorative works. In addition to all these there will be many another kindly deed, modest and unobtrusive in character and all the more touching because they will remain forever unrecorded.

Since then, the number of refugees in England has largely diminished. Some have gone back to Belgium, others have gone forth into the world to take whatever fortune may have in store for them. Of those who remain behind, most have found work to do and are now firmly established in business. All, come what may, will ever remember with emotion how the English people opened both their purse-strings and their hearts to them in the terrible days of their great affliction.

CHAPTER VIII

DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES

THIS chapter is but an empty vial, a frame without a picture. The reason is that diplomatic negotiations, from their very nature and tradition, are always carried on in secret. The time has not yet come for the story of them to be written and anything I could say would merely appear a clumsy indiscretion.

I am nevertheless anxious that the reader should not overlook the diplomatic activities which England has unceasingly performed since the beginning of the present war. There are triumphs in the realm of international diplomacy which though possibly less conspicuous are sometimes no less important than triumphs won on the battlefield. From these England has never stood aloof, and her prominent position has enabled her to direct the negotiations in such a manner as not only to secure complete harmony among the Allies but to influence neutrals and pave the way for a favourable solution of outstanding questions.

That these negotiations were occasionally marked

by errors and lack of foresight I do not for a moment deny, though to magnify and harp on them seems to me a very undesirable task. People who have no love for England, though they cannot gainsay the obvious magnitude of her naval, military, and financial effort, take delight in falling foul of her diplomacy. Such criticism is necessarily unfair, for we lack the documentary evidence on which to base a reasoned opinion. Moreover, it can do no good since it directs attention to matters for which other nations must be held equally responsible with England and this tends to impair the harmony of the Alliance. We decline, therefore, to devote ourselves to such dangerous feats since a false step would only bring profit to the enemy.

There are not a few good people in England who regard the secrecy with which diplomatic negotiations are conducted as a survival of the days when the relations between nation and nation depended on the personal will of the princes who ruled them. Such men hold that a democracy has the right to be informed of all arrangements calculated to affect the country's future. The English, with their passionate regard for liberty and freedom of speech, may be among the first to whom it may be granted to discard the system now in force ; and when they carry on their negotiations in the full light of day, they will inspire more confidence and more respect

than ever, for none will then have any grounds left for suspicion and everyone will join in paying a tribute to the liberal and magnanimous ideas which have almost invariably been the mainspring of her actions.

CHAPTER IX

THE UNION OF KINGDOM AND EMPIRE

THE KINGDOM UNITED

The Political Parties

WHEN war broke out the Radicals were in power. They were pacifists to the backbone and we have shown what efforts they made to preserve the peace of Europe. When they recognised the hopelessness of all their attempts, when they saw themselves flouted by Germany, who set at nought undertakings which she had pledged herself to fulfil in concert with Great Britain, they naturally relinquished their pacifism and took up the burden of the responsibilities and sacrifices entailed by the changed situation.

The Conservatives had been beforehand with the Radicals in calling for war. The reforms made urgent by the present conflict had long since been advocated by them. They could not therefore but lend the Government their full confidence and support. In England, then, as in France, the war brought about a union of parties. However, cer-

tain instances of a lack of judgment and want of foresight entailed a recrudescence of party strife and on the 15th June, 1915, a Coalition Ministry was formed in which the Conservatives were represented. From this time forth the political union was finally sealed.

The British Socialist Party was less prompt to recognise the needs of the situation. At first they showed themselves unanimously opposed to intervention based on any agreements between England and France. Their hostility was due to the apprehension that a Russian victory would set a seal on Tsardom; to a certain confidence¹ they felt in the future of German Socialism; to Germany itself; and to their disinclination to recognise as binding any international agreements concerning which the people had not been consulted. But gradually their opposition faded away. It came to be recognised that German despotism threatened greater danger to world-democracy than Tsardom. It became apparent that the Social Democratic Party in Germany was either unable or unwilling to free Germany from its imperialism and its imperialists; and lastly it was not denied that Great Britain's participation was not the consequence of a secret treaty with France but of a treaty known to all the world, the treaty which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. In September, 1914, the

Labour Party, or, at all events, a large majority of it, decided to support the Government. The Labour Party and the English Socialists gave open expression to the sentiments by which they were animated by taking a direct part in the recruiting campaign. Only the Independent Labour Party, with Messrs. Keir Hardie, W. C. Anderson, and Ramsay Macdonald, maintained its attitude of opposition to the war and attempted to launch a pacifist campaign, which, however, met with no response. They represented in fact only an insignificant minority. The sentiments of the vast majority of the English Socialists were clearly expressed in the manifesto issued in March, 1915, by twenty-seven Labour Members of Parliament.

“We recognise,” they said to the Socialists of France and Belgium, “that you are defending not only your national liberties, but that you are fighting for the freedom of Europe as a whole against a despotic military domination. We have the highest admiration for your courage, and our views are shared by the great majority of the workers of Great Britain. Hundreds of thousands of Trade Unionists, filled with indignation at Germany’s criminal aggression, have voluntarily joined the army that has been raised in the United Kingdom to go and fight side by side with the French and Belgians. We have supported every measure calculated to make this army of volunteers a great and powerful instrument for the defence

of Democracy and Civilisation. And we assure you, our comrades of France and Belgium, that we are with you heart and soul in your determination to rid France and Belgium of the invader, to secure the rehabilitation of the ravaged territories and to put an end, once for all, to the menace of militarism."

And on the 3rd September, 1915, Mr. W. Appleton, secretary of the Trades Union Federation, endorsed this declaration in the following terms :

"The effort which it is necessary to make—and I am speaking to you in the name of all the members of the Federation—that effort we shall make, not only on the field of battle, but in the factories, the dockyards and the mines, and we shall go on making it until victory is ours. Doubtless there have been some regrettable differences of opinion between employers and men. How could it be otherwise in a country so industrialised as our own? But how few in comparison with former years and also how short-lived. Indeed they have been so quickly settled, thanks to the goodwill shown on both sides, that the rate of production was not affected. To-day activity prevails everywhere and will continue to increase in intensity until the end. Everyone realises the importance of the part he is playing. Everyone knows he is working for final victory, and of this I can speak with certainty, everyone will perform here, as in France, his whole duty, to make that victory certain."

The Nationalist Movement in Ireland

The Irish Nationalist Movement might well have proved a source of considerable anxiety. Ulster was in a state of ferment and unrest and there was talk of Civil War. But no sooner was the United Kingdom threatened than these disputes died down and disappeared. The outspoken pronouncements of Mr. Redmond, which may be read in two interesting pamphlets entitled *Ireland and the War* and *The Irish Nation and the War*, were followed by a rally to the colours of Irishmen of all shades of opinion. Discussions were deferred to a later date, it being deemed unworthy to take advantage of a time of trouble and danger to force the passage of reforms, however legitimate such reforms might be in themselves.

It was only owing to prolonged efforts and to the discovery of a few traitors that Germany at last succeeded in stirring up revolt in Ireland. On the 20th and 21st April, 1916, a German vessel attempted to land arms and stores in Ireland. The attempt failed, the transports were captured, and the ringleader of the rebels in Ireland, Sir Roger Casement, was arrested. From the 24th April to the 4th May, there were riotous scenes in Dublin. The disturbances were quelled by the troops under

the command of General Maxwell, and calm was restored.

This revolt was only the work of a minority. The Irish nation repudiated it, and while the rioting was at its height in the streets of their capital, Irish soldiers in the field were testifying their loyalty by throwing themselves into the very forefront of the battle.

April 27th, 1916.—The Official communiqué records that the enemy having penetrated part of the British trenches south of Hulluch, were driven out within half an hour by our Irish troops.

April 28th, 1916.—Central News of America reports interview with Mr. Redmond, wherein he denounces the rising as “not half as much treason to the cause of the Allies as treason to the cause of Home Rule.” Further, “Is it not an additional horror that, on the very day when we hear that men of the Dublin Fusiliers have been killed by Irishmen in the streets of Dublin, we receive the news of how the men of the 16th division, our own Irish Brigade, and of the same Dublin Fusiliers, have dashed forward, and by their unconquerable bravery, retaken the trenches that the Germans had won at Hulluch? . . . The German plot has failed. The majority of the people of Ireland retain their calmness, fortitude, and unity. They abhor

this attack on their interests, their rights, their hopes, their principles."

On same date the Premier of Australia wired to Mr. Redmond : " Government of S. Australia desires to express sympathy with the Irish people in the position in which the Sinn Fein outrage has placed them. The heroism of the Irish troops, and the sacrifices made by the people of Ireland in the present war, calls for profound gratitude from all loyal Britishers."

The War of the Classes

When the war began, class warfare was very acute in England. A large number of strikes had broken out ; there were more than a hundred in progress in August, 1914. Others, such as the Midland Railway dispute and the Scottish Miners' trouble, were hatching. But when danger threatened, existing strikes came to an end, and those that were considered imminent came to nothing. By the end of August ninety strikes had been settled, the men having agreed to forgo their claims and to return to work on the existing terms. Only a very few disputes remained outstanding. But in January, 1915, some ten only remained unsettled. This is surely a striking proof of the patriotism of the British working classes.

It is true that in the course of the months which

followed numerous other strikes broke out. They created a very unfavourable impression on public opinion abroad and the Press was too ready to ascribe them to a defective national conscience, a failure to recognise the real nature of the interests that were at stake in the great war, not only for England, but for Europe and for Democracy as a whole. This view of the matter is due to an imperfect acquaintance with the nature of the problems peculiar to England. The People of Great Britain thoroughly understood the bearing of the issues involved. They know that it is a war for Justice and Freedom. But they know also that the special conditions and rights which they enjoy have only been gained at the cost of stubborn efforts maintained throughout the whole of the nineteenth century at least, and they are apprehensive lest these hard-won and much-prized advantages should be filched from them by the governing classes on the pretext of urgent public necessity. Moreover, they regarded it as a scandal that, while the cost of living was going up at an alarming rate day by day, employers of labour were reaping big profits without allowing their workpeople a share in them. Such considerations it was that gave rise to these disputes. Even though they were regrettable in themselves, they were assuredly legitimate. Compulsory arbitration and the limitation of war profits

provided for in the Munitions Act, so far as controlled establishments were concerned, had the effect of putting an end to a large number of these economic disputes.

These conflicts—and this is a point I wish particularly to emphasise—were strictly economic in character. The very miners who went on strike in South Wales sent a quarter of a million of men to Kitchener's Army, men who gave up high wages in their eagerness to serve their country. Altogether, British industries, by January, 1915, had parted with 17 per cent of their employees to the Army, a figure that was doubled in the ensuing quarter. One of their leaders, Mr. H. J. Thomas, M.P., addressing the railwaymen at Wellingborough, said rightly that not only had the workers raised "an army unprecedented in size, courage, and valour for battle on a foreign shore, but without hesitation they responded to the call which was made upon them to sacrifice many of their trade union rules and conditions that had been built up by years of sacrifice. They did that because they felt, as I feel, that no sacrifice is too great to secure victory in this world war."

APPENDIX

The following table summarises by trades the figures for 1914 and 1915 respectively :—

Groups of Trades.	1914.			1915.		
	No. of Disputes.	Number of Workpeople involved.	Aggregate Duration in Working Days of all Disputes in Progress.	No. of Disputes.	Number of Workpeople involved.	Aggregate Duration in Working Days of all Disputes in Progress.
Building	177	37,670	3,199,426	61	15,388	129,600
Coal Mining	158	271,242	3,718,387	77	296,064	1,643,700
Other Mining and Quarrying	19	1,438	62,696	5	785	10,200
Engineering	90	18,795	878,247	97	24,930	222,500
Shipbuilding	87	17,632	127,213	46	6,856	49,000
Other Metal	58	14,456	298,550	44	12,478	67,900
Textile	97	22,248	765,088	67	33,472	382,200
Clothing	48	4,397	61,529	37	5,150	24,300
Transport	58	13,546	93,128	78	25,111	158,900
Other Trades and Employees of Public Authorities	207	47,105	707,073	162	25,702	281,400
Total	999	448,529	10,111,337 ¹	674	445,936	2,969,700

¹ The aggregate duration in 1914 of the general dispute at Dublin (200,000) is included in the total, but not in

The Unity of the Empire

I have in my hands the *Continental Times* of the 8th March, 1915. The *Continental Times* is "a Journal for Americans in Europe." It is published in Berlin, and circulates to the tune of sixty thousand copies in America and the neutral countries of Europe. Its columns therefore should furnish the most authentic revelation concerning Germany's aims and desires in the realm of international politics. One article in this number I find of peculiar interest. It is entitled "To the Colonies of England : Peace with Freedom." A few passages merit quotation :

"Possibly the time has not yet come for an hereditary enemy such as Scotland to turn against

the separate groups of trades. Measured by aggregate duration all the groups of trades, except transport group, were less affected by disputes than in the previous year, this being most marked in the building, engineering, and other metal groups. The high figures for the coal-mining industry are entirely due to the strikes in South Wales coalfield which began in July and August following on the breakdown of negotiations for a new wages agreement. In the first of these some 200,000 miners were involved, and in the second 32,000 ; and the aggregate duration for the two disputes amounted to nearly 1,400,000 days, about half the respective totals for the year for all trades. About one half (110,000) of the total aggregate duration of disputes in the engineering trades is accounted for by the strike of nearly 9000 engineers on the Clyde, which occurred in February and March, and arose on a demand for an advance in wages. At the end of the year only thirteen disputes involving 3300 workpeople were in progress.

(*Board of Trade Labour Gazette* for January 1916, page 6.)

England. But in the case of Canada, there should be no hesitation. Is it the duty of Canada to send the best of her sons to water with their blood the soil of a foreign land? Let Canada cry 'a plague on all the warring houses' of Europe. An alliance with the United States would be much more in accordance with the lofty character of her institutions.

"Australia and New Zealand, gems of the Gracchi set in the Pacific, what an unhappy lot will be yours when the Mistress of the Seas shall have laid aside her trident. Were it not better forthwith to declare yourselves free, like Canada, from that ill-starred island in the Germanic Ocean? The capture of the *Emden* sheds a ray of light on the long series of the Allies' disasters. That will not be brought up against you when you settle the final account with a generous adversary."

Germany's illusions regarding the British Colonies are here clearly revealed. The Germans appeared to think that the moment danger threatened England, all her children beyond the seas would hasten to take arms against her in order to free themselves from her yoke. Nor did she spare any pains to foment latent insurrections. Her secret propaganda in the Transvaal, in Ireland, in India, and in Egypt resulted in miserable failure. She had counted on the looseness of the bonds which bound the Dominions and the Colonies to Great Britain. And here once more she grossly deceived herself. She

had never understood—she never could understand—that freedom given to a people is a much surer guarantee of loyalty than any system of administrative or military control. Now the strength of Great Britain resides precisely in this, that her control involves no restrictions on the freedom of the countries over which it is exercised, but rather strengthens and guarantees it. She has established a *Pax Britannica* throughout the world, by which the nations feel themselves exalted rather than enslaved.

Enthusiastic Loyalty

The attachment of the Dominions and the Colonies found expression in the very earliest days of the war in a manner that exceeded the most sanguine expectations. They showed complete unanimity in their devotion to the Mother-Country, and the spontaneity of their manifestations of sympathy and loyalty furnished an additional proof of the salutary effect of the application of liberal principles in colonial policy.

It is the spontaneous nature of the aid rendered by the Colonies that should be particularly emphasised. Every contribution by the Dominions had to be considered by their respective governments and agreed to by the people. There was no sending orders from London for this or that levy of men or money to be raised in Australia, New

Zealand, South Africa, or Canada. They were free countries ; free to regulate their own destiny ; free to take part, or to refrain from taking part in the European War ; free to limit their share in the fighting to the defence of their own frontiers. There was no central control binding the action of each and all ; there was no identity in their military organisation, their legislative measures or their method of preparation. But no sooner did danger threaten the Mother-Country, than all the Dominions, all the Colonies hastened to offer their aid and vied with one another in the magnitude of their sacrifices. They were up and ready even before war was declared, eager to testify their loyalty by shedding their blood for their country.

The German Press endeavoured to inspire the Dominions and Colonies with a mistrust of England, hinting that Perfidious Albion, by sending the Canadians and Australians to the Dardanelles and the Indians to Flanders, was shedding the blood of others in order to spare her own. No campaign ever produced more meagre results. The whole Empire knew that Canadian or Indian blood was not, in England's eyes, the " blood of others." It was blood freely offered by people belonging to the same great family, eager to perform their part in the defence of the common heritage.

To this splendid spirit the Dominion of Canada

bore glorious witness by word and deed. As soon as the threat of war took definite shape political dissensions melted away. The different parties presented a solid front to the enemy. After conferring with the leaders of the Liberal Party, Sir Wilfred Laurier promised that his party would give their whole-hearted support to the Government, and to whatever measures they might deem it necessary to take. With one accord the people, gathering together in the streets and public places, demonstrated their enthusiasm for England and their determination to stand or fall with her.

Three hours after war was declared Parliament decided to raise 20,000 volunteers for the European front. Before the day was out 100,000 men had offered themselves for service. There were financiers and big employers of labour who raised whole regiments at their own expense. To mitigate the effects of the economic crisis brought about in England by the war, arrangements were put in hand to dispatch enormous gifts of foodstuffs. A million sacks of flour each weighing ninety-eight pounds were offered by the people of Canada to the people of England, a gift which made it possible to maintain the price of bread at the normal level for a long time to come.

Then there were all manner of gifts for the Army and Navy as well as for France. From the farmers

of Ontario came wheat, potatoes, haricots and more than 250,000 sacks of flour ; from Nova Scotia, 100 tons of coal, from Albert and Prince Edward Island, 600,000 bushels of wheat ; from Quebec 4,000,000 kilogrammes of cheese ; from Saskatchewan, 1500 horses, value 250,000 dollars ; from New Brunswick 100,000 bushels of potatoes ; from British Columbia, 25,000 tins of salmon, etc.

The Canadian Red Cross fitted out a field hospital and sent £38,000 to the British Red Cross. A hospital was founded by the women of Canada. In short, everyone gave what he could, to demonstrate his loyalty. The fact that when war broke out Canada was in the throes of a serious economic and financial crisis renders this enthusiasm all the more remarkable.

The first expeditionary force, 33,000 strong, was no sooner formed and dispatched to England, in order to go into camp and complete their training on Salisbury Plain, than the formation of a second such body was begun. Once again the enlistment figures exceeded anything that had been deemed possible.

“As long as we are able to enlist a man and send a dollar,” said Walter Scott, the Premier of Saskatchewan, “we shall continue our effort to bring about the tyrant’s overthrow.”

Canada made up her mind to achieve even greater

things in the way of recruiting, and the length of the war has in no way abated the enthusiasm of her people. On the 1st January, 1916, the Canadian Prime Minister announced that the fighting forces would be increased from 250,000 to 500,000 men. By April, 1916, the figures had reached 300,000. And by the end of March, 1916, Canada had spent £158,000,000 in equipping the men she had raised.

Canada has assisted the Imperial Credit by raising locally a loan of £10,000,000 which has been placed to the credit of His Majesty's Government for purchases in North America.

By February, 1916, 225,000 workpeople in Canada were making munitions. Canada from the first placed her naval yards at the disposal of the Admiralty, and has been turning out military munitions of all sorts in large quantities. She has equipped her own troops throughout at her own expense and from her own resources.

This magnificent spirit, this unity and loyalty, are no less evident among the Irish-Americans and the French races in Canada—of whom 20,000 have joined the Army—than among those of British origin. We are a long way indeed from witnessing the fulfilment of German hopes. And what is calculated to fill their cup of bitterness to overflowing is that even the Canadians of German origin ranged themselves unhesitatingly with the rest

of their fellow-citizens. The people of Berlin, Ontario, proclaimed this far and wide in their telegram to Lord Kitchener. In that message they declared that Berlin, Ontario, a city of 18,000 inhabitants of which 12,000 were of German birth or German blood, proposed to vote upwards of £15,000 sterling in aid of the Canadian National Patriotic Fund. They added that the German inhabitants looked forward to seeing German militarism overthrown for ever, and the German people free to form a better and greater Germany.

Australia displayed a like spirit. The war was immensely popular there from the very outset. Party divisions went by the board, and the Labour Party was the first to signify its readiness to bear any sacrifice that might be necessary. The decision to send an expeditionary force of 20,000 men to Europe was followed by the opening of recruiting lists, the number of men presenting themselves far surpassing the number contemplated. Gifts in money and in kind flowed in apace.

By March, 1916, 150,000 men had been sent out to the European and Asiatic battlefields, 268,000 had enlisted; 300,000 expected by June.

The *Australian Navy* was at the outbreak of war at once placed under control of the British Admiralty. and the Australian vessels took a prominent share in clearing the South Seas of the enemy cruisers.

Australia has borne the whole cost of the troops she has furnished. Under this head she will have expended £60,000,000 by the end of June, 1916.

May 10th, 1916.—£50,000,000 of additional total War Loans to be issued.

Australia gave with lavish hand. Parliament voted £100,000 for Belgian relief and contributions of this nature from private sources increased day by day at a startling rate. Thousands of tons of butter were consigned for the British troops, hundreds of thousands of frozen sheep came from New South Wales and more than 20,000 lbs. of frozen meat from Queensland.

In Australia as in Canada the German settlers decided to stand by the country of their adoption. The German Lutheran congregations at Rella, Roseberg and Curzo, of German origin but mostly Australian born, unanimously adopted a resolution soon after the outbreak of the war: "That we, though of German descent, being British subjects either by birth or naturalisation, desire publicly to express our unswerving loyalty and fidelity to His Majesty King George V, and that as citizens of the British Empire, enjoying full civil and religious freedom, we are prepared, if the necessity arises, to sacrifice our property and our lives for the welfare of the British Empire."

New Zealand sent medical appliances, aeroplanes,

and large sums of money for the British wounded and for Belgium. An expeditionary force was at once offered, accepted, and got ready without delay, and the Maories insisted on having the khaki uniform.

New Zealand, five years ago, adopted compulsory military training of all males between 18 and 25.

By January 25th, 1916, 109,683 men had volunteered to serve in the war. Number of men immediately available was 61,000.

By May, 1916, 37,000 were actually in the field. New Zealand hopes to have supplied 60,000 men by the end of June, 1916.

In India there was the same emulation, the same enthusiasm. No one will read without genuine feelings of emotion the noble and touching telegram in which the Viceroy of India described how the Rajahs and Chiefs of the various states placed their treasures and their fealty at the Empire's disposal. Men, horses, guns, motors, ambulances, every requisite of modern warfare were traversing the Indian Ocean for months together, at full speed and under the protection of the British Fleet, and to-day the Indian troops after covering themselves with glory on the battlefields of France have recrossed the seas to play their part in other regions whither the defence of the Empire has summoned them.

By June, 1916, India had sent 300,000 men to fight the Empire's battles in France, Egypt, China, Mesopotamia, E. Africa, Gallipoli, Cameroons, and Persia.

Financial Assistance.—Sir W. Meyer's estimate was £2,000,000 for year ending March 31st, 1915; and £47,500,000 for year beginning April 1st, 1916.

The Transvaal gave a very special proof of loyalty in offering to undertake the defence of its own borders and thus to permit the soldiers of the European garrisons to go and fight side by side with the French and British troops on the Western front. England accepted the offer. Germany thought this foolhardy and hoped to incite the Boers against the foreign intruder. But despite German intrigues, the loyalty of the South African Colonies was beyond all praise. The rebellion fomented by the agents of Germany gave very little anxiety to the British Government. They had confidence in the fidelity of the South African forces, and the troops of General De Wet and his lieutenants soon found themselves compelled to yield to the gallant followers of General Botha who, with a tact and skill that do him honour, got the better of the rebels. The triumph was complete and was crowned by the conquest of the powerful German Colony of South-West Africa. And to-day we see South African brigades ranged along the Suez Canal to

defend Egypt from German attacks. Furthermore, a contingent, over 10,000 strong, has been sent to Europe.

Military assistance was given by the following :—

<i>The West Indies</i>	<i>East African Protectorates,</i>
<i>Bermuda</i>	<i>Uganda, Nyasaland</i>
<i>Falkland Islands</i>	<i>Malta and Fiji</i>
<i>Ceylon</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>
<i>The Straits Settlements</i>	<i>Gold Coast</i>
<i>Malay States</i>	<i>Newfoundland</i>
<i>West African Colonies and Protectorates</i>	

The following British Colonies and Protectorates have made contributions both in money and in kind :—

<i>Barbados</i>	<i>Windward Islands</i>
<i>Jamaica</i>	<i>Leeward Islands</i>
<i>Cayman Islands</i>	<i>Bahamas</i>
<i>Trinidad</i>	<i>Bermuda</i>
<i>Turks & Caicos Islands</i>	<i>British Guinea</i>
<i>Mauritius</i>	

Subscriptions to Imperial War Loans

Crown Colonies have invested large sums in War Loan and Exchequer Bonds.

Up to June, 1916, £2,100,000 in 4½ per cent War Loan ; £758,000 in 5 per cent Exchequer Bonds.

The account we have given is no doubt brief and

incomplete. It would take a whole book to state in full detail all the evidences of loyalty in the various sections of the British Empire in this tragic hour of history, when the perils which beset the Mother-Country would afford every chance of success to insurrections and revolutions. But brief as it is, we have said enough to show that King George was justified in his confidence in the Empire and that the telegram dispatched by him at the beginning of the war was founded on a true recognition of the psychology of the races that he had to deal with.

“ I desire to express to my people of the Oversea Dominions with what appreciation and pride I have received the messages from their respective Governments during the last few days. These spontaneous assurances of their fullest support recall to me the generous, self-sacrificing help given by them in the past to the Mother-Country. I shall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibility which rests upon me by the confident belief that in this time of trial my Empire will stand united, calm, resolute, trusting in God.—GEORGE R.I.”

The force that binds this Empire together, this Empire so various, consisting of so many different races professing such a variety of religions, is the freedom which prevails within it. When England arose to defend that freedom against the menace

of the worst form of Imperialism, the Dominions and Colonies were bound, both by duty and interest, to aid her with all the strength at their command. And this they rightly understood.

The Greatest Sacrifice of all

Of all the countries involved in the war England was unquestionably one of the most unprepared. This unpreparedness resulted not merely from the lack of any really effective military organisation, but also and principally from the non-adaptability of her laws and customs to the urgent necessities of a conflict on the scale of the one that has now arisen in Europe.

The present war is not of the kind that requires only a limited popular support, a war from which a part of the nation may, if they are so inclined, hold themselves aloof. All the forces of the country, industrial no less than military, have to be employed in supplying the requirements for so great a struggle. To employ on so great a scale means so vast and resources so imposing, requires a strict centralisation, a complete unity and directness of control on the part of the executive.

Not only is it necessary in the present circumstances to ensure their fullest contribution to the nation's energies ; it is equally requisite to unify and consolidate the country from within by taking

proper measures of precaution against the enemy within the gates, such as spies and intriguers whose efforts might tend to enfeeble the effort and diminish the spirit of the nation. History shows that times of trouble and danger cannot be lived through without the sacrifice of some of our acquired rights, without submitting to some form of dictatorship, which, however odious we might think it in normal times, becomes a necessity in times of extraordinary national danger. "If you would preserve Liberty," said Monsieur Briand, in the French Chamber, "you must learn to relinquish some of your liberties." And he went on to say, "all individual liberty must be suspended, because there is something greater, nobler and more glorious than the liberty of the individual, namely, the life of the Nation and the Freedom of the World. Both are in danger." No country could presume to enter into conflict with Prussia, without Prussianising herself to some extent. No one could set himself to combat the disease without inoculating himself beforehand with serum taken from those already afflicted with it; a painful necessity to which we only submit with the intention of freeing ourselves therefrom at the earliest possible moment.

Now let us look at the position of England in August, 1914. She was, of all others, the country endowed with the blessing of individual liberty,

which she regarded with a jealous and uncompromising veneration. Liberty in her eyes was a species of racial instinct, firmly implanted by immemorial tradition and stimulated by the struggles which had led, slowly and surely, to its consummation. The English were more independent of State control than any other nation. England, though a democracy, was, in her unshakable individualism, less imbued with Socialism than any other European country.

The liberty of the individual must be respected. Before such things were even thought of in other countries, England had beheld the establishment of the great principles of trial by jury and *habeas corpus*. To the right to be tried by one's peers, England had added, right back in the Middle Ages, the right of appeal. These time-honoured prerogatives England had maintained even in the darkest hours of her history. She had never allowed that a military tribunal should have the right to condemn a citizen to death without a public trial or the right of appeal. She had never tolerated the setting up of an extraordinary jurisdiction, or of a permanent court martial.

What she had looked upon as an unchangeable principle in regard to the trial of the subject, she regarded as essential to the exercise of the normal activities of the individual. The Government

never desired, much less attempted, to interfere in private enterprise ; it never entered into their heads to wish to control it or to take its place. England has never established a monopoly ; never stifled individual initiative by State interference.

From the point of view of Labour, England has maintained the same principles of absolute liberty. No restriction as regards the right to strike ! No Government intervention in the settlement of disputes between Capital and Labour ! These were spheres in which no statesman would have deemed himself justified in establishing any system of control.

And that which in the case of the nations of the Continent affords the most convincing evidence of the ascendancy of the State over the individual, namely, military conscription, has always been shunned as a thing unworthy of the British people. The voluntary system was an article of faith in British military policy. Woe betide those who should tamper with it.

It will be perfectly obvious from the foregoing that British law and British traditions were whole worlds away from what is needed for the successful conduct of a modern war, namely, the centralisation of power and the direct control by the power thus centralised, of the lives and activities of the individual citizens.

More than a year has gone by since England cast her ancient sword into the scales of Europe's destiny. A year has gone by and if a man had lain wrapped in magic slumber, as sometimes happens in fairy tales, and all that while had been kept in ignorance of events that have shaken the foundations of the world ; if, I say, such an one were suddenly to awaken he would no longer recognise the England that he once knew, and would imagine that he had been asleep for a hundred years.

He would see, nay he would already have seen in February last, courts martial established by law and endowed with power to condemn to death, without public trial and without appeal, the citizens of England the Free. He would behold officials making their way into factory and workshop to schedule particulars of the plant, he would see other officials overhauling the books of private firms and paying the profits over a certain fixed limit into the national Exchequer. He would see workmen and employers legally compelled to plead their cause before a tribunal empowered to settle their quarrels. He would see long-standing trade regulations, all the more binding and the more valued for never having been committed to writing, run to earth by the law and overthrown ; he would see whole brigades of workmen marching like soldiers at the Government's bidding, to take the

place of others who had gone on strike. He would see Government employees drawing up lists of all people in the Kingdom capable of answering the call, one day, to give their services to their country whether in the army or in the workshop. He would hear the people of Britain discussing the expediency of establishing a system of Compulsory Military Service similar to that in force on the Continent and then finally accepting the measure without a murmur.

He would see, in short, that the British Government which but a year ago had no control over the lives and activities of its citizens is to-day in possession of powers of the most formidable and Spartan-like character. A consideration well calculated to fill the observer with amazement. But it would astonish him still more to see that every Englishman—manufacturer, employee, tradesman, student—acquiesced in these radical changes without a murmur. This astonishment would be the highest praise he could bestow on the people of England, for it would prove that, once they recognised the great danger which threatened them, they were willing to dispense with their most valued prerogatives, their most cherished rights, in the knowledge that the gravity of the hour demanded that they should relinquish what was dearest to them, namely, their liberty.

Doubtless they know that this renunciation on their part is but temporary. They agree to it because it marks a transition and because the merely temporary abandonment of their liberty is only a means towards making that liberty more perfect, more complete—for themselves and for others—in the future. All these emergency measures will cease to operate when the war is over, and there need be no fear that a nation which has taken a part in overthrowing the very principles of Prussian Imperialism will itself become infected with the Prussian virus.

CHAPTER X

WHY WE SHOULD HAVE CONFIDENCE IN ENGLAND

England and the Freedom of the Nations

WE have seen in the preceding pages that England, involved in the great conflict by the necessity of fulfilling her treaty obligations to Belgium, is fighting in defence of her own vital interests. We regard these necessary defensive operations with respect, but it is of peculiar interest to us, who are not English, to learn, from our point of view, what consequences would result from an English victory and accurately to acquaint ourselves with the ideas that dominate England's foreign policy.

From the Belgian point of view there is no room for doubt. It is beyond question that England will devote all her resources to re-establishing Belgian independence and that no British Government would ever consent to bargain or parley on this point.

But the case of Belgium is merely the application, brought out into very strong relief, of a general line of conduct based on the principle of respect

for the independence and freedom of nations. As regards Belgium the principle was formally endorsed by a treaty, but towards other countries England's attitude, as being prompted by like principles, would be just the same.

England is the home of Freedom. It is her pride that she outstripped other nations in the practice of civil liberties. For centuries past she has recognised that liberty primarily consists in giving full play to individual differences. To an Englishman the Jacobin notion of one perfected type of humanity taught to aim at one and the same ideal of happiness, is absurd. He demands freedom for himself, but he fully recognises as a necessary corollary that others have an equal right to demand it for themselves, particularly those who do not share his views.

In view of such ideas as these no one need fear that England will become obsessed by that mania for world-wide domination which is the distinguishing attitude of German Imperialism. Not only does England renounce all claim to impose her views on the various races which compose her immense Colonial Empire, she goes farther and encourages the free development of the various independent nations. She is therefore the natural protectress of the smaller states.

In a speech which he delivered at the Hôtel de Ville, Paris, in December, 1914, Monsieur Carton

de Wiart, Belgian Minister of Justice, laid admirable emphasis on the part that should be played by the smaller nations in the general evolution of human society. After asserting their right to exist, he proceeded to demonstrate their usefulness. Big countries had often derived salutary lessons in the art of living from the lesser ones who were better able to test the practical possibilities of social theories. Before this Mr. Lloyd George, speaking at the Queen's Hall on the 19th September, 1914, had pleaded the cause of the smaller nations with that lively and original eloquence which always marks his utterances.

Sir Edward Grey's Declarations

In his speech at the Bechstein Hall the British Minister for Foreign Affairs said :

“ We wish the nations of Europe to be free to live their independent lives, working out their own forms of government for themselves and their own national development, whether they be great States or small States, in full liberty. That is our ideal. The German ideal . . . is that of the Germans as a superior people ; to whom all things are lawful in the securing of their own power ; against whom resistance of every sort is unlawful and to be savagely put down ; a people establishing a domination over the nations of the Continent ; imposing a peace that is not to be a liberty for other nations, but subservience

to Germany. I would rather perish or leave this Continent altogether than live in it under such conditions. After this war we and the other nations of Europe must be free to live, not menaced by talk of supreme war-Lords and shining armour and the sword continually rattled in the scabbard and Heaven continually invoked as an accomplice to German Arms, and not having our policy dictated and our national destinies and activity controlled by the military caste of Prussia. We claim for ourselves, and our Allies claim for themselves, and together we will secure for Europe, the right of independent sovereignty for the different nations, the right to pursue a national existence, not in the shadow of Prussian hegemony and supremacy, but in the light of equal liberty."

This point of view is whole-heartedly endorsed throughout the length and breadth of England. England is fighting not only for her own freedom, but also for the freedom of others. In her eyes the war has become a war of defence and a war of deliverance.

She does not aim at imposing her supremacy upon others; it is enough that no ambitions shall be suffered to disturb the peace or impair the liberty of the nations of the world. She is strong enough to refuse to bow to the whims or ambitions of others; she is sufficiently independent to be impartial. The oppressed, therefore, may put their trust in her and any people which strives, through

trial or suffering, to preserve the consciousness of its national unity and to strengthen it, will have England on its side and enjoy the benefit of her judgment and friendship. I am not merely quoting the formal and oft-repeated declaration of the leaders of England's foreign policy ; what I have said above represents the deep-rooted and inmost convictions of the English people as a whole, and they hold them so ardently that they would unhesitatingly overthrow any politician so rash as to flout them.

England and Italy

In the Italian version of this book which circumstances led me to publish in Milan before the French edition, I added the following :

“ Italy is not one of those little nations which, in dark and bodeful days, cast their eyes about them for a protector. Nevertheless what we have just set forth may serve to convince her how greatly the broad tendencies of British foreign policy should inspire her with confidence.

“ The principle of nationality which England aims at rendering sacrosanct wherever she can make her influence prevail is the very principle which gives strength and cohesion to the Italy of to-day. No other European nation, at its birth ever laid down more clearly and explicitly the distinctive and essential characteristic of every people, namely, the desire to dwell together, and the plebiscites which brought the Kingdom of Italy into being

gave it a firmness and solidity beyond the ordinary. Everywhere else frontiers have been fixed by the hazard of war and conquest. But in Italy the community of race, language, and customs has been strengthened and buttressed by the express suffrages of the people, and it is in order to set the final seal on this union that Italy is taking part in the European War. English ideas and Italian ideas are, on these points, identical.

“But more than this: Europe’s aims are set on the conquest of Africa. She means to throw open those immense tracts to civilisation and to subdue the lawless tribes. France holds Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis. The Italian sphere is Lybia, between the French possessions and the British possessions in Egypt. In the Mediterranean England holds Malta, and, at either extremity, Suez and Gibraltar. How then can anyone fail to see that the geographical position being what it is, an understanding between the three colonising powers in Europe is inevitable. All three have a common enemy in the fanatical and stagnant cult of Islam. Mutual aid and co-operation is the condition of progress for all three. These truths, which Germany has endeavoured to ignore, become daily more evident to all.”

After referring to the various causes which tend to bind the two nations closely together, the origins and manifestations of this union and the hopes entertained by the people of Italy that the bonds might be drawn yet closer still, I went on to recall

the words employed by Cavour when, in February, 1855, he was addressing the sub-Alpine Parliament. They are strangely applicable to the situation to-day.

“As for the disasters of the British Army,” he said, “I do not think that these can be regarded as a reason for doubting the ultimate issue of the undertaking, for doubting that England can and will exert herself to an extent equal or greater than her Allies. In all the wars that England has entered upon she has failed of success at first; she has always begun them with means inferior to her real resources. But disasters and defeats, far from destroying her confidence, have never failed to urge her forward to new efforts, to fresh sacrifices; and whilst her adversaries, after a few successes, feel their courage wane and their strength diminish, England gains in vigour and in means of attack the longer the war lasts. Thus it was, gentlemen, in the great war of the French Revolution, in the years 1792 and 1793. The English had met with nothing but reverses. Their forces were insignificant compared with those of their Allies; but their Allies grew weary; they, on the contrary, grew stronger as they fought on and in 1814, if I mistake not, they came to have 400,000 men in their pay.

“The same thing has often come to pass in India. Almost every enterprise the English embarked upon there began badly. Never until after a good solid defeat, a serious disaster, did the East India Company put adequate means into operation to

achieve success. You all recollect the Kabul Expedition of 1839, when an entire British Army Corps was wiped out. Out of fourteen or fifteen thousand men, only a few officers, I fancy, escaped with their lives. After this unparalleled catastrophe, many people thought they saw ruin overtaking British rule in India and considered its last hour had struck. This prophecy was not fulfilled. Next year the British came back to Kabul with a force twice as big, and succeeded. What was the cause in the last century in the War of the Revolution, what happened in our own time, in Kabul, will, I am confident, be repeated in the Crimea. We shall find our Allies in the field of battle stronger and more mighty than ever before.

"In all circumstances, whether as minister, deputy, or journalist, I have always shown myself a partisan of the alliance with England and above all an ardent partisan of English ideas. . . .

"And to-day," he went on, "shall we not be permitted to counsel you to contract an alliance with these two nations? We should have been in a sorry plight if untoward circumstances had placed them in opposing camps. But since for the first time there has come to pass before our eyes a fact that overshadows the whole of modern history, the alliance between France and England, our decision cannot remain in doubt."

England and France. The Entente Cordiale

Relations between the two great countries have not always been what they are to-day. Loyal

to her policy of maintaining the balance of power, England found herself in opposition to France under Louis XIV and Napoleon as she had previously been opposed to Spain. But these struggles left behind them no seeds of inextinguishable hatred, and after the conflicts the two adversaries did not fail to recognise each other's chivalry and valour.

The same traditional policy was bound to bring England and France together when, at the dawn of the twentieth century, Germany made disquieting additions to her military strength. But it was not the affair of a day. I have already remarked on the slowness which marks the evolution of public opinion in England, the persistent illusions entertained for so long regarding Germany's pacific intentions. It was not until after Queen Victoria's death that it was found possible to inaugurate an Anglo-French policy. This was the work of King Edward VII and Monsieur Delcassé (1904). As it was not deemed expedient to call it an alliance, it was happily termed the "Entente Cordiale."

This union of forces—England, France, and Russia—formed a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria, and Italy—and realised the balance of power, the equilibrium in Europe which was ever the principal concern of English statesmen.

This equilibrium of forces was a guarantee of

freedom and peace for Europe and the world. Germany saw, or pretended to see, in the Triple Entente, a menace to her own security. In point of fact there was no menace to anything save her pretensions to hegemony. No one dreamt of attacking her or bringing her into subjection, but everyone was alive to the necessity of taking precautionary measures against Germany's efforts in the same direction. Called into being purely and simply for defensive purposes, the aim of the Triple Entente was to preserve the peace. Had there been any other object in view England would never have become a party to it. The facts of which we made mention in our first chapter are sufficient to place that beyond all doubt.

Underlying Causes of the Anglo-French Alliance

England and France, however, are bound together by more than a mere diplomatic agreement proceeding from an identity of interests. Their alliance proceeds from deeper and more enduring causes. Both possess a ripe civilisation identical in nature one with the other, a common treasure-house of social ideals, an equal need of freedom and justice.

Monsieur Cestre, a professor at Bordeaux University, has just devoted a whole volume to demonstrating this truth. *England and the War* should be read through from cover to cover. It

contains a collection of "documented" essays thoroughly well thought out, which show, far more eloquently than mere official compliments, the basic necessity for the Anglo-French Entente and the capital importance of the part played by it in the evolution of civilisation as we understand it.

Let me be permitted to quote the views of the French writer, whose words derive the greater significance from the fact that he is a Frenchman.

"If I have succeeded in the design which prompted me to pen this essay, I shall have made it clear that from the very beginning of their history the English as a nation have possessed a certain moral independence which renders the autocratic rule, the administrative tyranny, and the mechanical discipline of the Germans utterly abhorrent to them. Theirs has been the exalted idealism which causes them to place Liberty in the forefront of all the benefits that life has to bestow; the sense of loyalty and the sense of justice which causes them to desire the independence and well-being of nations who are worthy, by their virtues, of contributing to the progress of civilisation, and, by their valour, to the establishment of the balance of power to Europe. To defend, whether on British soil or on the soil of countries menaced by the tide of German barbarism, those things of worth that men have striven for and won, they rose up, deaf to the hucksterers who would have purchased their neutrality, and they will strive, heedless of sacri-

fices, until they have achieved the arduous but splendid aim which reason and conscience have pointed out to them for accomplishment.

“As individuals they are endowed by tradition, by education, by race, and by the moderate nature of their social and political institutions, with that energy, self-reliance, and self-control which they sum up in that single pregnant word of theirs—*character*. With their men—soldiers, officers, workers, leaders of the nation—and with their women—mothers, wives, nurses, recruiters for the army or organisers of charity—there will be no weariness, no faint-heartedness. England is putting forth a mighty effort, and undertakes every day a burden of vast enterprises and vast expenditure in order to afford us, in addition to the naval assistance on which we counted, military aid for which we did not look and which will prove decisive.

“The friendship between England and France is indissoluble because it is based on esteem, respect, intellectual and moral sympathy, and enthusiasm for a common ideal. This reconciliation between two great nations, brought about by the forgetting of bygone enmities and by the mutual recognition of noble civilising qualities, is one of those events fraught with promise, that gild the pathways of the future. The alliance will endure by reason of the reciprocal moderation of the two nations, their loyalty, their reverence for the Right and their love of Peace.

“There exists a splendid symbol of the union of France and England and that is the spectacle of those 20,000 French Canadians, loyal subjects of England,

and faithful children of France, brothers of ours by race and language, brothers of their English fellow-countrymen by their love of English freedom, who have come of their own free will to take their place in the ranks of the Allies for the defence of the British Empire and the deliverance of the soil of France. The generosity of their twofold loyalty, their devotion, even to death, for both of their fatherlands, are tokens of that sympathy and faithful friendship which will reign throughout the years to come in French and English hearts, and which no storms of discord will ever avail to uproot.

“May that symbol live long in our recollection as a token of that alliance which is not merely a brotherhood of arms, but a union of hearts.”

Marks of Sympathy

Among the many evidences so numerous that it is out of the question to think of enumerating them all, of the popularity of the Entente Cordiale, we may mention the hospitals and ambulances that were inaugurated by English people in France. Such deeds are characteristic of the British temperament, which is deeply imbued with sentiments of humanity and with the duty of relieving pain. An Englishman is particularly sensible to the misfortunes of others, and his generosity knows no limits when it is a question of bringing succour to the victims of a calamity. The care of the sick and wounded he looks upon as an imperative

obligation. He has brought the art to an extreme pitch of perfection. He has sent doctors, nurses, hospital appliances, and ambulances innumerable to Serbia and Italy. He has done as much and more for France.

A French Relief Fund was inaugurated in London which sent large sums of money to France, notably—touching thought—for suffering artists. England has had her “France’s Day” when everyone wore the tricolour and gave their money in aid of the funds for the relief of suffering in France.

Madame Daniel Lesueur concludes an article on “British Aid for French Sufferers During the War,” as follows :

“None of these noble deeds found a place in the treaties of alliance. The armies of two countries may figure side by side for the same cause without there being any union, behind the lines, of thought, sorrow, and compassion between the two races. But in their frightful struggle this sublime thing has come to pass, as a recompense and a consolation. The heart of England has gone out to us without reserve. To give her gold for our people was not enough. She longed to bend over them, to stanch their wounds, to gather them in her arms. Her most eminent doctors, her most skilful nurses have begged for the honour and happiness of being allowed to come and lavish their care and attentions on our wounded. Many are her sons who with their own hands are building dwelling-places for our suffering martyrs from the Marne.”

With this noble people at our side we can feel confidence in the future of mankind. For them, as for us, fraternity is not a vain word. If ever the "Entente Cordiale" embraces the whole of a Europe regenerated, England and France may rejoice that they were the first to endow this happy formula with its deepest and most generous interpretation.

On the 4th August, 1915, the anniversary of the Franco-British Alliance in the war, there was founded in Paris with the support of several persons of eminence the Entente Cordiale Committee.

Monsieur Boutroux of the Académie Française kindly consented to be president. Forthwith the Committee was joined by MM. Appell, Dean of the Faculty of Science ; Louis Barthou, deputy ; Pierre Baudin, senator ; General Bonnal ; MM. Bounat, director of the École des Beaux-Arts ; Leon Bourgeois, senator ; Romain Coolus, president of the Society of Dramatic Authors ; Alfred Croiset, Dean of the Faculty of Letters ; Darboux, permanent Secretary of the Académie des Sciences ; Delbos, of the Academy of Moral Science ; Deschanel, of the Académie Française, president of the Chamber of Deputies ; d'Eschlhall, director of the School of Political Science ; de Freycinet, of the Académie Française, senator ; Comte d'Haussonville, of the Académie Française ; Lacroix, permanent Secretary

of the Académie des Sciences ; André Lebey, deputy ; Georges Lecomte, president of the Society of Men of Letters ; Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, of the Academy of Moral Science ; Madame Daniel Lesueur ; MM. Raphael Georges Levy, of the Academy of Moral Science ; Georges Leygues, deputy ; Lindet, president of the Society for the Encouragement of Industry ; Robert Linzele ; Antonin Mercié, president of the Society of French Artists ; Madame David Nutt, publisher, of London ; Edmond Perrier, Director of the Museum, member of the Academy of Science and the Academy of Medicine ; Stephen Pichon, senator ; Em. Rodocanachi ; Roll, president of the National Fine-Arts Society ; de Rousiers, secretary general of the Central Committee of French shipowners ; Madame Jules Siegfried, etc.

We judge that this Committee is carrying on in France a work similar to that of the Anglo-Italian League of which I made mention in *Ciò che hanno fatto gli Inglesi*, and the efforts of each will necessarily proceed along the same lines.

Moreover, the more the members of the two governments and the military leaders of the two nations, recognising the advantages of frequent meetings and conversations as the sole means of bringing about unity of action and control, met together in France and England, the members of

the two parliaments also began to draw near to one another and to seek to improve one another's acquaintance. The Socialist members were the first to take this course (conference held in London in February, 1915), but since on both sides of the Channel the fight for freedom was tending to destroy the old party barrier, it was thought right to get all the Parliamentary representatives to follow the example set by the Socialists. Monsieur Marcel Cachin showed the manifold advantages calculated to accrue from more frequent contact. A meeting was announced to take place in March, 1916, in Paris, between the French Deputies and the English members of Parliament.

Finally, the Franco-Italian Congress which was held at Cernobbio in September, 1915, decided to invite to its forthcoming meeting men of prominence in England and Belgium. Thus the nations engaged in the struggle against German Imperialism are arriving at a better understanding, a more thorough knowledge of one another, and thus the united will of all of them is strengthened and made more than ever determined to carry on the struggle to a triumphant issue; thus too are being laid for the morrow the foundations of concord and union which will outlive the war and bring compensation for its horrors.

To the Bitter End

If, amid all the uncertainties of the hour, there is one thing that may be predicted with confidence, it is that England will go on to the very end. Victory will be hers sooner or later, and reverses, if reverses there are to be, will not impair her calmness and her resolution. *Chi va piano va sano, chi va sano va lontano* is an Italian proverb. It is particularly applicable to England. She does not move quickly enough to suit our impatience ; we think her painfully slow to understand a situation and to make up her mind, but it is for these very reasons that she should inspire us with complete confidence. She has passed her word to History that she will triumph, and triumph she will. The transitory successes of her enemies do not disturb her. Listen to what Mr. Lloyd George said when the Russians were being compelled to fall back.

“I have no doubt that, however long victory may tarry, it will ultimately come. We may have to wait for the dawn. The Eastern sky is dark and lowering ; the stars have been clouded over. I regard that stormy horizon with anxiety, but with no dread. To-day I can see the colour of a new hope beginning to empurple the sky. The enemy in their victorious march know not what they are doing. Let them beware, for they are unshackling Russia. With their monster

artillery they are shattering the rusty bars that fettered the strength of the people of Russia. You can see them shaking their powerful limbs free from the stifling debris, and preparing for the conflict with a new spirit. I repeat, the enemy know not what they are achieving for their apparent victims. Austria and Prussia are doing for Russia to-day what their military ancestors effected just as unwittingly for France. They are hammering the sword that will destroy them, and are freeing a great nation to wield it with a more potent stroke and a mightier sweep than it ever yet commanded.

“For us, we must fight on or forever sink into impotent obscurity. Britain has another task. It is becoming clearer and our own share of it becoming greater as the months roll past. It is to see that the suffering and the loss shall not be in vain. The fields of Europe are being rent by the ploughshares of war. The verdure of the old civilisation is vanishing in the desolating upheaval of the conflict. Let us see to it that wheat and not tares are sown in the bleeding soil, and ‘in due season we shall reap if we faint not.’”

This is no isolated instance. All the leading men continually express themselves to the same effect, and the very humblest of the population give utterance to the same stern resolution with a calmness that leaves no room for hesitation.

On the Nelson Column in Trafalgar Square the royal declaration stood posted up for months in

large letters. "We have taken up arms in a just cause and we will not lay them down until our end is attained."

After a year of war, Mr. Balfour ends an address to the people of London by proposing the following resolution :

"That on this anniversary of the declaration of the righteous war this meeting of the people of London records its inflexible determination to continue to a victorious end the struggle in the maintenance of those ideals of liberty and justice which are the common and the sacred cause of all the Allies."

Finally, let us mark the terms of the telegrams that passed between the Kings of England and Belgium.

*To His Majesty the King of the Belgians, Chief
Headquarters*

"On the occasion of the anniversary of the day when my country was forced to take up arms against the Power which preferred war to conference, and which violated in the most flagrant fashion treaties which it had signed, I desire to express to you my firm conviction that our united efforts will lead to success, and to assure you of my unfailing co-operation and of my determination, as well as that of my country, to continue the war with our valiant Armies until it ends to our satisfaction, and until peace can be guaranteed."

King Albert replied as follows :

To His Majesty the King of England, London

“ I express to you my lively gratitude for the telegram you have sent me and my unshakable conviction that the efforts of the Allied Armies will tend to a peace founded on triumph and justice.

“ Having already sacrificed herself in order to safeguard her honour and to remain faithful to the treaties which solemnly guaranteed her independent existence and the balance of power in Europe, Belgium will continue to discharge her duty till the end despite the sufferings and sorrows that have been heaped upon her. This fresh token of your sympathy has deeply touched me and I assure you from my heart of my devoted attachment.

“ ALBERT.”

When rumours of peace, spread abroad by German agents, found their way into the international Press in September, 1915, it occurred to a British journalist to question the members of the Government regarding their attitude to the matter. Their replies were clear and outspoken. Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, delivered himself as follows :—

“ We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn, until Belgium recovers in full measure all, and more than all she has sacrificed ; until France is adequately secured against the

menace of aggression ; until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation ; and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed."

Sir Edward Carson replied that no one in England entertained the idea that he would be called upon to make useless sacrifices, but that, on the contrary, everyone would recognise the danger of the situation and the menace represented by Germany to the ideas of liberty.

The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Robert Cecil, speaking in the House of Commons on the 15th September, 1916, proclaimed the British Government's resolution to remain loyal to the London covenant whereby they pledged themselves not to make a separate peace.

" I wish to make it quite clear, so as to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding in any part of this country, or in foreign countries, that no consideration will be given to any suggestion of peace, except in common with our Allies, and in conformity with our treaty obligations to them."

In December, 1915, Mr. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, answering a question that had been put to him by a number of members regarding the measures to be taken to facilitate the expansion of British trade when peace was

declared, once more reiterated the same declaration :

“ I should be glad to see an early peace, but, like the rest of my colleagues, I will be no party to a peace that would in any way conflict with the interest of the Allies ; they stand together ; they will not make peace separately, and there will be no hint of hankering after peace before the main end has been attained. Any investigations conducted by us for the return of peace are not made with the idea of abandoning the harmony which now exists between the Allies, or of in any way hastening the return of peace at the cost of the main object at which we are aiming.”

Mr. Lloyd George, who in February, 1916, was interviewed by Signor Mario Borso for the *Secolo* of Milan, spoke as follows :

“ This is a war of Democracy. If it were not a war of Democracy I would not be in it. I was against the last war in which Great Britain was engaged, but on this occasion the whole future of Democracy—in Britain, France, Russia, Italy, all over the world—is involved. It is a final test between military autocracy and political liberty.

“ It is a grim struggle, but we are going to win ; of that I am quite confident. The enemy has gone beyond the height of his power, and is on the down grade. We and our Allies are gaining strength every day. The Central Empires have lost their opportunity of victory, and they know it.

“ Our whole country is united on the war. If there were an election now there would not be one member returned who is against the war. I do not foresee any difficulty with regard to compulsion.”

And again :

“ Make no mistake about it. Great Britain is determined to fight this war to a finish. We may make mistakes, but we do not give in. It was the obstinacy of Britain that wore down Napoleon after twenty years of warfare. Allies broke away one by one, but Britain kept on. Our Allies on this occasion are just as solid and determined as we are.”

Thus we have a whole series of official declarations, repeated again and again for more than a year, which leave no doubt whatever that England is thoroughly prepared to go through with this terrific struggle to the very end in concert with her Allies, and particularly with France.


And to anyone who should again attempt in defiance of the facts to cast suspicion on Britain's loyalty, to the systematic slanderer who should tell us that ministers come and go, and that words fly away on the breeze, we would make answer that the people themselves remain and that what we have recorded of the British people in the foregoing pages commands admiration, respect, and confidence.



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